Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Kick-Starting Economic Growth: An Interview With Dr K. V. Subramanian, India's Chief Economic Advisor, K V Subramanian, Havovi Joshi

Asian Management Insights

Dr K. V. Subramanian emphasises the importance of higher investment rates, good quality loans, and structural reforms for boosting India’s economic growth.

Rationalizable Implementation Of Correspondences, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano

Research Collection School Of Economics

A new condition, which we call uniform monotonicity, is shown to be necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation of corre-spondences. Uniform monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonic-ity and reduces to it in the case of functions. Maskin monotonicity, the key condition for Nash implementation, had also been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Our conclusion is that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are not only starkly different from, but also much weaker than those for Nash implementation, when we consider social choice correspondences. Thus, dropping rational ex-pectations significantly expands the class of rules …

Strategically Simple Mechanisms, Tilman Börgers, Jiangtao Li

Research Collection School Of Economics

We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first-order beliefs about the other agents' preferences and first-order certainty about the other agents' rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple …

Parametric Rationing With Uncertain Needs, Yan Long, Jingyi Xue

Research Collection School Of Economics

We study resource allocation in the face of uncertain needs. We extend Young (1987)’s parametric rules to the uncertain context. We re-establish the axiomatic char-acterization of parametric rules and show the optimality of the rules.

Non-Separable Models With High-Dimensional Data, Liangjun Su, T Ura, Yc Zhang

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper studies non-separable models with a continuous treatment when the dimension of the control variables is high and potentially larger than the effective sample size. We propose a three-step estimation procedure to estimate the average, quantile, and marginal treatment effects. In the first stage we estimate the conditional mean, distribution, and density objects by penalized local least squares, penalized local maximum likelihood estimation, and numerical differentiation, respectively, where control variables are selected via a localized method of L-1-penalization at each value of the continuous treatment. In the second stage we estimate the average and marginal distribution of the potential …

Continuous Implementation With Small Transfers, Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun

Research Collection School Of Economics

The robust mechanism design literature investigates the global robustness of op-timal mechanisms to large changes in the environment. Acknowledging the global robustness as an overly demanding requirement, we propose continuous implementa-tion as a local robustness of optimal mechanisms to small changes in the environment. We say that a social choice function is continuously implementable “with small trans-fers” if there exists a mechanism which yields the outcome close to the desired one for all types close to the designer’s initial model. We show that when a generic cor-relation condition is imposed on the class of interdependent values environments, any incentive compatible …

Limit Theory For Moderate Deviation From Integrated Garch Processes, Yubo Tao

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper develops the limit theory of the GARCH(1,1) process that moderately deviates from IGARCH process towards both stationary and explosive regimes. The asymptotic theory extends Berkes et al. (2005) by allowing the parameters to have a slower rate of convergence. The results can be applied to unit root test for processes with mildly-integrated GARCH innovations (e.g. Boswijk (2001), Cavaliere and Taylor (2007, 2009)) and deriving limit theory of estimators for models involving mildly-integrated GARCH processes (e.g. Jensen and Rahbek (2004), Francq and Zakoïan (2012, 2013).

Equivalence Of Stochastic And Deterministic Mechanisms, Yi-Chun Chen, Jiangtao Li, Jiangtao Li, Yeneng Sun

Research Collection School Of Economics

We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent deterministic mechanism that (1) is Bayesian incentive compatible; (2) delivers the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same interim expected utilities for all agents; and (3) delivers the same ex ante expected social surplus. This result holds in settings with a rich class of utility functions, multidimensional types, interdependent valuations, and in settings without monetary transfers. To prove our result, we develop a novel …

Random Mechanism Design On Multidimensional Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng

Research Collection School Of Economics

We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a particular class of top-separable domains: connected domains, and show that in the class of minimally rich and connected domains, the multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the design of a flexible random social choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof. Such a flexible …

Mixed Bayesian Implementation In General Environments, Takashi Kunimoto

Research Collection School Of Economics

A social choice rule is said to be mixed Bayesian implementable if one can design a mechanism (or institution) in which the set of all mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with that specified by the rule. The objective of this paper is to generalize the results of mixed Bayesian implementation. By means of example, I first assess the implication of common priors in Bayesian implementation. Second, I identify a mild condition that fills the gap between the necessity and sufficiency for mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments including non-economic ones. Third, I establish some new results to unify the …

Equal-Quantile Rules In Resource Allocation With Uncertain Needs, Yan Long, Jay Sethuraman, Jingyi Xue

Research Collection School Of Economics

A group of agents have uncertain needs on a resource, and the resource has to be divided before uncertainty resolves. We propose a class of division rules we call equal-quantile rules, parameterized by λ ∈ (0, 1]. The parameter λ is a common maximal probability of satisfaction — the probability that an agent’s realized need is no more than his assignment — imposed on all agents. Thus, the maximal assignment of each agent is his λ-quantile assignment. If the endowment of the resource exceeds the sum of the agents’ λ-quantile assignments, each agent receives his λ-quantile assignment and the resource …

The Revealed Preference Theory Of Stable Matchings With One-Sided Preferences, Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, Rui Tang

Research Collection School Of Economics

This note studies the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings intwo-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects therevealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stablematchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data set by analyzing the joins andmeets of matchings.

Three Essays On Nonstationary Time-Series Analysis And Network Dynamics, Yubo Tao

Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)

My dissertation consists of three essays which contribute new theoretical results to nonstationary time-series analysis and network dynamics.

Chapter 2 examines the limit properties of information criteria (such as AIC, BIC, HQIC) for distinguishing between the unit root model and the various kinds of explosive models. The explosive models include the local-to-unit-root model, the mildly explosive model and the regular explosive model. Initial conditions with different orders of magnitude are considered. Both the OLS estimator and the indirect inference estimator are studied. It is found that BIC and HQIC, but not AIC, consistently select the unit root model when data …

Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Multiplicity Of Equilibria In A Directed Search Model Of The Labor Market, Nicolas L. Jacquet, John Kennes, Serene Tan

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper studies a directed search model of the labour market, which is standard in all aspects except two. First, we allow firms to post wage–vacancy contracts advertising the number of workers they would pay as well as the payment all will receive. Second, we consider two cases: one where workers are risk neutral and one where workers are risk averse, both in finite and large economies. Our paper shows that when firms post wage–vacancy contracts, whether workers are modelled as risk neutral or risk averse matters: the types of symmetric equilibria and the nature of multiplicity of equilibria are …

Robustly Optimal Reserve Price, Wei He, Jiangtao Li

Research Collection School Of Economics

We study a robust version of the single-unit auction problem. The auctioneer has confidence in her estimate of the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not have reliable information about the joint distribution. In this setting, we analyze the performance of second-price auctions with reserve prices in terms of revenue guarantee, that is, the greatest lower bound of revenue across all joint distributions that are consistent with the marginals. For any finite number of bidders, we solve for the robustly optimal reserve price that generates the highest revenue guarantee. Our analysis has interesting implications in large markets. …

Maximum Likelihood Estimation For The Fractional Vasicek Model, Katsuto Tanaka, Weilin Xiao, Jun Yu

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper is concerned about the problem of estimating the drift parameters in the fractional Vasicek model from a continuous record of observations. Based on the Girsanov theorem for the fractional Brownian motion, the maximum likelihood (ML) method is used. The asymptotic theory for the ML estimates (MLE) is established in the stationary case, the explosive case, and the null recurrent case for the entire range of the Hurst parameter, providing a complete treatment of asymptotic analysis. It is shown that changing the sign of the persistence parameter will change the asymptotic theory for the MLE, including the rate of …