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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Iron Law Of Selfishness: Response To A Comment By Alexander Field, Ted Bergstrom
The Iron Law Of Selfishness: Response To A Comment By Alexander Field, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
Alexander Field was not convinced of a result that I claimed in my JEP 2001 paper that in "haystack models" with non-assortative mating, if the number of descendants of founding group members is determined by an n-player prisoners' dilemma game, then the population will converge to a population of defectors. He thought that the result applied only if the groups were large. I respond with a more detailed discussion and show how the result works even when groups have only two members.
On The Evolution Of Altruistic Ethical Rules For Siblings, Ted Bergstrom
On The Evolution Of Altruistic Ethical Rules For Siblings, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends biologists' kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. It shows that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a "semi-Kantian" utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists invasion by dominant and also by recessive mutants. (JEL C70, D10, D63)
Interrelated Consumer Preference And Voluntary Exchange, Ted Bergstrom
Interrelated Consumer Preference And Voluntary Exchange, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper presents a model of interrelated preferences for pairs of individuals. It investigates the possibility of an equilibrium with voluntary transactions. It identifies the puzzling case of two people who disagree because each wants the other to have the better part and shows that if this is assumed away, then there exists a competitive equilibrium with voluntary bilateral gifts.
A Scandinavian Consensus Solution For Efficient Income Distribution Among Nonmalevolent Consumers, Ted Bergstrom
A Scandinavian Consensus Solution For Efficient Income Distribution Among Nonmalevolent Consumers, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
If Persons A and B are both benevolent to C, then a gift from A to C also benefits B. Thus C's income is like a public good to A and B. What happens with lots of people whose affections are entangled? This paper shows that a "distributional Lindahl equilibrium" exists and leads to an efficient income redistribution.