Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

A Theory Of Political Entrenchment, Gilles Saint-Paul, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

We develop a theory of endogenous political entrenchment in a simple two-party dynamic model of income redistribution with probabilistic voting. A partially self-interested left-wing party may implement (entrenchment) policies reducing the income of its own constituency, the lower class, in order to consolidate its future political power. Such policies increase the net gain that low-skill agents obtain from income redistribution, which only the Left (but not the Right) can credibly commit to provide, and therefore may help offsetting a potential future aggregate ideological shock averse to the left-wing party. We demonstrate that political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if …

Religion And Innovation, Roland Bénabou, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

In earlier work (Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni 2013) we uncovered a robust negative association between religiosity and patents per capita, holding across countries as well as US states, with and without controls. In this paper we turn to the individual level, examining the relationship between religiosity and a broad set of pro- or anti-innovation attitudes in all five waves of the World Values Survey (1980 to 2005). We thus relate eleven indicators of individual openness to innovation, broadly defined (e.g., attitudes toward science and technology, new versus old ideas, change, risk taking, personal agency, imagination and independence in children) to …

Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy Of Science, Religion, And Growth, Roland Bénabou, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

We study the coevolution of religion, science and politics. We first uncover, in international and U.S. data, a robust negative relationship between religiosity and patents per capita. The model then combines: (i) scientific discoveries that raise productivity but sometimes erode religious beliefs; (ii) a government that allows innovations to diffuse, or blocks them; (iii) religious institutions that can invest in doctrinal reform. Three long-term outcomes emerge. The “Western-European Secularization” regime has declining religiosity, unimpeded science, and high taxes and transfers. The “Theocratic” regime involves knowledge stagnation, unquestioned dogma, and high religious-public-goods spending. The “American” regime combines scientific progress and stable …

A Theory Of Political Entrenchment, Gilles Saint-Paul, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Andrea Vindigni

We develop a theory of endogenous political entrenchment in a simple two-party dynamic model of income redistribution with probabilistic voting. A partially self-interested left-wing party may implement (entrenchment) policies reducing the income of its own constituency, the lower class, in order to consolidate its future political power. Such policies increase the net gain that low-skill agents obtain from income redistribution, which only the Left (but not the Right) can credibly commit to provide, and therefore may help offsetting a potential future aggregate ideological shock averse to the left-wing party. We demonstrate that political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if …

Democracy, Dictatorship And The Cultural Transmission Of Political Values, Davide Ticchi, Thierry Verdier, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

develop a theory of endogenous regimes transitions (with a focus on democratic consolidation), which emphasizes the role of political culture and of its interaction with political institutions. Political culture reflects the extent of individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of political socialization: the family and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their children. The state invests resources in public indoctrination infrastructures. The model …

Democracy, Dictatorship And The Cultural Transmission Of Political Values, Davide Ticchi, Thierry Verdier, Andrea Vindigni

Andrea Vindigni

We develop a theory of endogenous regimes transitions (with a focus on democratic consolidation), which emphasizes the role of political culture and of its interaction with political institutions. Political culture reflects the extent of individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of political socialization: the family and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their children. The state invests resources in public indoctrination infrastructures. The …

Emergence And Persistence Of Inefficient States, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

We present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics. The society consists of rich and poor individuals. The rich are initially in power, but expect to transition to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats. By choosing an inefficient state structure, the rich may use patronage and capture democratic politics, so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy. Moreover, the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time. Intuitively, an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one. When …

Persistence Of Civil Wars, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized …

Persistence Of Civil Wars, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Andrea Vindigni

A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized …

Endogenous Constitutions, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Andrea Vindigni

We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively …

Endogenous Constitutions, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively …

A Theory Of Military Dictatorships, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Andrea Vindigni

We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. The elite may build a strong military and make the concessions necessary for the military to behave as their perfect agent, or they may risk the military turning against them. Once transition to democracy takes place, a strong military poses a threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. We study the role of income inequality and natural resources in the emergence of military dictatorships and show how the national defense role of the military may facilitate democratic consolidation.

Emergence And Persistence Of Inefficient States, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Andrea Vindigni

We present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics. The society consists of rich and poor individuals. The rich are initially in power, but expect to transition to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats. By choosing an inefficient state structure, the rich may use patronage and capture democratic politics, so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy. Moreover, the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time. Intuitively, an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one. When …

A Theory Of Military Dictatorships, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

War And Endogenous Democracy, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

Many episodes of extension of franchise in the 19th and especially in the 20th century occurred during or in the aftermath of major wars. Motivated by this fact, we offer a theory of political transitions which focuses on the impact of international conflicts on domestic political institutions. We argue that mass-armies, which appeared in Europe after the French Revolution, are an effective military organization only if the conscripted citizens are willing to put effort in fighting wars, which in turn depends on the economic incentives that are provided to them. The need to provide such incentives implies that an oligarchy …

Road Pricing As A Citizen-Candidate Game, Edoardo Marcucci, Marco Marini, Davide Ticchi

Davide Ticchi

We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport …

Eliciting Compliance From Warlords: The Ecowas Experience In Liberia, 1990–1997, Emmanuel Aning

Emmanuel Kwesi Aning

This article examines the strategies initiated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to elicit compliance with its disarmament policies from belligerents in Liberia's 1989–96 civil conflict. I propose to tackle the task within a linked and holistic four‐fold approach. First, I situate ECOWAS's intervention in Liberia from 1990 to 1997 within the changing context of international perceptions of multilateral organisation involvement in civil wars. ECOWAS's intervention had different diplomatic phases. The first phase under the Standing Mediation Committee lasted from May 1990‐June 1991, The Committee of Five Process from June 1991‐August 1992, and the Committee of Nine …