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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Economics

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1993

Job security and unemployment dynamics

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?: Lessons From Germany, France And Belgium, Katharine G. Abraham, Susan N. Houseman Mar 1993

Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?: Lessons From Germany, France And Belgium, Katharine G. Abraham, Susan N. Houseman

Upjohn Institute Working Papers

Laws in most West European countries give workers strong job rights, including the right to advance notice of layoff and the right to severance pay or other compensation if laid off. Many of these same countries also encourage hours adjustment in lieu of layoffs by providing prorated unemployment compensation to workers on reduced hours. This paper compares the adjustment of manufacturing employment and hours in West Germany, France and Belgium, three countries with strong job security regulations and well-established short-time compensation systems, with that in the United States. Although the adjustment of employment to changes in output is much slower …


The Costs Of Worker Dislocation, Louis S. Jacobson, Robert J. Lalonde, Daniel G. Sullivan Jan 1993

The Costs Of Worker Dislocation, Louis S. Jacobson, Robert J. Lalonde, Daniel G. Sullivan

Upjohn Press

The authors use findings from this study, in conjunction with their comprehensive interpretation of existing worker dislocation literature, to develop policy recommendations concerning prevailing and potential assistance programs. They conclude by proposing that any new policies designed to compensate dislocated workers should target those suffering the greatest losses while providing incentives to take new jobs - even if lower paying - as soon as possible. Programs which allow dislocated workers to receive compensation after regaining employment (modified earnings subsidies) are promoted as practical and financially feasible.


Pension Policy For A Mobile Labor Force, John A. Turner, Tabitha A. Doescher, Phyllis A. Fernandez Jan 1993

Pension Policy For A Mobile Labor Force, John A. Turner, Tabitha A. Doescher, Phyllis A. Fernandez

Upjohn Press

Employers often create a conflict between job mobility and retirement security when they deny future pension benefits to workers who quit a job before reaching retirement age. Unfortunately, this deterrent to job-changing inhibits the labor market's ability to adjust. It also means workers may be unprepared financially upon retirement. Turner describes why pension losses are such a significant problem and presents empirical evidence as to the number of workers affected and the amount of losses they incur. He also probes pension portability policy options and looks at portability options in effect in Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.


Profit Sharing: Does It Make A Difference?: The Productivity And Stability Effects Of Employee Profit-Sharing Plans, Douglas Kruse Jan 1993

Profit Sharing: Does It Make A Difference?: The Productivity And Stability Effects Of Employee Profit-Sharing Plans, Douglas Kruse

Upjohn Press

Kruse details the reasons profit sharing plans are implemented and the systemic factors within firms, particularly in relation to unions, that influence whether or not they are successful. Presented is evidence based on a unique database developed from 500 public U.S. firms - matched to firm performance over the period of 1979-1991 - on the two central theories related to profit sharing: 1) The Productivity Theory, and 2) the Stability Theory