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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Diseconomies Of Scale In Employment Contracts, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Todd Zenger Jun 1990

Diseconomies Of Scale In Employment Contracts, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Todd Zenger

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

We find that small teams can write more efficient incentive contracts than large teams when agents choose individual effort levels but the principal observes only the joint output. This result is helpful in understanding organizational diseconomies of scale and is consistent with both existing evidence and our own analysis of data from the Current Population Survey. Our modelling approach, similar to classical hypothesis testing, is of interest because we need not derive the optimal contract to show the advantage of small teams.


Hayek's Four Tendencies Toward Equilibrium, Mario J. Rizzo Jan 1990

Hayek's Four Tendencies Toward Equilibrium, Mario J. Rizzo

Mario Rizzo

F.A. Hayek uses the concepts of "equilibrium" and the "tendency toward equilibrium" in a number of senses that are subtly, but importantly, different from each other. This article elucidates those differences and puts them in the context of his theoretical work. As far as I know, this is still the only article that undertakes this analysis.


Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey Jan 1990

Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey

Peter Cramton

What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? For private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements that can be supported, recognizing incentive and participation constraints. If defection results in either Cournot or Bertrand competition, the incentive problem in large cartels is severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome. However, if the cartel agreement requires less than unanimous ratification by the member firms, then the incentive problem can be overcome in large cartels. With common cost uncertainty, perfect collusion is possible in large cartels, regardless of the ratification rule.


Positive Residues Involved In The Voltage-Gating Of The Mitochondrial Porin-Channel Are Localized In The External Moiety Of The Pore, Philadelphia University Jan 1990

Positive Residues Involved In The Voltage-Gating Of The Mitochondrial Porin-Channel Are Localized In The External Moiety Of The Pore, Philadelphia University

Philadelphia University, Jordan

No abstract provided.


Strategy And Structure: Reconceiving The Relationship, Herman L. Boschken Jan 1990

Strategy And Structure: Reconceiving The Relationship, Herman L. Boschken

Herman L. Boschken

Discussions have drawn attention to the relationship between strategy and structure for much of the last quarter century. Yet, no firm basis has emerged to settle the issue of causal direction or to affirm the relationship's effects on organizational performance. By adding a new dimension to the strategy-structure model, this article attempts to conceptually link long-term performance with (a) the presence of subunits having distinctive competence in strategic planning and (b) the coordination of these differentiated subunits into a discernible micro-structure embedded within the overall organization. This new dimension is explored and developed by use of a case of the …