Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Corporate Cash Holding, Agency Problems And Economic Policy Uncertainty, Siamak Javadi, Mohsen Mollagholamali, Ali Nejadmalayeri, Saud Al-Thaqeb
Corporate Cash Holding, Agency Problems And Economic Policy Uncertainty, Siamak Javadi, Mohsen Mollagholamali, Ali Nejadmalayeri, Saud Al-Thaqeb
Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations
Consistent with the agency view of cash holdings, we document a strong negative relationship between economic policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings for non-U.S. firms from 19 countries. Our results are robust to different measures of cash holdings and model specifications and survive after addressing endogeneity. We provide evidence that the decrease in cash holdings is moderated by shareholders' ability to force managers to disgorge cash that fits consistently within the agency framework. Overall, results suggest that lowering cash holdings help alleviate agency problems in the presence of policy uncertainty and underscore the significance of country attributes in corporate finance.
Cross-Listing Performance And Insider Ownership: The Experience Of U.S. Investors, Omar A. Esqueda, Dave Jackson
Cross-Listing Performance And Insider Ownership: The Experience Of U.S. Investors, Omar A. Esqueda, Dave Jackson
Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations
Insider-owned firms pursue U.S. cross-listings following periods of extraordinary performance. However, the long-run post-cross-listing abnormal returns become negative only for insider-controlled cross-listings. We find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) has mitigated the market-timing attempts as negative abnormal returns are limited to the pre-SOX period, supporting a cross-listing bonding benefit after U.S. securities regulation was enhanced. In addition, investors anticipate future operating performance as stock returns incorporate forthcoming operating outcomes one and two years ahead. Whereas capital-raising cross-listings show better operating performance than non-capital-raising, the returns of capital-raising firms are more sensitive to the potential agency problems created by insider-ownership.