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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Robust mechanism design (2)
- Capital taxation (1)
- Complete information (1)
- Complex mechanisms (1)
- Correlation (1)
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- Disjoint confidence sets (1)
- Dominant-strategy mechanisms (1)
- Duality approach (1)
- Embodiment controversy (1)
- Full implementation (1)
- Information perturbations (1)
- Investment subsidies (1)
- Local strategy-proofness (1)
- Long memory (1)
- Low reserve price (1)
- Maskin monotonicity (1)
- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (1)
- Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms (1)
- Optimal transport (1)
- Realized volatility (1)
- Second-price auction (1)
- Simple mechanisms (1)
- Social choice function. (1)
- Strategy-proofness (1)
- Strongly obviouslystrategy-proof mechanisms (1)
- Trading volume (1)
- Transition dynamics (1)
- Unanimity (1)
- Vintage capital (1)
- Weak identification (1)
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Maskin Meets Abreu And Matsushima, Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, Siyang Xiong
Maskin Meets Abreu And Matsushima, Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, Siyang Xiong
Research Collection School Of Economics
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games, which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1977, 1999) but allow for the use of lotteries and monetary transfers as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994). We unify the two well-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for (exact) mixed-strategy Nash implementation by a finite mechanism. In contrast to previous papers, our approach possesses the following features: finite mechanisms (with no integer …
The Embodiment Controversy: On The Policy Implications Of Vintage Capital Models, Roberto M. Samaniego, Juliana Yu Sun
The Embodiment Controversy: On The Policy Implications Of Vintage Capital Models, Roberto M. Samaniego, Juliana Yu Sun
Research Collection School Of Economics
We explore the long-run impact of policy on the level of economic activity through changes in the vintage distribution of capital, in a model where different vintages coexist in production. Because firms can choose the vintage of capital in which they invest, investment subsidies do not affect the vintage structure of capital. In contrast, vintage-specific taxes or subsidies that target the newest vintages of capital can significantly affect output and welfare in the long run, mainly downward. Transition dynamics are rapid, so that steady-state comparisons give an accurate picture of the welfare impact of vintage tax wedges.
Weak Identification Of Long Memory With Implications For Inference, Jia Li, Peter C. B. Phillips, Shuping Shi, Jun Yu
Weak Identification Of Long Memory With Implications For Inference, Jia Li, Peter C. B. Phillips, Shuping Shi, Jun Yu
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper explores weak identification issues arising in commonly used models of economic and financial time series. Two highly popular configurations are shown to be asymptotically observationally equivalent: one with long memory and weak autoregressive dynamics, the other with antipersistent shocks and a near-unit autoregressive root. We develop a data-driven semiparametric and identification-robust approach to inference that reveals such ambiguities and documents the prevalence of weak identification in many realized volatility and trading volume series. The identification-robust empirical evidence generally favors long memory dynamics in volatility and volume, a conclusion that is corroborated using social-media news flow data.
Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules And Hybrid Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules And Hybrid Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the preferences are single-peaked at the “extremes” and unrestricted in the “middle”. We also study the structure of strategy-proof and unanimous Random Social Choice Functions on these domains. We show them to be special cases of probabilistic fixed ballot rules (introduced by Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken (2002)).
Correlation-Robust Auction Design, Wei He, Jiangtao Li
Correlation-Robust Auction Design, Wei He, Jiangtao Li
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study the design of auctions when the auctioneer has limited statistical information about the joint distribution of the bidders' valuations. More specifically, we consider an auctioneer who has an estimate of the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation but does not have reliable information about the correlation structure. We analyze the performance of mechanisms in terms of the revenue guarantee, that is, the greatest lower bound of revenue across all joint distributions that are consistent with the marginals. A simple auction format, the second-price auction with no reserve price, is shown to be asymptotically optimal, as the number …
Mechanism Design By Observant And Informed Planners, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Mechanism Design By Observant And Informed Planners, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study the mechanism design problem where the planner can observe ex-post the first-ranked alternatives or peaks of voter preferences. We contrast this with the design problem where the planner has ex-ante information regarding the peaks of voter preferences.
Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal When Agents Are Unsophisticated?, Jiangtao Li, Piotr Dworczak
Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal When Agents Are Unsophisticated?, Jiangtao Li, Piotr Dworczak
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study the design of mechanisms involving agents that have limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be simple if—given the assumed level of strategic sophistication—agents can determine their optimal strategy. We examine whether it is optimal for the mechanism designer who faces strategically unsophisticated agents to offer a simple mechanism. We show that when the designer uses a mechanism that is not simple, while she loses the ability to predict play, she may nevertheless be better off no matter how agents resolve their strategic confusion