Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

The Ethics Problem: Toward A Second-Best Solution To The Problem Of Economic Expertise, David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

The collective action problem of economic experts was diagnosed acutely by Knight and Pigou in the 1930s. The interest of economists as a group is in pursuing the public good of truth; the interest of an individual economist is in pursuing the private good of happiness. Pigou’s example is the pursuit of political influence. Deviation from truth-seeking devastates the theory of governance as objective inquiry laid out by Knight and John Rawls, as we saw in the eugenic era. We reformulate the Knight–Rawls position as truth-seeking contingent on a presupposed system. The best case for the Knight–Rawls position is transparency, …

On "Strongly Fortified Minds": Self-Restraint And Cooperation In The Discussion Tradition, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Accordingly, this essay explores some unappreciated benefits of discussion.² While educators frequently favor discussion as a means to encouraging engaged learning, they nonetheless rarely attempt to explain how or why these benefits arise. More than this, the role of economists from Adam Smith through Frank Knight and his student, James Buchanan, in explaining the benefits associated with discussion has been neglected both within economics and throughout the academy. In this tradition one accepts the inevitability of an individual "point of view" and the good society is one that can govern itself by means of an emergent consensus among points …

On "Strongly Fortified Minds": Self-Restraint And Cooperation In The Discussion Tradition, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Accordingly, this essay explores some unappreciated benefits of discussion. While educators frequently favor discussion as a means to encouraging engaged learning, they nonetheless rarely attempt to explain how or why these benefits arise. More than this, the role of economists from Adam Smith through Frank Knight and his student, James Buchanan, in explaining the benefits associated with discussion has been neglected both within economics and throughout the academy. In this tradition one accepts the inevitability of an individual "point of view" and the good society is one that can govern itself by means of an emergent consensus among points of …

Learning From Failure: A Review Of Peter Schuck’S Why Government Fails So Often: And How It Can Do Better (Book Review), David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Peter Schuck catalogs an overwhelming list of US government failures. He points to both structural problems (culture and institutions) and incentives. Despairing of cultural change, Schuck focuses on incentives. He relies on Charles Wolf ’s theory of nonmarket failures in which “internalities” replace the heavily-studied market failure from externalities (Wolf 1979). Internalities are evidence of a discord between the public goals by which a program is defended and the private goals of its administrators. What might economists contribute? We suggest that economists have neglected internalities because they take group goals as exogenously determined and we defend an alternative tradition in …

Comment: Entering The "Great School Of Self-Command": The Moralizing Influence Of Markets, Language, And Imagination, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Economists for centuries have struggled to understand the self-other relationship and its implications for economic life. For economists in the classical tradition of Adam Smith, this was a central question regarding the wealth and flourishing of nations. Later, as this volume demonstrates, the relationship of the self to others was forgotten as economics became associated almost exclusively with the pursuit of what Peter Boettke and Daniel Smith describe as "ruthless efficiency."

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and a growing body of experimental and empirical evidence showing the predictive shortcomings of narrow self-interest models, a more capacious economics …

Queen Elizabeth’S Leadership Abroad: The Netherlands In The 1570s, Peter Iver Kaufman

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

In 1576, after Edmund Grindal, archbishop of Canterbury, presumed to lecture Queen Elizabeth on the importance of preaching and on her duty to listen to such lectures, his influence diminished precipitously, and leadership of the established English church fell to Bishop Aylmer. Grindal’s friends on the queen’s Privy Council, “forward” Calvinists (or ultra-Protestants), were powerless to save him from the consequences of his indiscretion, which damaged the ultras’ other initiatives’ chances of success. This paper concerns one of those initiatives. From the late 1560s, they urged their queen “actively” to intervene in the Dutch wars. They collaborated with Calvinists on …

F. A. Hayek’S Sympathetic Agents, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

In what follows, we show first that, for Hayek, behavior within the small group – the “small band or troop,” or “micro-cosmos” – is correlated, resulting from agents who are sympathetic one with another. We shall argue that sympathy in this context for Hayek entails the projection of one’s preferences onto the preferences of others. With such correlated agency as the default in small-group situations, Hayek attempts to explain the transition from small groups to a larger civilization. We consider the role of projection in Hayek’s system at length, because projection from the local group characterized by a well-defined preference …

"Introduction" To "Symposium: The Fate Of Anglo-American Capitalism", Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

The call for papers in this special issue asked whether there is a future for the robust sort of capitalism favoured by Adam Smith or whether we have reached a limit to Anglo-American capitalism as the engine of human betterment. Contemporary events loomed large late in 2008 and it seemed appropriate to consider whether Anglo-American capitalism was passing away. We were particularly interested in contributions that viewed current economic events through a lens informed by Smith's teaching on institutions, money and economic growth.

Political Economy, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Political economy describes how human societies are organized by exchange. The critical issue for political economists is the interaction between self-directed decision making and the incentives that turn decisions into approved outcomes. In this interaction, political economists see a key role for leadership, a role that depends upon our common concern for others (Robbins, 1981). There are three roles, then, for leadership in the political economist’s model: self-directed decision making, incentive making, and establishing the criteria for approved outcomes.

2008 Hes Presidential Address: We're All "Persons" Now: Classical Economists And Their Opponents On Marriage, The Franchise, And Socialism, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

My purpose is to paint a broad brush narrative—it will have some visual representations as well—of how nineteenth-century political economists and their critics confronted a set of basic and related questions: Are men and women equally capable of self governance? Are they equally able to decide when and whom to marry and how many children to have? Can they be trusted equally to cast a ballot? Is their right to property inviolate or might new arrangements be designed and adopted for the production and distribution of wealth?

This is a story interwoven with extraordinary characters: John Stuart Mill will be …

Adam Smith And The Place Of Faction, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Our approach to faction focuses on Smith’s account of the interrelation between social distance and small group cohesion. We make the case that social distance is not necessarily constant in Smith’s system. As social distance shrinks, sympathy becomes more habitual and the affection we have for others increases (Peart and Levy, 2005b). Factions reduce social distance, and this gives them power and makes them dangerous. By modifying social distance, they created a disconnect between behavior of which we approve (cooperation) and consequences of which we disapprove. It is in this context that we find virtuous behavior with deleterious consequences. The …

Adam Smith, Collusion And “Right” At The Supreme Court, David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Adam Smith’s views on collusion were injected into the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly as Justice Stevens puzzled over why a collusive action might be viewed as “right.” Motivation by a desire for approbation provides Smith’s explanation for the existence of well- functioning groups. “Right” action is approved by the group. The question is what happens when the groups are in conflict. For Smith, collusion is one instance of the larger problem of faction in which a small group organizes to exploit the larger society.

Counterfeiting Truth: Statistical Reporting On The Basis Of Trust, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

There are two parts of our chapter. First, we review Adam Smith's argument that the evolution of monetary institutions is tied up in the problem of detecting deceitful metal offered in exchange. Smith points to no such comparable institution by which deceitful policy advocacy is detected and severely punished.⁵ Yet his recommendation for caution in the evaluation of policy advocacy points to the caution that routinely prevailed in monetary matters before public safeguards evolved to make the metallic content of the medium of exchange transparent and to preserve its quality. Second, we tum to a different sort of deceit, …

Counterfeiting Truth: Statistical Reporting On The Basis Of Trust, David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Semantics and game theory offer modern approaches to very old problems.¹ David Lewis introduced game theoretic concepts into the study of language in his examination of conventions.² In this chapter we study the language of a specific sort of conventions: statistical estimators. Such estimators have the important property of being both well-defined mathematical objects and devices that form the basis of factual claims asserted and, perhaps, believed by rational agents.³ The convention we analyze allows econometric reporting to proceed on the basis of trust.⁴ In contrast with Lewis, we shall demonstrate that such a convention is …

Attitudes Toward Race, Hierarchy And Transformation In The 19th Century, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Using the debates between Classical political economists and their critics as our lens, this paper examines the question of whether we're the same or different. Starting with Adam Smith, Classical economics presumed that humans are the same in their capacity for language and trade ; observed differences were then explained by incentives, luck and history, and it is the "vanity of the philosopher" incorrectly to conclude otherwise. Such "analytical egalitarianism" was overthrown sometime after 1850 , when notions of race and hierarchy came to infect social analysis as a result of attacks on homogeneity by the Victorian Sages (including Thomas …

The Negro Science Of Exchange: Classical Economics And Its Chicago Revival, David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

For analytical purposes, are economic agents—humans—the same or not? In this chapter, we argue that, historically, the debate between those who trusted in markets and those who did not followed logically from different answers to this questions. Starting with Adam Smith, classical economists held that humans are the same in their capacity for language and trade. They concluded that since markets are useful for some agents, they are beneficial for all of us. But the supposition of homogeneous competence was widely questioned in the nineteenth century but those who held that significant differences exist among humans, only some of whom …

On The "Bitter Quarrel" Between Economics And Its Enemies, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Economics has long had its enemies. The question is, why? What, precisely, is it about economics that its critics oppose? William Coleman seeks to tell the story of «anti-economics», «to take its measure» (p. 3), and then finally to defend economics from these attacks. His is a broad, sweeping study that uses a wide lens, panoramically over time, to survey the opposition. The crisis in economics, edited by Edward Fullbrook, provides us instead with a detailed snapshot of a recent sort of anti-economics - the Post-Autistic Economics (PAE) movement that originated among French economics students in 2000. Both serve to …

"Not An Average Human Being": How Economics Succumbed To Racial Accounts Of Economic Man, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

In this chapter, we shall show how the attacks on the doctrine of human homogeneity succeeded—how, late in the century, economists came to embrace accounts of racial heterogeneity entailing different capacities of optimization.¹ We attribute the demise of the classical tradition largely to the ill-understood influence of anthropologists and eugenicists² and to a popular culture that served to disseminate racial theories visually and in print. Specifically, W. R. Greg, James Hunt, and Francis Galton all attacked the analytical postulate of homogeneity that characterized classical economics from Adam Smith³ through John Stuart Mill. Greg cofounded the eugenics movement …

Denying Human Homogeneity: Eugenics & Making Of Post-Classical Economics, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

The question we propose to address is how did economics move from the classical period characterized by the hardest possible doctrine of initial human homogeneity—all the observed differences among people arise from incentives, luck, and history¹—to become comfortable with accounts of human behavior which alleged foundational differences among and within races of people? (Darity 1995) In this paper, we shall argue that early British eugenics thinkers racialized economics in the post-classical period.²

Theory, Application And The Canon: The Case Of Mill And Jevons, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Whatever disputes remain about the nature and content of the "canon" of economics, it is widely accepted that the boundary of economic science was narrowed throughout the nineteenth century (Winch 1972). This chapter offers a partial explanation for that narrowing in the methodological developments that occurred during the second half of the century. For reasons of practicality in the face of pronounced "multiplicity of cause," John Stuart Mill called, In his 1836 Essay On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It, and again in his 1843 Logic, for a separate …

A Rejoinder To Abraham Hirsch, Samuel Hollander, Sandra J. Peart

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The dispute between Hollander and Peart, and Hirsch, turns on the nature and role of verification in Mill’s perception of the appropriate method for Political Economy. Professor Hirsch maintains against us that, for Mill, the models constructed by political economists are insulated from verification. His case is based on two counterclaims. First, that when Mill writes of “verification” in Book III of the Logic, he has in mind a procedure differing from that appropriate for Political Economy, which allows only “indirect verification” (outlined in Book VI). Hirsch finds that Hollander and Peart confuse the two. Secondly, since the contexts …

John Stuart Mill's Method In Principle And In Practice: A Review Of The Evidence, Samuel Hollander, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

We believe an additional, and contrasting, interpretation of Mill’s method is supported by the evidence. For in our view Mill insisted on the possibility of theory modification in the light of inadequacies revealed by empirical evidence, and also held that the central behavioral axiom is not of universal relevance but is pertinent only to the local circumstances of contemporary Great Britain and America—and, even so, qualified as we shall see—that axiom itself is empirically based. On our reading, there is more in common between his research strategy and that of Milton Friedman than is sometimes granted, at least when Friedman’s …

Sun Spots And Expectations: W. S. Jevons And The Theory Of Economic Fluctuations, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

W. Stanley Jevon’s statistical study of periodicity has received much scrutiny (Aldrich1987), but less attention has been given to his theoretical position on economic fluctuations, a circumstance which T.W. Hutchison justly finds surprising considering that “Jevons maintained that aggregate instability, and the distress it caused, presented profoundly serious problems, and devoted some of his most strenuous economic research to their explanation” (Hutchison 1988, p. 6). This paper takes up the challenge to examine the development of Jevon’s though on economic fluctuations from the early 1860s until his death in 1882.

I shall distinguish in what follows between Jevon’s “theory of …

Jevons's Applications Of Utilitarian Theory To Economic Policy, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

The precise nature of W. S. Jevons's utilitarianism as a guiding rule for economic policy has yet to be investigated, and that will be the first issue treated in this paper. While J. A. Schumpeter, for instance, asserted that 'some of the most prominent exponents of marginal utility' (including Jevons), were 'convinced utilitarians', he did not investigate the further implications for Jevons's policy analysis.¹