Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Strategic Ignorance In Sequential Procurement, Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

Information, Competition, And The Quality Of Charities, Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

Drawing upon the all-pay auction literature, we propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can account for the significant quality heterogeneity across similar charities. Our analysis identifies a negative effect of competition and a positive effect of informed giving on the equilibrium quality of charity. In particular, we show that as the number of charities grows, so does the percentage of charity scams, approaching one in the limit. In light of this and other results, we discuss the need for regulating nonprofit entry and conduct as well as promoting informed giving.

"Giving" In To Social Pressure, Alvaro J. Name-Correa, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from adirect solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a socialnorm. Despite a higher level of the public good, relatively poor and/or low altruism giversfare worse under social pressure and would avoid the solicitor at a cost. Aggregate donorwelfare improves to the extent that the added social motive alleviates the underprovision ofthe public good; however, overprovision may result. Our theory therefore predicts a lighthandedregulation for charitable solicitations, which is consistent with their exemption fromthe popular Do Not Call list in the U.S. We further show …

A Theory Of Outsourced Fundraising: Why Dollars Turn Into "Pennies For Charity", Zdravko Paskalev, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

Charities frequently rely on professional solicitors whose commissions exceed half of total donations. To rationalize this practice, we propose a principal-agent model in which the charity optimally offers a higher commission to a more "efficient" solicitor, raising the price of giving significantly. Outsourcing is, therefore, profitable for the charity only if giving is very price-inelastic. This, however, clashes with empirical evidence. We show that paid solicitations can benefit the charity if: (1) donors are unaware; (2) donors have intense "warm-glow" preferences; or (3) the charity worries mostly about watchdog ratings. Unable to regulate fundraiser contracts due to freedom of speech, …

Andreoni‐Mcguire Algorithm And The Limits Of Warm‐Glow Giving, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

A Theory Of Charitable Fund-Raising With Costly Solicitations, Alvaro Name Correa, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

(Un)Informed Charitable Giving, Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

Evidence suggests little informed giving. To understand this behavior, we examine voluntary provision of a discrete public good with independent private values that can be ascertained at a cost. We find that an individual who considers a smaller contribution is less likely to learn her value, and thus the percentage of informed giving diminishes as the population grows. We also find that a direct grant to the charity exacerbates crowding-out by discouraging information acquisition whereas a matching grant increases donations by encouraging it. We further show that with costly information, a (first-order) stochastic increase in values can decrease donations; and …

Time-Consistent Majority Rules With Interdependent Valuations, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

This paper studies collective decision-making with interdependent valuations, where, unlike the extant literature, the committee cannot commit to a majority rule, necessitating it to be ex post optimal or “time-consistent”. We find that (1) a majority rule is time-consistent if and only if the expected number of affirmative votes it generates is approximately the rule itself; (2) the preference interdependence exacerbates the commitment problem by creating incentives for strategic (pivotal) voting and in turn expanding the set of time-consistent rules; in particular, any majority rule, including the unanimity, becomes time-consistent under pure common values; and (3) as the committee size …

On The Role Of Confidentiality And Deadlines In Bilateral Negotiations, Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Payoff Uncertainty, Bargaining Power, And The Strategic Sequencing Of Bilateral Negotiations, Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

This paper investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. We show that the buyer cares about the sequence only when equilibrium trade can be inefficient. In this case, the buyer begins with the weaker seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers. If, however, both sellers are strong bargainers, then the buyer begins with the stronger of the two. For either choice, the buyer’s sequencing is likely to increase the social surplus. We also show that the buyer may find it optimal to raise her own cost of …

Subjective Performance And The Value Of Blind Evaluation, Curtis R. Taylor, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Public Information And Electoral Bias, Curtis R. Taylor, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

A Unified Analysis Of Rational Voting With Private Values And Group-Specific Costs, Curtis R. Taylor, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Distribution Of Surplus In Sequential Bargaining With Endogenous Recognition, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Proposal Power And Majority Rule In Multilateral Bargaining With Costly Recognition, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Getting The Ball Rolling: Voluntary Contributions To A Large-Scale Public Project, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Contests With Multiple Rounds, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

On The Endogeneity Of Cournot-Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria: Games Of Accumulation, Richard Romano, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Managing Switching Costs In Multi-Period Procurements With Strategic Buyers, Tracy R. Lewis, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Piecewise Procurement Of A Large-Scale Project, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Learning By Doing And Dynamic Regulation, Tracy R. Lewis, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Managing Dynamic Competition, Tracy R. Lewis, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Why Charities Announce Donations: A Positive Perspective, Richard Romano, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.

Practices For Managing Information Flows Within Organizations, Joel Demski, Tracy R. Lewis, Dennis Yao, Huseyin Yildirim

Huseyin Yildirim

No abstract provided.