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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Keyword
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- Beliefs (2)
- Experiment (2)
- Framing effects (2)
- Identity (2)
- Institutions (2)
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- Religion (2)
- Self-interest (2)
- Social preferences (2)
- Trust (2)
- Trustworthiness (2)
- And behavioral insights (1)
- Bayes-Nash equilibrium (1)
- Cheap talk (1)
- Cognitive reflection (1)
- Colonel Blotto games (1)
- Common-pool resource management (1)
- Conflict (1)
- Conflict of Interest (1)
- Conflict resolution (1)
- Contagion (1)
- Contest (1)
- Cooperation (1)
- Cost externality (1)
- Credence Goods (1)
- Cross-culture (1)
- Cultural transmission (1)
- Decentralized markets (1)
- Dictator games (1)
- Disclosure (1)
- Dual process (1)
Articles 1 - 25 of 25
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
A Reassessment Of The Potential For Loss-Framed Incentive Contracts To Increase Productivity: A Meta-Analysis And A Real-Effort Experiment, Paul J. Ferraro, J. Dustin Tracy
A Reassessment Of The Potential For Loss-Framed Incentive Contracts To Increase Productivity: A Meta-Analysis And A Real-Effort Experiment, Paul J. Ferraro, J. Dustin Tracy
ESI Working Papers
Substantial productivity increases have been reported when incentives are framed as losses rather than gains. Loss-framed contracts have also been reported to be preferred by workers. The results from our meta-analysis and real-effort experiment challenge these claims. The meta-analysis' summary effect size of loss framing is a 0.16 SD increase in productivity. Whereas the summary effect size in laboratory experiments is a 0.33 SD, the summary effect size from field experiments is 0.02 SD. We detect evidence of publication biases among laboratory experiments. In a new laboratory experiment that addresses prior design weaknesses, we estimate an effect size of 0.12 …
Beware The Gini Index! A New Inequality Measure, Sabiou M. Inoua
Beware The Gini Index! A New Inequality Measure, Sabiou M. Inoua
ESI Working Papers
The Gini index underestimates inequality for heavy-tailed distributions: for example, a Pareto distribution with exponent 1.5 (which has infinite variance) has the same Gini index as any exponential distribution (a mere 0.5). This is because the Gini index is relatively robust to extreme observations; while a statistic’s robustness to extremes is desirable for data potentially distorted by outliers, it is misleading for heavy-tailed distributions, which inherently exhibit extremes. We propose an alternative inequality index: the variance normalized by the second moment. This ratio is more stable (hence more reliable) for large samples from an infinite-variance distribution than the Gini index …
Dynamic Resource Allocation With Cost Externality, Hao Zhao, David Porter
Dynamic Resource Allocation With Cost Externality, Hao Zhao, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
The inter-temporal resource allocation efficiency of a property rights-based common-pool resource system is challenged by a cost externality when one user’s extraction raises the extraction cost for others. This paper builds a dynamic resource allocation model to illustrate the efficiency loss from a standard property rights market. We then create a novel inter-temporal allocation mechanism that preserves dynamic efficiency. Our dynamic resource allocation mechanism includes an optimal planning stage where the agents collectively determine a binding extraction target for each period and a market stage where agents can exchange their extraction rights assigned within each period. The theoretical model demonstrates …
Conflict In The Pool: A Field Experiment, Loukas Balafoutas, Marco Faravelli, Roman Sheremeta
Conflict In The Pool: A Field Experiment, Loukas Balafoutas, Marco Faravelli, Roman Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
We conduct a field experiment on conflict in swimming pools. When all lanes are occupied, an actor joins the least crowded lane and asks one of the swimmers to move to another lane. The lane represents a contested scarce resource. We vary the actor’s valuation (high and low) for the good through the message they deliver. Also, we take advantage of the natural variation in the number of swimmers to proxy for their valuation. Consistent with theoretical predictions, a swimmer’s propensity to engage in conflict increases in scarcity (incentive effect) and decreases in the actor’s valuation (discouragement effect). We complement …
Uncertainty And Reputation Effects In Credence Goods Markets, Eric Schniter, J. Dustin Tracy, Vojtěch Zíka
Uncertainty And Reputation Effects In Credence Goods Markets, Eric Schniter, J. Dustin Tracy, Vojtěch Zíka
ESI Working Papers
Credence-goods experiments have focused on stylized settings in which experts can perfectly identify the buyer’s best option and that option works without fail. However, in nature, credence goods involve uncertainties that complicate assessing the quality of service and advice. We introduce two sources of uncertainty. The first is diagnostic uncertainty; experts receive a noisy signal of buyer type so might make an ‘honest’ mistake when advising what is in buyers’ best interests. The second is service uncertainty; the services available to the buyers do not always work. Both sources of uncertainty make detection of expert dishonesty more difficult, so are …
Keeping A Clean Reputation: More Evidence On The Perverse Effects Of Disclosure, Cary Deck, J. Dustin Tracy
Keeping A Clean Reputation: More Evidence On The Perverse Effects Of Disclosure, Cary Deck, J. Dustin Tracy
ESI Working Papers
When a principal relies on an agent, a conflict of interest can encourage the agent to provide biased advice. Conventional wisdom suggests that such behavior can be reduced through disclosure requirements. However, disclosure has been shown to exacerbate self-serving bias and can actually lead to greater harm for the principal in one-shot interactions. But in many naturally occurring settings, agents form reputations, a mechanism that could diminish the incentive to provide biased advice. We test for bias in the advice agents provide when faced with reputation concerns, and examine the impact of disclosure in such an environment. In controlled laboratory …
The Economic Impact Of Lockdowns: A Theoretical Assessment, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
The Economic Impact Of Lockdowns: A Theoretical Assessment, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
ESI Working Papers
The sudden appearance of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered extreme and open-ended “lockdowns” to manage the disease. Should these drastic interventions be the blueprint for future epidemics? We construct an analytical framework, based on the theory of random matching, which makes explicit how epidemics spread through economic activity. Imposing lockdowns by assumption prevents contagion and reduces healthcare costs, but also disrupts income-generation processes. We characterize how lockdowns impact the contagion process and social welfare. Numerical analysis suggests that protracted, open-ended lockdowns are generally suboptimal, bringing into question the policy responses seen in many countries.
Making It Public: The Effect Of (Private And Public) Wage Proposals On Efficiency And Income Distribution, Lara Ezquerra, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Natalia Jiminez, Praveen Kujal
Making It Public: The Effect Of (Private And Public) Wage Proposals On Efficiency And Income Distribution, Lara Ezquerra, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Natalia Jiminez, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
The implications of (public or private) pre-play communication and information revelation in a labour relationship is not well understood. We address these implications theoretically and experimentally. In our baseline experiments, the employer offers a wage to the worker who may then accept or reject it. In the public and private treatment, workers, moving first, make a non-binding private or public wage proposal. Our theoretical model assumes that wage proposals convey information about a worker’s minimum acceptable wage and are misreported with a certain probability. It predicts that, on average, wage proposals lead to higher wage offers and acceptance rates, with …
An Experimental Study Of Within- And Cross-Cultural Cooperation: Chinese And American Play In The Prisoner’S Dilemma Game, Michael Kuroda, Jieran Li, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, Bochen Zhu
An Experimental Study Of Within- And Cross-Cultural Cooperation: Chinese And American Play In The Prisoner’S Dilemma Game, Michael Kuroda, Jieran Li, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, Bochen Zhu
ESI Working Papers
We study whether cross- and within-culture groups have different cooperation rates in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In an experiment, university students in China and America engage in a single iteration of the game, complete belief elicitation tasks regarding their opponents’ play and take a survey including attitudinal measurements regarding their in- and out-group attitudes. Cooperation rates are higher across the two countries are higher in both cross-culture and in within-culture interactions, although not significantly. We also find that Chinese participants cooperate less than American ones. Further, female Chinese participants are more cooperative than Chinese male ones. In the cross-culture treatment, …
Economics Of Majoritarian Identity Politics, Rohit Ticku, Raghul S. Venkatesh
Economics Of Majoritarian Identity Politics, Rohit Ticku, Raghul S. Venkatesh
ESI Working Papers
Majoritarian identity politics has become salient in representative democracies. Why do parties engage in identity politics and what are its consequences? We present a model of electoral competition in which parties capture voter groups based on their identity, and compete over an economic policy platform for the support of non-partisan voters. In addition, the party that caters to majoritarian interests makes a costly investment in polarizing identity. The investment provides subsequent payoffs to voters who have a preference for identity. When voter preferences over policy platforms are idiosyncratic in nature, greater investment in polarizing identity (i) increases both parties’ rents …
Group-Identity And Long-Run Cooperation: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Lukas Hohl
Group-Identity And Long-Run Cooperation: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Lukas Hohl
ESI Working Papers
We stress-test the limits of the power of group identity in the context of cooperation by constructing laboratory economies where participants confront an indefinitely repeated social dilemma as strangers. Group identity is artificially induced by random assignment to color-coded groups, and reinforced by an initial cooperation task played in-group and in fixed pairs. Subsequently subjects interact in-group and out-group in large economies, as strangers. Indefinite repetition guarantees full cooperation is an equilibrium. Decision-makers can discriminate based on group affiliation, but cannot observe past behaviors. We find no evidence of group biases. This suggests that group effects are less likely to …
Classical Theory Of Competitive Market Price Formation, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon L. Smith
Classical Theory Of Competitive Market Price Formation, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon L. Smith
ESI Working Papers
We offer an information theory of market price formation, formalizing and elaborating on an old, implicit, classical tradition of supply and demand based on buyers’ and sellers’ mone-tary valuations of commodities (formally their reservation prices) and competition as a multilat-eral higgling and bargaining process. The early laboratory market experiments, as it turns out with hindsight, established the remarkable stability, efficiency, and robustness of the old view of competitive price discovery, and not the neoclassical price theory (based on individual utility and profit maximization for given prices). Herein, we present a partial-equilibrium version of the the-ory in which wealth is implicitly …
Trustors’ Disregard For Trustees Deciding Intuitively Or Reflectively: Three Experiments On Time Constraints, Antonio Cabrales, Antonio M. Espín, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti
Trustors’ Disregard For Trustees Deciding Intuitively Or Reflectively: Three Experiments On Time Constraints, Antonio Cabrales, Antonio M. Espín, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti
ESI Working Papers
Human decisions in the social domain are modulated by the interaction between intuitive and reflective processes. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly triggers these processes and is thus likely to elicit different social behaviors. Meanwhile, time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important. In three Trust …
Standard Vs Random Dictator Games: On The Effects Of Role Uncertainty And Framing On Generosity, Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Amparo Urbano
Standard Vs Random Dictator Games: On The Effects Of Role Uncertainty And Framing On Generosity, Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Amparo Urbano
ESI Working Papers
We show that generosity is affected when we vary the level of role uncertainty, i.e., the probability that the dictator’s decision will be implemented. We also show that framing matters for generosity in that subjects are less generous when they are told that their choices will be implemented with a certain probability, compared with a setting in which they are told that their choices will not be implemented with certain probability.
Legalized Same-Sex Marriage And Coming Out In America: Evidence From Catholic Seminaries, Avner Seror, Rohit Ticku
Legalized Same-Sex Marriage And Coming Out In America: Evidence From Catholic Seminaries, Avner Seror, Rohit Ticku
ESI Working Papers
We study the effect of legalization of same-sex marriage on coming out in the United States. We overcome data limitations by inferring coming out decisions through a revealed preference mechanism. We exploit data on enrollment in seminary studies for the Catholic priesthood, hypothesizing that Catholic priests' vow of celibacy may lead gay men to self-select as a way to avoid a heterosexual lifestyle. Using a differences-in-differences design that exploits variation in the timing of legalization across states, we find that city-level enrollment in priestly studies fell by about 15% exclusively in states adopting the reform. The celibacy norm appears to …
The Influence Of Food Recommendations: Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment, Kamal Bookwala, Caleb Gallemore, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
The Influence Of Food Recommendations: Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment, Kamal Bookwala, Caleb Gallemore, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
ESI Working Papers
We report results from a randomized field experiment conducted at two food festivals. Our primary aim is to assess the impact of two types of recommendations commonly observed in food settings: most popular and chef’s choice. Subjects select a cupcake from a binary menu. The two options, offered by the same bakery, are the best seller in the bakery and the baker’s recommended cupcake. Our treatments manipulate whether the recommendation is disclosed in tandem with the cupcakes in the menu. We find that the most popular is the only recommendation that statistically significantly increased consumers’ demand relative to …
A Class Of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information, Christian Ewerhart, Dan Kovenock
A Class Of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information, Christian Ewerhart, Dan Kovenock
ESI Working Papers
In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M ≤ N, full-support type distributions, and network games.
Institutions And Opportunistic Behavior: Experimental Evidence, Antonio Cabrales, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
Institutions And Opportunistic Behavior: Experimental Evidence, Antonio Cabrales, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
Risk mitigating institutions have long been used by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. We know little about how they are demanded, who demands them or how they impact subsequent behavior. To study these questions, we run a large-scale online experiment where insurance can be purchased to safeguard against opportunistic behavior. We compare two different selection mechanisms for risk mitigation, the individual and the collective (voting). We find that, whether individual or collective, there is demand for riskmitigating institutions amongst high-opportunism individuals, while low-opportunism individuals demand lesser levels of insurance. However, high-opportunism individuals strategically demand lower insurance institutions when they …
Economics Students: Self-Selected In Preferences And Indoctrinated In Beliefs, Antonio M. Espín, Manuel Correa, Alberto Ruiz-Villaverde
Economics Students: Self-Selected In Preferences And Indoctrinated In Beliefs, Antonio M. Espín, Manuel Correa, Alberto Ruiz-Villaverde
ESI Working Papers
There is much debate as to why economics students display more self-interested behavior than other students: whether homo economicus self-select into economics or students are instead “indoctrinated” by economics learning, and whether these effects impact on preferences or beliefs about others’ behavior. Using a classroom survey (n>500) with novel behavioral questions we show that, compared to students in other majors, econ students report being: (i) more self-interested (in particular, less compassionate or averse to advantageous inequality) already in the first year and the difference remains among more senior students; (ii) more likely to think that people will be unwilling …
In-Group Versus Out-Group Preferences In Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment, Subhashish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Roman M. Sheremeta
In-Group Versus Out-Group Preferences In Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment, Subhashish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
Individuals participating in a group conflict have different preferences, e.g., maximizing their own payoff, maximizing the group’s payoff, or defeating the rivals. When such preferences are present simultaneously, it is difficult to distinctly identify the impact of those preferences on conflict. In order to separate in-group and out-group preferences, we conduct an experiment in which human in-group or out-group players are removed while keeping the game strategically similar. Our design allows us to study (i) how effort in a group conflict vary due to in-group and out-group preferences, and (ii) how the impact of these preferences vary when the two …
Strategically Revealing Intentions In General Lotto Games, Keith Paarporn, Rahul Chandan, Dan Kovenock, Mahnoosh Alizadeh, Jason R. Marden
Strategically Revealing Intentions In General Lotto Games, Keith Paarporn, Rahul Chandan, Dan Kovenock, Mahnoosh Alizadeh, Jason R. Marden
ESI Working Papers
Strategic decision-making in uncertain and adversarial environments is crucial for the security of modern systems and infrastructures. A salient feature of many optimal decision-making policies is a level of unpredictability, or randomness, which helps to keep an adversary uncertain about the system’s behavior. This paper seeks to explore decision-making policies on the other end of the spectrum – namely, whether there are benefits in revealing one’s strategic intentions to an opponent before engaging in competition.We study these scenarios in a well-studied model of competitive resource allocation problem known as General Lotto games. In the classic formulation, two competing players simultaneously …
Culture, Institutions & The Long Divergence, Alberto Bisin, Jared Rubin, Avner Seror, Thierry Verdier
Culture, Institutions & The Long Divergence, Alberto Bisin, Jared Rubin, Avner Seror, Thierry Verdier
ESI Working Papers
During the medieval and early modern periods the Middle East lost its economic advantage relative to the West. Recent explanations of this historical phenomenon— called the Long Divergence—focus on these regions’ distinct political economy choices regarding religious legitimacy and limited governance. We study these features in a political economy model of the interactions between rulers, secular and clerical elites, and civil society. The model induces a joint evolution of culture and political institutions converging to one of two distinct stationary states: a religious and a secular regime. We then map qualitatively parameters and initial conditions characterizing the West and …
A Simple Measure Of Economic Complexity, Sabiou M. Inoua
A Simple Measure Of Economic Complexity, Sabiou M. Inoua
ESI Working Papers
Contrary to conventional economic growth theory, which reduces a country’s output to one aggregate variable (GDP), product diversity is central to economic development, as recent, “economic complexity”, research suggests. A country’s product diversity reflects its diversity of knowhow or “capabilities”. Researchers proposed the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and the country Fitness index to estimate a country’s number of capabilities from international export data; these measures predict economic growth better than conventional variables such as human capital. This paper offers a simpler measure of a country’s knowhow, Log Product Diversity (or LPD, the logarithm of a country’s number of products), which …
Differences In Cognitive Reflection Mediate Gender Differences In Social Preferences, Antonio M. Espín, Valerio Capraro, Brice Corgnet, Simon Gächter, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti
Differences In Cognitive Reflection Mediate Gender Differences In Social Preferences, Antonio M. Espín, Valerio Capraro, Brice Corgnet, Simon Gächter, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti
ESI Working Papers
Previous studies have shown that women tend to be more egalitarian and less self-interested than men whereas men tend to be more concerned with social efficiency motives. The roots of such differences, however, remain unknown. Since different cognitive styles have also been associated with different distributional social preferences, we hypothesise that gender differences in social preferences can be partially explained by differences in cognitive styles (i.e., women rely more on intuition whereas men are more reflective). We test this hypothesis meta-analytically using data from seven studies conducted in four countries (USA, Spain, India, and UK; n=6,910) where cognitive reflection and …
The Art Of Concession In General Lotto Games, Rahul Chandan, Keith Paarporn, Dan Kovenock, Mahnoosh Alizadeh, Jason R. Marden
The Art Of Concession In General Lotto Games, Rahul Chandan, Keith Paarporn, Dan Kovenock, Mahnoosh Alizadeh, Jason R. Marden
ESI Working Papers
Success in adversarial environments often requires investment into additional resources in order to improve one’s competitive position. But, can intentionally decreasing one’s own competitiveness ever provide strategic benefits in such settings? In this paper, we focus on characterizing the role of “concessions” as a component of strategic decision making. Specifically, we investigate whether a player can gain an advantage by either conceding budgetary resources or conceding valuable prizes to an opponent. While one might na¨ıvely assume that the player cannot, our work demonstrates that – perhaps surprisingly – concessions do offer strategic benefits when made correctly. In the context of …