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Efficient Bilateral Trade With Interdependent Values: The Use Of Two-Stage Mechanisms, Takashi Kunimoto, Cuiling Zhang

Research Collection School Of Economics

As efficient, voluntary bilateral trades are generally not incentive compatible in an interdependent-value environment (Fieseler, Kittsteiner, Moldovanu (2003) and Gresik (1991)), we seek for more positive results by employing two-stage mechanisms (Mezzetti (2004)). We say that a two-stage mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility if the truth-telling in both stages constitutes an equilibrium strategy.First, we show by means of a stylized example that the generalized two-stage Groves mechanism never guarantees voluntary trade, while it satisfies efficiency and incentive compatibility. In a general environment, we next propose Assumption 1 under which there exists a two-stage incentive compatible mechanism implementing an efficient, voluntary trade. …

Essays On A Mechanism Design Approach To The Problem Of Bilateral Trade And Public Good Provision, Cuiling Zhang

Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)

The dissertation consists of three chapters which studies a mechanism design approach to the problem of bilateral trade and public good provision.

Chapter 1 characterizes mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and interim individual rationality (IIR) in the classical public good provision problem. We propose a stress test for the results in the standard continuum type space by subject- ing them to a finite type space. The main contribution of this paper is to propose a set of techniques that allow us to characterize the efficient and optimal mechanisms in a discrete setup. Using these techniques, we conclude that many …