Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Global Reuse And Optimal Waste Policy, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Global Reuse And Optimal Waste Policy, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
Electronic waste generated from the consumption of durable goods in developed countries is often exported to underdeveloped countries for reuse, recycling, and disposal with unfortunate environmental consequences. The lack of efficient disposal policies within developing nations coupled with global free trade agreements make it difficult for consumers to internalize these costs. This paper develops a two-country model, one economically developed and the other under-developed, to solve for optimal tax policies necessary to achieve the efficient allocation of economic resources in an economy with a durable good available for global reuse without policy measures in the underdeveloped country. A tax in …
Waste Disposal And Recycling, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Waste Disposal And Recycling, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
No abstract provided.
Economic Policies To Address The Environmental Consequences Of Global Reuse, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Economic Policies To Address The Environmental Consequences Of Global Reuse, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
This paper summarizes a two-country model that solves for optimal tax rates to achieve efficiency in an economy with international trade in used consumer electronics. If only the developed nation can tax the disposal of e-waste, then the global Pareto Optimum can be obtained by either imposing an import tariff on used consumer electronics or subsidizing the return of e-waste for disposal in the developed country. The global Pareto Optimum can also be obtained by reducing the disposal tax in the developed country to a level below the external marginal cost of disposal should no other policy option be available.
The Costs Of Municipal Curbside Recycling And Waste Collection, Thomas C. Kinnaman
The Costs Of Municipal Curbside Recycling And Waste Collection, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
This paper estimates cost functions for both municipal solid waste collection and disposal services and curbside recycling programs. Cost data are obtained from a national survey of randomly selected municipalities. Results suggest, perhaps unsurprisingly, that both marginal and average costs of recycling systems exceed those of waste collection and disposal systems. Economies of scale are estimated for all observed quantities of waste collection and disposal. Economies of scale for recycling disappear at high levels of recycling - marginal and average cost curves for recycling take on the usual U-shape. Waste and recycling costs are also estimated as functions of factor …
Optimal Solid Waste Policy With Centralized Recycling Opportunities, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Optimal Solid Waste Policy With Centralized Recycling Opportunities, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
Economic models have demonstrated the efficiency of curbside collection taxes. This paper demonstrates that such efficiencies disappear in economies with centralized recycling options - where recyclable materials can be removed from the waste stream either by households or at a centralized recycling facility. In such economies a curbside garbage tax not only fails to encourage the centralized recycler to internalize the external costs of waste disposal, but introduces inefficiencies to the cost-minimizing mix of household and centralized recycling efforts. The optimal waste policy is a tax assessed further downstream at the landfill rather than at the curb.
The Economics Of Municipal Solid Waste Management, Thomas C. Kinnaman
The Economics Of Municipal Solid Waste Management, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
No abstract provided.
Landfill Closure And Housing Values, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Landfill Closure And Housing Values, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
The United States disposes roughly 60% of the municipal solid waste it generates each year in solid waste disposal facilities, commonly known as landfills. Hedonic pricing studies have estimated the external costs of landfills on neighboring housing markets, but the literature is silent on what happens to property values after the landfill closes. Original housing price data collected both before and after a landfill closure are used to estimate how a landfill closure affects neighboring property values. Results of both a hedonic pricing model and repeat-sales estimator are used in the analysis.
The Economics Of Household Garbage And Recycling Behavior, Don Fullerton, Thomas Kinnaman
The Economics Of Household Garbage And Recycling Behavior, Don Fullerton, Thomas Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
This book collects ten previously published papers by Don Fullerton, or Thomas Kinnaman, or both together. These papers include a theory of optimal pricing per bag of garbage when recycling and dumping are available options, empirical work using a cross section of cities that charge different prices, and empirical work using a cross section of households at the start of a price per bag of garbage at the curb.
The Economics Of Household Garbage And Recycling Behavior, Don Fullerton, Thomas Kinnaman
The Economics Of Household Garbage And Recycling Behavior, Don Fullerton, Thomas Kinnaman
Don Fullerton
This book collects ten previously published papers by Don Fullerton, or Thomas Kinnaman, or both together. These papers include a theory of optimal pricing per bag of garbage when recycling and dumping are available options, empirical work using a cross section of cities that charge different prices, and empirical work using a cross section of households at the start of a price per bag of garbage at the curb.
Garbage And Recycling With Endogenous Local Policy, Thomas C. Kinnaman, Don Fullerton
Garbage And Recycling With Endogenous Local Policy, Thomas C. Kinnaman, Don Fullerton
Don Fullerton
This paper estimates the impact of a user fee and a curbside recycling program on garbage and recycling amounts, allowing for the possibility of endogenous policy choices. Without correction for endogenous policy, the price per unit of garbage collection has a negative effect on garbage and a positive cross-price effect on recycling. When we correct for endogenous policy, then the effect of the user fee on garbage increases. The implementation of a $1 per bag user fee is estimated to reduce garbage by 412 pounds per person per year.
The Economics Of Residential Solid Waste Management, Thomas C. Kinnaman
The Economics Of Residential Solid Waste Management, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
This paper provides a broad overview of recent trends in solid waste and recycling, related public policy issues, and the economics literature devoted to these topics. Public attention to solid waste and recycling has increased dramatically over the past decade both in the United States and in Europe. In response, economists have developed models to help policy makers choose the efficient mix of policy levers to regulate solid waste and recycling activities. Economists have also employed different kinds of data to estimate the factors that contribute to the generation of residential solid waste and recycling and to estimate the effectiveness …
Household Responses To Pricing Garbage By The Bag, Don Fullerton, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Household Responses To Pricing Garbage By The Bag, Don Fullerton, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Don Fullerton
This paper employs individual household data to estimate the effect of per-unit pricing on the weight of garbage, the number of containers, the weight per can, and the amount of recycling. We also provide two indirect measures of illegal dumping. The data are based on a natural experiment that provides a unique opportunity to study human behavior in response to a change in price. On July 1, 1992, the City of Charlottesville, Virginia, implemented a program to charge $0.80 per 32-gallon bag or can of residential garbage collected at the curb. Before and after the implementation of this program, we …
Household Responses To Pricing Garbage By The Bag, Don Fullerton, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Household Responses To Pricing Garbage By The Bag, Don Fullerton, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
This paper employs individual household data to estimate the effect of per-unit pricing on the weight of garbage, the number of containers, the weight per can, and the amount of recycling. We also provide two indirect measures of illegal dumping. The data are based on a natural experiment that provides a unique opportunity to study human behavior in response to a change in price. On July 1, 1992, the City of Charlottesville, Virginia, implemented a program to charge $0.80 per 32-gallon bag or can of residential garbage collected at the curb. Before and after the implementation of this program, we …
Garbage, Recycling, And Illicit Burning Or Dumping, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Garbage, Recycling, And Illicit Burning Or Dumping, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
No abstract provided.
Garbage, Recycling, And Illicit Burning Or Dumping, Don Fullerton, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Garbage, Recycling, And Illicit Burning Or Dumping, Don Fullerton, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Thomas C. Kinnaman
With garbage and recycling as the only two disposal options, we confirm prior results that the optimal curbside fee for garbage collection equals the direct resource cost plus external environmental cost. When illicit burning or dumping is a third disposal option that cannot be taxed directly, the optimal curbside tax on garbage changes sign. The optimal fee structure is a deposit-refund system: a tax on all output plus a rebate on proper disposal through either recycling or garbage collection. The output tax helps achieve the first-best allocation even though it affects the choice between consumption and untaxed leisure.
Garbage, Recycling, And Illicit Burning Or Dumping, Don Fullerton, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Garbage, Recycling, And Illicit Burning Or Dumping, Don Fullerton, Thomas C. Kinnaman
Don Fullerton
With garbage and recycling as the only two disposal options, we confirm prior results that the optimal curbside fee for garbage collection equals the direct resource cost plus external environmental cost. When illicit burning or dumping is a third disposal option that cannot be taxed directly, the optimal curbside tax on garbage changes sign. The optimal fee structure is a deposit-refund system: a tax on all output plus a rebate on proper disposal through either recycling or garbage collection. The output tax helps achieve the first-best allocation even though it affects the choice between consumption and untaxed leisure.