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- Keyword
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- Strategy-proofness (3)
- Bundles (2)
- Decomposability (2)
- Equal treatment of equals (2)
- Implementation (2)
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- Random assignments (2)
- Rationalizability. (2)
- Sd-efficiency (2)
- Sd-strategy-proofness (2)
- (semi)-hybrid preference (1)
- (semi)-single-peaked preference (1)
- Ambiguity averse preferences; Ambiguity; Increasing relative ambiguity aversion; Decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion; Wealth effect; Variant constraint representation; Weighted maxmin representation (1)
- Bayesian incentive com-patibility (1)
- Bayesian incentive compatibility (1)
- Bayesian monotonicity (1)
- Bilateral trade (1)
- Common certainty of optimism (1)
- Complete information (1)
- Decomposability; connectedness (1)
- First-order belief (1)
- Greatest equilibrium (1)
- Hybrid domain (1)
- Incentive compatibility (1)
- Interdependent values (1)
- Interim correlated rationalizaibility (1)
- Interim rationalizable monotonic-ity (1)
- Interim rationalizable monotonicity (1)
- Invariance (1)
- Lattice structure (1)
- Least equilibrium (1)
Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
On Strategy-Proofness And The Salience Of Single-Peakedness In A Private Goods Economy, Shurojit Chatterji, Masso Jordi, Serizawa Shigehiro
On Strategy-Proofness And The Salience Of Single-Peakedness In A Private Goods Economy, Shurojit Chatterji, Masso Jordi, Serizawa Shigehiro
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition "desirable", in that it is tops-only, continuous, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as smilattice single-peakedness). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns our that this domain coincides with the one already identified in …
The Revealed Preference Theory Of Stable Matchings With One-Sided Preferences, Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, Rui Tang
The Revealed Preference Theory Of Stable Matchings With One-Sided Preferences, Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, Rui Tang
Research Collection School Of Economics
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings in two-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data set by analyzing the joins and meets of matchings.
Robust Virtual Implementation With Almost Complete Information, Takashi Kunimoto
Robust Virtual Implementation With Almost Complete Information, Takashi Kunimoto
Research Collection School Of Economics
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the set of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003) and show that Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability are necessary and sufficient conditions for robust virtual implementation, which implies that virtual implementation is possible uniformly over all type spaces consistent with Δ-restrictions. By appropriately defining Δ in order to restrict attention to complete information environments and thereafter explicitly modelling the assumption of complete information in the language of type spaces, I re-establish the permissive implementation …
Interim Rationalizable Implementation Of Functions, Takashi Kunimoto, Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano
Interim Rationalizable Implementation Of Functions, Takashi Kunimoto, Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) in incomplete information environments. We identify weak interim rationalizable monotonicity (weak IRM) as a novel condition and show that weak IRM is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation. We show by means of an example that interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM), found in the literature, is strictly stronger than weak IRM as its name suggests, and that IRM is not necessary for rationalizable implementation, as had been previously claimed. The same example also demonstrates that Bayesian monotonicity, the key condition for full Bayesian implementation, is not necessary for …
A Taxonomy Of Non-Dictatorial Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
A Taxonomy Of Non-Dictatorial Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
We provide an exhaustive classification of all preference domains that allow the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. This taxonomy is based on a richness assumption and employs a simple property of two-voter rules called invariance. The preference domains that form the classification are semi-single-peaked domains (introduced by Chatterji et al. (2013)) and semi-hybrid domains (introduced here) which are two appropriate weakenings of the single-peaked domains, and which, more importantly, are shown to allow strategy-proof rules to depend on non-peak information of voters’ preferences. As a refinement of the classification, single-peaked domains and …
Order On Types Based On Monotone Comparative Statics, Takashi Kunimoto, Takuro Yamashita
Order On Types Based On Monotone Comparative Statics, Takashi Kunimoto, Takuro Yamashita
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper introduces a novel concept of orders on types by which the so-called monotone comparative statics is valid in all supermodular games with incomplete information. We fully characterize this order in terms of what we call common optimism, providing a sense in which our order has a sharp epistemic interpretation. We say that type ti′ is higher than type ti in the order of the common optimism if ti′ is more optimistic about state than ti; ti′ is more optimistic that all players are more optimistic about state than ti; and so on, ad infinitum. First, we show that …
Efficiency, Quality Of Forecasts And Radner Equilibria, Shurojit Chatterji, Atsushi Kajii
Efficiency, Quality Of Forecasts And Radner Equilibria, Shurojit Chatterji, Atsushi Kajii
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study a simple two period economy with no uncertainty and complete markets where agents trade based on forecasts about the second period spot price. We propose as our solution concept a set of forecasts with the following properties: there exist (heterogenous) forecasts contained in this set that lead to efficient allocations, the set contains only those forecasts that correspond to some efficient equilibrium, and Önally that the forecasts assign positive probability to the actual market clearing spot price. We call such a set of prices an efficient equilibrium with ambiguity, and interpret it as a generalization of Radner equilibrium …
Efficient Bilateral Trade With Interdependent Values: The Use Of Two-Stage Mechanisms, Takashi Kunimoto, Cuiling Zhang
Efficient Bilateral Trade With Interdependent Values: The Use Of Two-Stage Mechanisms, Takashi Kunimoto, Cuiling Zhang
Research Collection School Of Economics
As efficient, voluntary bilateral trades are generally not incentive compatible in an interdependent-value environment (Fieseler, Kittsteiner, Moldovanu (2003) and Gresik (1991)), we seek for more positive results by employing two-stage mechanisms (Mezzetti (2004)). We say that a two-stage mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility if the truth-telling in both stages constitutes an equilibrium strategy.First, we show by means of a stylized example that the generalized two-stage Groves mechanism never guarantees voluntary trade, while it satisfies efficiency and incentive compatibility. In a general environment, we next propose Assumption 1 under which there exists a two-stage incentive compatible mechanism implementing an efficient, voluntary trade. …
Random Assignments Of Bundles, Shurojit Chatterji, Liu Peng
Random Assignments Of Bundles, Shurojit Chatterji, Liu Peng
Research Collection School Of Economics
We propose a model studying the random assignments of bundles with no free disposal. The key difference between our model and the one where objects are allocated (see Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) is one of feasibility. The implications of this difference are significant. Firstly, the characterization of sd-efficient random assignments is more complex. Secondly, we are able to identify a preference restriction, called essential monotonicity, under which the random serial dictatorship rule (extended to the setting with bundles) is equivalent to the probabilistic serial rule (extended to the setting with bundles). This equivalence implies the existence of a rule on …
Random Assignment Of Bundles, Shurojit Chatterji, Peng Liu
Random Assignment Of Bundles, Shurojit Chatterji, Peng Liu
Research Collection School Of Economics
We propose a model studying the random assignments of bundles with no free disposal. The key difference between our model and the one where objects are allocated (see Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) is one of feasibility. The implications of this difference are significant. Firstly, the characterization of sd-efficient random assignments is more complex. Secondly, we are able to identify a preference restriction, called essential monotonicity, under which the random serial dictatorship rule (extended to the setting with bundles) is equivalent to the probabilistic serial rule (extended to the setting with bundles). This equivalence implies the existence of a rule on …
The Relative Price Of Capital And Economic Structure, Roberto Samaniego, Juliana Yu Sun
The Relative Price Of Capital And Economic Structure, Roberto Samaniego, Juliana Yu Sun
Research Collection School Of Economics
Are trends in the price of capital technological in nature? First, we find that trends in the relative price of capital vary significantly across countries. We then show that a multi-industry growth model, calibrated to match differences in economic structure around the world and productivity growth rates across industries, accounts for this variation – mainly due to variation in the composition of capital. The finding indicates that the rate of change in the relative price of capital can be interpreted as investment-specific technical change – the extent to which productivity growth is relatively more rapid in the capital-producing sector. The …
Preferences With Changing Ambiguity Aversion, Jingyi Xue
Preferences With Changing Ambiguity Aversion, Jingyi Xue
Research Collection School Of Economics
We provide two extensions of Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18:141–153, 1989)’s maxmin expected utility decision rule to accommodate a decision maker’s changing ambiguity attitudes. The two rules are, respectively, a weighted maxmin rule and a variant constraint rule. The former evaluates an act by a weighted average of its worst and best possible expected utilities over a set of priors, with the weights depending on the act. The latter evaluates an act by its worst expected utility over a neighborhood of a set of approximating priors, with the size of the neighborhood depending on the act. Canonical representations …
Restricted Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules And Hybrid Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Restricted Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules And Hybrid Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study Random Social Choice Functions (or RSCFs) in a standard ordinal mech-anism design model. We introduce a new preference domain called a hybrid domain which includes as special cases as the complete domain and the single-peaked domain. We characterize the class of unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs on these domains and refer to them as Restricted Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules (or RPFBRs). These RSCFs are not necessarily decomposable, i.e., cannot be written as a convex combina-tion of their deterministic counterparts. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which decomposability holds for anonymous RPFBRs. Finally, we provide an axiomatic justification …
Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation Of Sets In Rationalizable Strategies, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano
Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation Of Sets In Rationalizable Strategies, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice sets (SCSs) in incomplete information environments. We identify rationalizable incentive compatibility (RIC) as its key condition, argue by means of example that RIC is strictly weaker than the standard Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), and show that RIC reduces to BIC when we only consider single-valued SCSs (i.e., social choice functions or SCFs). We next identify additional necessary conditions and, essentially closing the gap be-tween necessity and sufficiency, obtain a sufficiency result for rationalizable implementation in general environments. We also characterize a well-studied class of economic environments in which RIC is essentially the …