Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Bundling In Advance Sales: Theory And Evidence From Round-Trip Versus Two One-Way Tickets*, Diego Escobari, Paan Jindapon, Nicholas G. Rupp

Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations

We theoretically derive an optimal price for a bundle of two goods that are sold in advance to risk-averse buyers. The theory predicts that a round-trip ticket is less expensive than two one-way tickets when demands for the outbound and the inbound are uncertain and positively correlated. Using a unique airlines dataset, we find evidence that is consistent with the theory; round-trip bundle discounts exist and they are larger for passengers who buy early in advance, stay on a Saturday night, and have higher valuations. We also find that the bundle discounts decrease with competition.

An Analysis Of Dynamic Price Discrimination In Airlines, Diego Escobari, Nicholas G. Rupp, Joseph Meskey

Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations

Prices for the same flight change substantially depending on the time of purchase. This article uses a unique data set with round‐the‐clock posted fares to document significant within‐day price variation. Labeling time‐variation as discriminatory is difficult because the cost of an unsold airline seat changes with inventory, days before departure, and aggregate demand expectations. After controlling for these factors and aggregating hourly fares to have a framework with two consumer types, we are able to identify a component that is largely consistent with dynamic price discrimination. We find higher prices during office hours (when business travelers are likely to buy) …

Price Discrimination And Focal Points For Tacit Collusion: Evidence From The Airline Industry, Diego Escobari, Nicholas G. Rupp, Joseph Meskey

Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations

We use unique data sets with round-the-clock posted fares and a regression discontinuity design to identify price discrimination in advance-purchase discounts. Price discrimination increases fares by 7.6% at 14 days to departure, and by 14% at 7 days to departure. While competition reduces price discrimination, it is unaffected by product variety for a multiproduct monopolist. The results show that the arbitrary thresholds of 7 and 14 days-in-advance serve as focal points for tacit collusion and to implement price discrimination in competitive markets. For round-trip tickets price discrimination depends on the days-in-advance for both the outbound and inbound flights.

Estimation Of Cost Efficiency Without Cost Data, Levent Kutlu, Ran Wang

Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations

One of the advantages of conduct parameter games is that they enable estimation of market power without total cost data. In line with this, we develop a conduct parameter based model to estimate the firm specific “marginal cost efficiency” and conduct without using total cost data. The marginal cost efficiency is an alternative measure of efficiency that is based on deadweight loss. We illustrate our methodology by estimating firm-route-quarter specific conducts and marginal cost efficiencies of U.S. airlines for Chicago based routes without using route-level total cost data.

Estimating Dynamic Demand For Airlines, Diego Escobari

Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations

This paper uses an original panel dataset with posted prices and sales to estimate a dynamic demand. We find that consumers become more price sensitive as time to departure nears which is consistent with having lower valuations. This result provides empirical support to a key theoretical implication in Deneckere and Peck (2012)—high-valuation consumers purchase earlier. We also find that the number of active consumers increases closer to departure.

Highlights

• We use an original dataset with posted prices and sales to estimate a dynamic demand.

• The estimates are consistent with agents forming expectations.

• We find that high-valuation consumers …

Price Discrimination Through Refund Contracts In Airlines, Diego Escobari, Paan Jindapon

Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations

This paper shows how an airline monopoly uses refundable and non-refundable tickets to screen consumers who are uncertain about their travel. Our theoretical model predicts that the difference between these two fares diminishes as individual demand uncertainty is resolved. Using an original data set from U.S. airline markets, we find strong evidence supporting our model. Price discrimination opportunities through refund contracts decline as the departure date nears and individuals learn about their demand.

Highlights

• We show how an airline screens consumers who are uncertain about their travel.

• The theory explains how an airline sets refundable and non-refundable prices. …