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On The Optimality Of One-Size-Fits-All Contracts: The Limited Liability Case, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
On The Optimality Of One-Size-Fits-All Contracts: The Limited Liability Case, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
Felipe Balmaceda
This paper studies a principal-agent relationship when both are risk-neutral and in the presence of
adverse selection and moral hazard. Contracts must satisfy the limited-liability and monotonicity conditions. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal contract is simple, in the sense that each type is offered the same contract. These are: the action and the agent's type are complements, and the output's cumulative distribution function is such that the marginal rate of substitution between the action and the agent's type is the same for each possible output realization. Furthermore, under the average monotone likelihood ratio property, the optimal contract …