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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Commitment Problems In Conflict Resolution, Erik O. Kimbrough, Jared Rubin, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
Commitment Problems In Conflict Resolution, Erik O. Kimbrough, Jared Rubin, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are mitigated to a greater extent for groups who opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed, commitment problems are greatly reduced amongst those groups who choose to opt-in.
When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents, Erik O. Kimbrough, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents, Erik O. Kimbrough, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by fair coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. The model predicts that “parity promotes peace”: in the pure-strategy equilibrium, agents with relatively symmetric conflict capabilities agree to resolve the conflict by using a random device; however, with sufficiently asymmetric capabilities, conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger agent …