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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 20 of 20
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Opec, The Seven Sisters, And Oil Market Dominance: An Evolutionary Game Theory And Agent-Based Modeling Approach, Aaron Wood, Charles F. Mason, David C. Finnoff
Opec, The Seven Sisters, And Oil Market Dominance: An Evolutionary Game Theory And Agent-Based Modeling Approach, Aaron Wood, Charles F. Mason, David C. Finnoff
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Price Discontinuities In The Market For Rins, Charles F. Mason, Neil A. Wilmot
Price Discontinuities In The Market For Rins, Charles F. Mason, Neil A. Wilmot
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
On The Strategic Use Of Border Tax Adjustments As A Second-Best Climate Policy Measure, Charles F. Mason, Edward B. Barbier, Victoria Umanskaya
On The Strategic Use Of Border Tax Adjustments As A Second-Best Climate Policy Measure, Charles F. Mason, Edward B. Barbier, Victoria Umanskaya
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Pipeline Congestion And Basis Differentials, Matthew E. Oliver, Charles F. Mason, David C. Finnoff
Pipeline Congestion And Basis Differentials, Matthew E. Oliver, Charles F. Mason, David C. Finnoff
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Duopoly Behavior In Asymmetric Markets : An Experimental Evaluation, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips, C. Nowell
Duopoly Behavior In Asymmetric Markets : An Experimental Evaluation, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips, C. Nowell
Charles F Mason
Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets : An Experimental Evaluation
Wars Of Attrition In Experimental Duopoly Markets, Owen R. Phillips, Charles F. Mason
Wars Of Attrition In Experimental Duopoly Markets, Owen R. Phillips, Charles F. Mason
Charles F Mason
Wars of Attrition in Experimental Duopoly Markets
Information And Cost Asymmetry In Experimental Duopoly Markets, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips
Information And Cost Asymmetry In Experimental Duopoly Markets, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips
Charles F Mason
Information and Cost Asymmetry in Experimental Duopoly Markets
Entry, Collusion, And Capacity Constraints, Charles F. Mason, C. Nowell
Entry, Collusion, And Capacity Constraints, Charles F. Mason, C. Nowell
Charles F Mason
Entry, Collusion, and Capacity Constraints
The Commons And The Optimal Number Of Firms, R. Cornes, Charles F. Mason, T. Sandler
The Commons And The Optimal Number Of Firms, R. Cornes, Charles F. Mason, T. Sandler
Charles F Mason
The Commons and the Optimal Number of Firms
Eco-Labeling And Market Equilibria With Noisy Certification Tests, Charles F. Mason
Eco-Labeling And Market Equilibria With Noisy Certification Tests, Charles F. Mason
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Are Ceos Expected Utility Maximizers?, John List, Charles Mason
Are Ceos Expected Utility Maximizers?, John List, Charles Mason
Charles F Mason
Are individuals expected utility maximizers? This question represents much more than academic curiosity. In a normative sense, at stake are the fundamental underpinnings of the bulk of the last half-century’s models of choice under uncertainty. From a positive perspective, the ubiquitous use of benefit-cost analysis across government agencies renders the expected utility maximization paradigm literally the only game in town. In this study, we advance the literature by exploring CEO’s preferences over small probability, high loss lotteries. Using undergraduate students as our experimental control group, we find that both our CEO and student subject pools exhibit frequent and large departures …
Dynamic Learning In A Two-Person Experimental Game, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips
Dynamic Learning In A Two-Person Experimental Game, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Information Sharing And Tacit Collusion In Laboratory Duopoly Markets, Timothy N. Cason, Charles F. Mason
Information Sharing And Tacit Collusion In Laboratory Duopoly Markets, Timothy N. Cason, Charles F. Mason
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
An Experimental Analysis Of Subgame Perfect Play: The Entry Deterrence Game, Charles F. Mason, Clifford Nowell
An Experimental Analysis Of Subgame Perfect Play: The Entry Deterrence Game, Charles F. Mason, Clifford Nowell
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Mitigating The Tragedy Of The Commons Through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips
Mitigating The Tragedy Of The Commons Through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
The Optimal Number Of Firms In The Commons: A Dynamic Approach, Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky
The Optimal Number Of Firms In The Commons: A Dynamic Approach, Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Market Regulation And Multimarket Rivalry, Owen R. Phillips, Charles F. Mason
Market Regulation And Multimarket Rivalry, Owen R. Phillips, Charles F. Mason
Charles F Mason
Multimarket contact between duopolists in an X and a Y market is modelled with a trigger strategy. We show that mildly restrictive price-cap regulation in the X market decreases Y market quantities; but restrictive caps in the X market have a positive impact on Y market outputs. Behavior in laboratory markets confirms these propositions. Regulation that lowers X market prices by a small amount results in a statistically significant reduction in Y outputs. When the regulated X market price is reduced to the Cournot/Nash level, Y market outputs rise to a point statistically indistinguishable from the unregulated quantities.
Entry Deterrence In The Commons, Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky
Entry Deterrence In The Commons, Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Imperfect Product Testing And Market Size, Charles F. Mason, Frederic P. Sterbenz
Imperfect Product Testing And Market Size, Charles F. Mason, Frederic P. Sterbenz
Charles F Mason
No abstract provided.
Mutual Forbearance In Experimental Conglomerate Markets, Owen R. Phillips, Charles F. Mason
Mutual Forbearance In Experimental Conglomerate Markets, Owen R. Phillips, Charles F. Mason
Charles F Mason
We conduct economic experiments to gauge the level of cooperation between conglomerate rivals. First we run control experiments to observe cooperation between subjects acting as duopolists in one of two markets. In the control experiments, subject pairs choose a quantity xi (or yi) from a payoff matrix in a repeated game. Relatively less cooperation is observed in the Y market than in the X market. A second series of experiments then combines the two payoff matrices to create a conglomerate setting. Facing each other in two markets, opponents now choose an (xi, yi) …