Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- File Type
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
A Test For Efficiency In The Supply Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Judith Roberts, Daniel Rubinfeld, Perry Shapiro
A Test For Efficiency In The Supply Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Judith Roberts, Daniel Rubinfeld, Perry Shapiro
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper conducts an empirical test of whether local governments spend more or less than a Pareto optimal amount on local public goods. Our procedure is to check whether the Samuelson first order conditions ) for efficient provision of public goods are satisfied.
When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?, Ted Bergstrom
When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
H.R. Bowen showed that if voters have equal tax shares and if marginal rates of substitution are symmetrically distributed, then majority voting leads to efficient provision of public goods. These conditions are not likely to apply in a community with asymmetric income distribution. This paper defines a new idea for public goods allocation, a "pseudo-Lindahl equilibrium" which combines majority voting with tax rates that depend on income and other observable characteristices in such a way that the majority rule outcome is Pareto optimal for an interesting class of societies. The informational requirements for implementing pseudo-Lindahl are much less stringent than …
Interrelated Consumer Preference And Voluntary Exchange, Ted Bergstrom
Interrelated Consumer Preference And Voluntary Exchange, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper presents a model of interrelated preferences for pairs of individuals. It investigates the possibility of an equilibrium with voluntary transactions. It identifies the puzzling case of two people who disagree because each wants the other to have the better part and shows that if this is assumed away, then there exists a competitive equilibrium with voluntary bilateral gifts.