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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Economics

ESI Working Papers

Series

2021

Framing effects

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

A Reassessment Of The Potential For Loss-Framed Incentive Contracts To Increase Productivity: A Meta-Analysis And A Real-Effort Experiment, Paul J. Ferraro, J. Dustin Tracy Oct 2021

A Reassessment Of The Potential For Loss-Framed Incentive Contracts To Increase Productivity: A Meta-Analysis And A Real-Effort Experiment, Paul J. Ferraro, J. Dustin Tracy

ESI Working Papers

Substantial productivity increases have been reported when incentives are framed as losses rather than gains. Loss-framed contracts have also been reported to be preferred by workers. The results from our meta-analysis and real-effort experiment challenge these claims. The meta-analysis' summary effect size of loss framing is a 0.16 SD increase in productivity. Whereas the summary effect size in laboratory experiments is a 0.33 SD, the summary effect size from field experiments is 0.02 SD. We detect evidence of publication biases among laboratory experiments. In a new laboratory experiment that addresses prior design weaknesses, we estimate an effect size of 0.12 …


Standard Vs Random Dictator Games: On The Effects Of Role Uncertainty And Framing On Generosity, Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Amparo Urbano May 2021

Standard Vs Random Dictator Games: On The Effects Of Role Uncertainty And Framing On Generosity, Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Amparo Urbano

ESI Working Papers

We show that generosity is affected when we vary the level of role uncertainty, i.e., the probability that the dictator’s decision will be implemented. We also show that framing matters for generosity in that subjects are less generous when they are told that their choices will be implemented with a certain probability, compared with a setting in which they are told that their choices will not be implemented with certain probability.