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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Common-Value Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler
Common-Value Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler
Economics Faculty Publications
This note contains the equilibrium bid functions for two types of common-value procurement auctions: 1) a procurement auction in which bids represent an enforceable contract; 2) a procurement auction in which, upon learning the true cost of supplying the good, the winning bidder can renegotiate the contract with the buyer, and each bidder must submit a bond with their bid, which is returned at the end of the auction unless they are the low bidder and renegotiate the contract.
El Mal De Chagas Y Su Potencial De Eliminación, Eileen Stillwaggon
El Mal De Chagas Y Su Potencial De Eliminación, Eileen Stillwaggon
Economics Faculty Publications
La Asamblea Mundial de la Salud ha elegido algunas enfermedades como blancos para la eliminación. Hay mucha esperanza y una alta probabilidad de que varias enfermedades, recientemente llamadas desatendidas, sean eliminadas en las próximas décadas. Vamos a presenciar el fin de la transmisión de la dracunculiasis, la filariosis linfática, la poliomielitis, y en las Américas por lo menos, la oncocercosis. Ya se ven éxitos significativos como la cuasi erradicación de la dracunculiasis y paso importantes en contra de otras aflicciones. [Original Spanish version]
The World Health Assembly has chosen some diseases as targets for elimination. There is much …
Risk Preferences And Prenatal Exposure To Sex Hormones For Ladinos, Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler
Risk Preferences And Prenatal Exposure To Sex Hormones For Ladinos, Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler
Economics Faculty Publications
Risk preferences drive much of human decision making including investment, career and health choices and many more. Thus, understanding the determinants of risk preferences refines our understanding of choice in a broad array of environments. We assess the relationship between risk preferences, prenatal exposure to sex hormones and gender for a sample of Ladinos, which is an ethnic group comprising 62.86% of the population of Guatemala. Prenatal exposure to sex hormones has organizational effects on brain development, and has been shown to partially explain risk preferences for Caucasians. We measure prenatal exposure to sex hormones using the ratio of the …
An Experimental Study Of Complex-Offer Auctions From Wholesale Energy Markets, Rimvydas Baltaduonis
An Experimental Study Of Complex-Offer Auctions From Wholesale Energy Markets, Rimvydas Baltaduonis
Economics Faculty Publications
A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization auction for use in wholesale electric power markets with an intention to lower procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns have been raised for this proposal while assuming that the true production costs would be revealed to the auctioneer in a competitive market. Using an experimental approach, the study compares the performance of these two complex-offer auctions, controlling for the level of unilateral market power. The analysis finds that neither auction results in allocations that correspond to the true cost revelation. Two auctions perform similarly …
Putting A Human Face On The Minimum Wage, Christopher R. Fee
Putting A Human Face On The Minimum Wage, Christopher R. Fee
English Faculty Publications
What is a “livable wage,” and should we strive to raise wages for American workers?
There are lots of conflicting studies and reports. The Congressional Budget Office projects that an increase in the minimum wage from $7.25 an hour to $10.10 an hour would eliminate 500,000 jobs while raising the incomes of nearly 17 million Americans.
Even prominent economists like David Card and David Neumark diametrically disagree on the likely consequences of raising the minimum wage, and their studies of results in New Jersey have consistently yielded conflicting results for decades. [excerpt]
Bootstrap Blues, Hannah M. Frantz
Bootstrap Blues, Hannah M. Frantz
SURGE
Meet David*. In mid-January, he came to the small town Iowa elementary school where I work. David has attended more schools in the two years since he started school than I have in my lifetime. In fact, the school he just moved from only has four days of attendance listed on his record. David moves so often because he’s homeless. His situation is not what we may stereotypically think of as “homeless”—you wouldn’t see him on the streets or even in soup kitchens. Instead, David stays with his mother, and they couch surf from one home to another from week …
Valuation Structure In First-Price And Least-Revenue Auctions: An Experimental Investigation, Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler
Valuation Structure In First-Price And Least-Revenue Auctions: An Experimental Investigation, Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler
Economics Faculty Publications
In many auctions the valuation structure involves both private and common value elements. Existing experimental evidence (e.g. Goeree and Offerman in Am. Econ. Rev. 92(3):625–643, 2002) demonstrates that first-price auctions with this valuation structure tend to be inefficient, and inexperienced subjects tend to bid above the break-even bidding threshold. In this paper, we compare first-price auctions with an alternative auction mechanism: the least-revenue auction. This auction mechanism shifts the risk regarding the common value of the good to the auctioneer. Such a shift is desirable when ex post negative payoffs for the winning bidder results in unfulfilled contracts, as is …
The Presumption Of Payment, Christopher J. Dellana
The Presumption Of Payment, Christopher J. Dellana
SURGE
At Gettysburg College, students invest a considerable amount of money to make their experiences rewarding for future aspirations. Enrollment at this school, like others, I am sure, seems to breed a special type of student: the students who view themselves as paying and therefore deserving consumers. [excerpt]