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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Successful Tax Reforms In The Recent International Experience: Lessons In Political Economy And The Nuts And Bolts Of Increasing Country Tax Revenue Effort, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Successful Tax Reforms In The Recent International Experience: Lessons In Political Economy And The Nuts And Bolts Of Increasing Country Tax Revenue Effort, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
ICEPP Working Papers
The main objective of this paper is to extract practical lessons on increasing tax revenue effort that are relevant to developing countries. Specifically, it focuses on insights from two dimensions: the political economy requirements to generate public support for reform and the technical factors (“nuts and bolts”) of substantially increasing tax revenue effort. General topics covered include the political economy preconditions that facilitate tax reform, how and by whom tax reform should be implemented, the timing of reform efforts, determinants of current tax effort, tax policy choice options, tax administration options, and the enhancement of tax morale and compliance norms. …
Evidence On Economies Of Scale In Local Public Service Provision: A Meta-Analysis, Juan Luis Gómez-Reino, Santiago Lago-Peñas, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Evidence On Economies Of Scale In Local Public Service Provision: A Meta-Analysis, Juan Luis Gómez-Reino, Santiago Lago-Peñas, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
ICEPP Working Papers
The standard theory of optimal jurisdictional size hinges on the existence of economies of scale in the provision of local public goods and services. However, despite its relevance for forced local amalgamation programs and related policies, the empirical evidence on the existence of such economies of scale remains elusive. The main goal of this paper is to produce an updated and comprehensive quantitative review of the existence of economies of scale in the provision of local public goods using a meta-analysis approach to systematize the wide range of empirical approaches and modeling frameworks found in the previous literature. Our analysis …
Fiscal Policies, Decentralization, And Life Satisfaction, Manuela Ortega Gil
Fiscal Policies, Decentralization, And Life Satisfaction, Manuela Ortega Gil
ICEPP Working Papers
This paper studies the relationship between wellbeing and governments’ fiscal policies across the world, including government decentralization, over the period between 1999 and 2018. In contrast to the previous literature on wellbeing, the current paper investigates four forms of life satisfaction (SL) as the dependent variable and tries to answer whether different types of public spending program, different types of taxes and the level of fiscal decentralization influence wellbeing as measured by life satisfaction. The analysis uses survey data from two sources of life satisfaction variables: The World Values Survey and the European Values Survey, both of which use a …
Do You Know To Whom You Pay Your Taxes?: The Case Of Decentralized Spain, Julio López-Laborda, Fernando Rodrigo, Eduardo Sanz-Arcega
Do You Know To Whom You Pay Your Taxes?: The Case Of Decentralized Spain, Julio López-Laborda, Fernando Rodrigo, Eduardo Sanz-Arcega
ICEPP Working Papers
A necessary condition for the efficiency gains that the theory of fiscal federalism attributes to decentralization to be effective is that citizens rightly assign the governmental responsibility for public action. However, surveys show that most Spaniards are unable to correctly identify the taxes received by the various levels of government. Exploiting the 2015 wave of the Spanish Institute for Fiscal Studies’ Fiscal Barometer, this paper empirically determines the profile of citizens who are best able to identify the allocation of taxes among levels of government in Spain. The estimates suggest that these citizens are those who are able to identify …
The Fiscal Architecture Of Subnational Governments In Federal Nepal, Khim Lal Devkota
The Fiscal Architecture Of Subnational Governments In Federal Nepal, Khim Lal Devkota
ICEPP Working Papers
The formation of the three tiers of government represents a novel experiment in Nepal’s federal journey since the adoption of the new constitution in 2015. State power in the former unitary system, both rights and responsibilities, has been divided across federal, provincial and local tiers of government, with a mix of exclusive and concurrent powers for each. In matters within their jurisdiction, subnational governments can formulate laws on financial rights, set their own budgets, make decisions, devise plans and policies, implement those plans, levy taxes, and collect revenues. In the roughly three years since devolution went into effect, a few …
The Effect Of Crises On Fiscal And Political Recentralization: Large-Panel Evidence, Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza, Pablo Evia Salas, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
The Effect Of Crises On Fiscal And Political Recentralization: Large-Panel Evidence, Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza, Pablo Evia Salas, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
ICEPP Working Papers
Economic stability plays a key role in any fiscal and political decentralization process. In the face of financial and economic shocks, when revenues and expenditures are reduced, countries may decide to gather resources at the central level—creating a recentralization scenario—or may take away devolved powers and centralize political institutions. Using data for 75 countries, we examine the effects of economic crisis on fiscal and political decentralization. We find that several types of crises lead to fiscal recentralization; only in the case of domestic borrowing crises is the effect further revenue decentralization, probably reflecting the central government’s willingness to empower subnational …
Welfare Benefits In Highly Decentralized Fiscalsystems: Evidence On Interregional Mimicking, Luis Ayala, Ana Herrero, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Welfare Benefits In Highly Decentralized Fiscalsystems: Evidence On Interregional Mimicking, Luis Ayala, Ana Herrero, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
ICEPP Working Papers
This paper analyzes the determinants of welfare benefit levels within a highly fiscally decentralized context. More specifically, we analyze the role of mimicking as a driver of the institutional design of subnational government policies in the absence of federal co-ordination and financing. Empirically, we focus on the welfare benefit programs of Spanish regional governments during the period 1996-2015. Our results strongly support the significant role played by mimicking: regional public agents observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly, and this holds even in a context of low mobility of households.
Electoral Accountability And Fiscal Federalism:The Case Of Peru, Janet Porras Mendoza, Charles R. Hankla, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Electoral Accountability And Fiscal Federalism:The Case Of Peru, Janet Porras Mendoza, Charles R. Hankla, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
ICEPP Working Papers
Accountability is at the heart of the democratic enterprise. One commonly touted benefit of decentralization is that it promotes this accountability by allowing sub-national governments to target fiscal policy more precisely to the varying preferences of people in different locales. But if accountability is really functioning as it should, then citizens should use the ballot box to reward and punish local officials for their concrete policy behavior. In other words, we should not only be able to link the presence of decentralization with improvements in local public goods, but we should also be able to connect voting behavior in specific …