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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 23 of 23
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Storage For Good Times And Bad: Of Rats And Men, Ted Bergstrom
Storage For Good Times And Bad: Of Rats And Men, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
How do rats and squirrels decide how much to hoard for the winter when they do not know how long the winter will be? This paper argues that natural selection is likely to result in random differences in the attitudes toward systemic risk by genetically identical individuals.
Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, And Can Antitrust Rise To The Challenge?, Aaron S. Edlin
Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, And Can Antitrust Rise To The Challenge?, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Price-matching policies can be highly anticompetitive. They allow firms to raise their prices above competition levels by discriminating in price between informed and uninformed customers. The resulting high prices can persist even when new firms enter the industry, a fact that gives price matching the potential to be much more socially costly than an ordinary monopoly or cartel. At the same time, widespread entry implies that the agreement among sellers that is typical of a Sherman Act price-fixing case may be absent. In this article, Professor Edlin argues that there is nonetheless an analogy between a seller offering (and agreeing) …
International Trade Between Consumer And Conservationist Countries, M. Scott Taylor, James A. Brander
International Trade Between Consumer And Conservationist Countries, M. Scott Taylor, James A. Brander
M. Scott Taylor
We consider trade between a Consumer country with an open access renewable resource and a Conservationist country that regulates resource harvesting to maximize domestic steady-state utility. In what we call the mild overuse case, the consumer country exports the resource good and suffers steady-state losses from trade, as suggested by the conventional wisdom that weak resource management standards confer a comparative advantage on domestic firms in the resource sector but cause welfare losses. Strikingly, however, when the resource stock is most in jeopardy, the conservationist country exports the resource good in steady state and both countries gain from trade.
Mitigating The Tragedy Of The Commons Through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips
Mitigating The Tragedy Of The Commons Through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Auction Design For Standard Offer Service, Peter Cramton, Andrew Parece, Robert Wilson
Auction Design For Standard Offer Service, Peter Cramton, Andrew Parece, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its price. We explore the design issues in establishing rules for such an auction.
Neglected Effects On The Uses Side: Even A Uniform Tax Would Change Relative Goods Prices, Don Fullerton, Diane Lim Rogers
Neglected Effects On The Uses Side: Even A Uniform Tax Would Change Relative Goods Prices, Don Fullerton, Diane Lim Rogers
Don Fullerton
No abstract provided.
Africa And The New World Order, Andrew Ewoh
Africa And The New World Order, Andrew Ewoh
Andrew I.E. Ewoh
What is the plight of Africa under the New World Order? The paper argues that the NWO poses severe economic problems for African nations. It offers two main practical solutions for these problems and plausible policy implications. The analysis concludes by acknowledging that structural adjustment programs as traditionally suggested by the International Monetary Fund and democratization of the polity will not guarantee economic prosperity for the continent.
Environmental Levies And Distortionary Taxation: Comment, Don Fullerton
Environmental Levies And Distortionary Taxation: Comment, Don Fullerton
Don Fullerton
No abstract provided.
The Optimal Number Of Firms In The Commons: A Dynamic Approach, Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky
The Optimal Number Of Firms In The Commons: A Dynamic Approach, Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Protective Labor Legislation And Women's Employment, James Whitney, Pamela Nickless
Protective Labor Legislation And Women's Employment, James Whitney, Pamela Nickless
Jim Whitney
No abstract provided.
Measuring Market Power And Cost-Efficiency Effects Of Industrial Concentration, Azzeddine Azzam
Measuring Market Power And Cost-Efficiency Effects Of Industrial Concentration, Azzeddine Azzam
Azzeddine Azzam
In this paper, the author shows how E. Appelbaum's framework for testing price-taking behavior in a single industry can be formally extended to consider concentration explicitly. In so doing, he separates the market power effect of concentration from its cost-efficiency effect. Data from the U.S. beef-packing industry are used to illustrate an empirical application of the model. The findings support oligopsonistic market power and slaughter-cost efficiency in the industry. However, the cost-efficiency effect outweighs the market-power effect.
Coursebook For Economics, A. Studenmund
Wither Baseball After The Strike Of 1994?, James Whitney
Wither Baseball After The Strike Of 1994?, James Whitney
Jim Whitney
No abstract provided.
The Impact Of Welfare Reform On The Afdc Caseload, Diane Schanzenbach, Phillip Levine
The Impact Of Welfare Reform On The Afdc Caseload, Diane Schanzenbach, Phillip Levine
Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach
No abstract provided.
Economics: Private And Public Choice, A. Studenmund, James Gwartney, Richard Stroup
Economics: Private And Public Choice, A. Studenmund, James Gwartney, Richard Stroup
A. H. Studenmund
No abstract provided.
The Economics Of Affirmative Action, James Whitney, Robert Moore
The Economics Of Affirmative Action, James Whitney, Robert Moore
Jim Whitney
No abstract provided.
Uniformly Adaptive Estimation For Models With Arma Errors, Douglas Steigerwald
Uniformly Adaptive Estimation For Models With Arma Errors, Douglas Steigerwald
Douglas G. Steigerwald
A semiparametric estimator based on an unknown density is uniformly adaptive if the expected loss of the estimator converges to the asymptotic expected loss of the maximum likelihood estimator based on the true density (MLE), and if convergence does not depend on either the parameter values or the form of the unknown density. Without uniform adaptivity, the asymptotic expected loss of the MLE need not approximate the expected loss of a semiparamteric estimator for any finite sample. I show that a two-step semiparametric estimator is uniformly adaptive for the parameters of nonlinear regression models with autoregressive moving average errors.
Econometric Estimation Of Foresight: Tax Policy And Investment In The U.S., Douglas G. Steigerwald, Charles Stuart
Econometric Estimation Of Foresight: Tax Policy And Investment In The U.S., Douglas G. Steigerwald, Charles Stuart
Douglas G. Steigerwald
We develop a method for measuring the foresight agents have. We first dichotomize an agent's information at current date t into knowledge up to date t+f and expectations after t+f. We then form a residual-based test statistic that allows us to compare prediction errors for econometric models based on different values of f. We illustrate the method, examining investment around tax reforms to measure the foresight firms have about tax policy. In this illustration, current investment appears to reflect currently available information but little foresight other than foresight of enacted policy changes.
Asymptotic Bias For Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimators In Models With Conditional Heteroskedasticity, Douglas G. Steigerwald, Whitney Newey
Asymptotic Bias For Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimators In Models With Conditional Heteroskedasticity, Douglas G. Steigerwald, Whitney Newey
Douglas G. Steigerwald
Virtually all applications of time-varying conditional variance models use a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE). Consistency of a QMLE requires an identification condition that the quasi-log-likelihood have a unique maximum at the true conditional mean and relative scale parameters. We show that the identification condition holds for a non-Gaussian QMLE if the conditional mean is identically zero or if a symmetry condition is satisfied. Without symmetry an additional parameter, for the location of the innovation density, must be added for consistency. We calculate the efficiency loss from adding such a parameter under symmetry, when the parameter is not needed. We also …
Women And Substance Use: Are Women More Susceptible To Addiction?, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula
Women And Substance Use: Are Women More Susceptible To Addiction?, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula
Rosalie Liccardo Pacula
No abstract provided.
Sulfur Dioxide Compliance Of A Regulated Utility, Don Fullerton, Shaun P. Mcdermott, Jonathan P. Caulkins
Sulfur Dioxide Compliance Of A Regulated Utility, Don Fullerton, Shaun P. Mcdermott, Jonathan P. Caulkins
Don Fullerton
Electric utilities can reduce sulfur dioxide emissions through a variety of strategies, and the cost of abatement can be minimized using tradable permits as under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Previous theoretical work has analyzed effects of public utility commission regulations on a utility's choice between permits and a single continuous "abatement technology." Our numerical model considers discrete choices among three abatement technologies. Using illustrative parameters, we find that regulatory rules could more than double the cost of sulfur dioxide compliance. They can even make costs with allowance trading higher than costs with command and control regulation.
Estimating Economic Impacts From Tourism, Ujjayant N. Chakravorty, Deyong Zhou, John Yanagida, Pingsun Leung
Estimating Economic Impacts From Tourism, Ujjayant N. Chakravorty, Deyong Zhou, John Yanagida, Pingsun Leung
Ujjayant Chakravorty
Economists have traditionally used input-output (IO) analysis to examine the impacts of tourism on the economy of a region. This paper introduces a relatively new and alternative technique, computable general equilibrium (CGE). The two approaches are compared and then used to analyze, as an illustration, the impacts on Hawaii’s economy from a reduction in visitor expenditure. The study concludes that the results of the IO model are similar in magnitude to those of the CGE model but generally higher and that sectors closely associated with tourism exhibit the largest effects. The ability to account for inter-sectoral resource flows is a …
Review Discussion: Game Theory And The Law By Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, And Randall Picker, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Kenneth Dau- Schmidt, Michael Alexeev, Jeff Stake, Bob Heidt
Review Discussion: Game Theory And The Law By Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, And Randall Picker, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Kenneth Dau- Schmidt, Michael Alexeev, Jeff Stake, Bob Heidt
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Our dialogue- form review of the 1994 book by Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner \& Randall Picker.