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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Effect Of Bidders’ Asymmetries On Expected Revenue In Auctions, Estelle Cantillon
The Effect Of Bidders’ Asymmetries On Expected Revenue In Auctions, Estelle Cantillon
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Bidders’ asymmetries are widespread in auction markets. Yet, their impact on behavior and, ultimately, revenue and profits is still not well understood. In this paper, I define a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private value auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations. I show that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction always dominates that from the asymmetric auction, both in the first price auction and the second price auction. These results formalize and make transparent the idea that competition is reduced by bidders’ asymmetries. The paper also contributes to a better understanding of competition and the nature …
A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton
A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Peter Cramton
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Jesse A. Schwartz
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …
Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.