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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Decomposability And Strategy-Proofness In Multidimensional Models, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
Decomposability And Strategy-Proofness In Multidimensional Models, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional hybrid preferences arise naturally through assembling marginal preferences under the condition of semi-separability - a weakening of separability. The main result shows that under a suitable “richness” condition, every strategy-proof rule on this domain can be decomposed into component-wise strategy-proof rules, and more importantly every domain of preferences that reconciles decomposability of rules with strategy-proofness must be a multidimensional hybrid domain.
Obfuscation And Rational Inattention, Aljoscha Janssen, Johannes Kasinger
Obfuscation And Rational Inattention, Aljoscha Janssen, Johannes Kasinger
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study the behavior of duopolistic firms that can obfuscate their prices before competing on price. Obfuscation affects the rational inattentive consumers' optimal information strategy, which determines the probabilistic demand. Our model advances related models by allowing consumers to update their unrestricted prior beliefs with an informative signal of any form. We show that the game may result in an obfuscation equilibrium with high prices or a transparency equilibrium with low prices and no obfuscation, providing an argument for market regulation. Obfuscation equilibria cease to exist for low information costs and if one firm seems a priori considerably more attractive.
Legal Protection Of Property Rights: A Dynamic Evolution Model, Fali Huang
Legal Protection Of Property Rights: A Dynamic Evolution Model, Fali Huang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper presents an analysis of a dynamic evolution model of institutions, focusing on the factors affecting the security of property rights such as coercive capacity, political power, legal quality, and private protection. These factors are endogenously determined in equilibrium, allowing legal quality to serve as a summary indicator of property security. The primary finding of the study indicates that the legal protection of property rights tends to increase over time, driven by a decline in the economy's vulnerability to expropriation, particularly due to the growing importance of commercial and industrial activities relative to agriculture. Furthermore, the coexistence of the …
Connecting The (Dirty) Dots: Current Account Surplus And Polluting Production, Jungho Lee, Shang-Jin Wei, Jianhuan Xu
Connecting The (Dirty) Dots: Current Account Surplus And Polluting Production, Jungho Lee, Shang-Jin Wei, Jianhuan Xu
Research Collection School Of Economics
According to the existing open-economy macroeconomics literature, a current account surplus is associated with a welfare loss only when distortions exist in either savings or investment. We propose a new welfare effect even in the absence of such distortions. In our theory, a trade imbalance − the largest component of a current account imbalance − interacts with a country’s pollution control (“cleanness”) regime to generate welfare effects outside the standard channels. In particular, a trade surplus alters the shipping costs and composition of a country’s imports, producing a welfare loss associated with greater pollution.
Interim Rationalizable Implementation Of Functions, Takashi Kunimoto, Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano
Interim Rationalizable Implementation Of Functions, Takashi Kunimoto, Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) in incomplete information environments. We identify weak interim rationalizable monotonicity (weak IRM) as a novel condition and show it to be a necessary and almost sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation. We show by means of robust examples that interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM), found in the literature, is strictly stronger than weak IRM and that IRM is not necessary for rationalizable implementation, as had been previously claimed. These examples also demonstrate that Bayesian monotonicity, the key condition for full Bayesian implementation, is not necessary for rationalizable implementation. That is, rationalizable implementation …
Robust Contracting Under Distributional Uncertainty, Jiangtao Li, Kexin Wang
Robust Contracting Under Distributional Uncertainty, Jiangtao Li, Kexin Wang
Research Collection School of Economics
We study the design of contracts when the principal has limited statistical information about the output distributions induced by the agent’s actions. In the baseline model, we consider a principal who only knows the mean of the output distribution for each action, and show that it is optimal for the principal to adopt a monotone affine contract. We further show that the optimality of monotone affine contracts persists even if the principal has access to other information about the output distributions, such as the information that the output distribution induced by each action has full support.
Competing Auctions With Non-Identical Objects, Massimiliano Landi, Domenico Menicucci, Andrey Sarychev
Competing Auctions With Non-Identical Objects, Massimiliano Landi, Domenico Menicucci, Andrey Sarychev
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study a competition model with two sellers that auction non-identical objects, unlike most of the literature on competing auctions. Each bidder has bidimensional private information, his values for the objects, and chooses the auction in which he participates (if any) after each seller has set a reserve price for her auction. We show that in some cases the duopoly reserve price is greater than the reserve price for a monopolist auctioning a single object; thus, an increase in the number of sellers may make some bidder’s types worse off. In our analysis we first characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium …
Continuous Implementation With Payoff Knowledge, Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun
Continuous Implementation With Payoff Knowledge, Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun
Research Collection School Of Economics
The literature on robust mechanism design assumes players' knowledge about a fixed payoff environment and investigates global robustness of optimal mechanisms to large changes in the information structure. Acknowledging global robustness as a demanding requirement, we propose continuous implementation as a notion of local robustness. Keeping the assumption of payoff knowledge, we say that an SCF is continuously implementable if there exists a mechanism which yields the outcome close to the desired one for all types close to the planner's initial model. We show that when a generic correlation condition is imposed on the class of interdependent-value environments, any (interim) …
Local Dominance, Emiliano Catonini, Jingyi Xue
Local Dominance, Emiliano Catonini, Jingyi Xue
Research Collection School Of Economics
We define notions of dominance between two actions in a dynamic game. Local dominance considers players who have a blurred view of the future and compare the two actions by first focusing on the outcomes that may realize at the current stage. When considering the possibility that the game may continue, they can only check that the local comparison is not overturned under the assumption of "continuing in the same way" after the two actions (in a newly defined sense). Despite the lack of forward planning, local dominance solves dynamic mechanisms that were found easy to play and implements social …
On The Welfare Role Of Redundant Assets With Heterogenous Forecasts, Shurojit Chatterji, Atsushi Kajii
On The Welfare Role Of Redundant Assets With Heterogenous Forecasts, Shurojit Chatterji, Atsushi Kajii
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study a multiperiod model with a nominal bond that matures in one period and identify the set of e¢ cient allocations that can be sustained as Walrasian equilibria with heterogeneous forecasts. We next add a long maturity bond, which under perfect foresight would be a redundant asset, and show that it fundamentally expands the set of e¢ cient allocations that can be sustained as Walrasian equilibria. Indeed all wealth transfers compatible with e¢ ciency can arise endogenously. The key feature driving this conclusion are forecasting errors, which lead to ex post arbitrage opportunities that induce these income transfers.
Getting Dynamic Implementation To Work, Yi-Chun Chen, Richard Holden, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, Tom Wilkening
Getting Dynamic Implementation To Work, Yi-Chun Chen, Richard Holden, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, Tom Wilkening
Research Collection School Of Economics
We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our Simultaneous Report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experimentally that a SR mechanism performs well in inducing truth-telling in both complete and incomplete information environments and that it can induce efficient investment in a two-sided hold-up problem with ex-ante investment. The SR mechanism also …
Decentralizability Of Efficient Allocations With Heterogenous Forecasts, Shurojit Chatterji, Atsushi Kajii
Decentralizability Of Efficient Allocations With Heterogenous Forecasts, Shurojit Chatterji, Atsushi Kajii
Research Collection School Of Economics
Do price forecasts of rational economic agents need to coincide in perfectly competitive complete markets? To address this question, we define an efficient temporary equilibrium (ETE) within the framework of a two period economy. Although an ETE allocation is intertemporally efficient and is obtained by perfect competition, it can arise without the agents forecasts being completely coordinated on a perfect foresight price. Nevertheless, it entails price forecasts delicately related with each other: we show that regardless of the number of agents, there is a one dimensional set of such Pareto efficient allocations for generic endowments.
A Taxonomy Of Non-Dictatorial Unidimensional Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
A Taxonomy Of Non-Dictatorial Unidimensional Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
Non-dictatorial preference domains allow the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. On a class of preference domains called unidimensional domains, we show that the unique seconds property characterizes all non-dictatorial domains. Subsequently, we provide an exhaustive classification of all non-dictatorial, unidimensional domains, based on a simple property of two-voter rules called invariance. The domains constituting the classification are semi-single-peaked domains and semi-hybrid domains (introduced here) which are two appropriate weakenings of single-peaked domains and shown to allow strategy-proof rules to depend on non-peak information of voters' preferences; the canonical strategy-proof rules for these …