Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Comments On The Rggi Market Design, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

This paper is provided in connection with the 2007 Telecommunications Symposium – Voice, Video and Broadband: The Changing Competitive Landscape and Its Impact on Consumers, sponsored by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“the Division”). Our focus is on the state of competition in the wireless sector. Maintaining a competitive wireless sector is particularly critical if, as the Division’s agenda indicates, wireless services are to function as a competitive alternative to wireline technologies. Strengthening competition is especially important now after recent mergers that consolidated the wireless industry into a few dominant firms (two to four depending on …

Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Colombia’S Forward Energy Market, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper presents a market design for Colombia’s forward energy market, which is scheduled to began in 2008. The forward energy market is an organized market to procure energy for electricity customers on a forward basis. It includes both the regulated market (residential and other small customers) and the nonregulated market (large customers). Currently, regulated customers represent 68% of the total electricity demand and nonregulated customers represent the remaining 32%. The proposed design is novel in that it integrates both the regulated and nonregulated customers into a single organized market. Although the regulated and nonregulated energy products remain distinct, their …

Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

As the 700 MHz auction approaches, we are writing to clear up a common misconception about the nature of spectrum auctions and the impact of various rules on auction revenues.

Essential Entry: Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

A common misconception is that an open access provision on a sliver of the 700 MHz spectrum would reduce auction revenues. In fact, the open access, wholesale, and bidding credit provisions put forth by Frontline Wireless, will motivate new entry, enhance competition in the auction, and raise revenues.

The Constrained Coalitional Price Setting Game: Theory And Applications, Martin C. Byford

Martin Byford

In a number of simple settings there do not exist Nash equilibria, to the Bertrand price setting game, in pure strategies. Two prominent examples where pure strategy solutions do not exist are price competition with convex costs and spatial competition with finite buyers. This thesis develops an alternative model of price formation. The model examines as a non- transferable utility coalitional game the set of outcomes that are feasible in the Bertrand price setting game.

In spatial models with finite buyers the core of this NTU coalitional game is equivalent to the set of outcomes that can be produced by …

Integracion Profunda En El Mercosur. Un Analisis En La Perspectiva De Paraguay, Francisco Carlos Ruiz Diaz

Francisco Carlos Ruiz Diaz

No abstract provided.

Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

There have been several comments that criticize auction rules that prevent the two major low-frequency incumbents from winning all of the newly available spectrum and incorporating it into their proprietary networks. Such rules include new-entrant set-asides, new-entrant bidding credits, and the open access plan. We disagree with these criticisms and argue that given the current market structure, such rules are likely to improve welfare and auction revenues. We are submitting this report to provide sound economic analysis of these claims.

Economic Comments On The Design Of The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

We comment on the service and auction rules discussed in the Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC 07-72, 27 April 2007. We recommend that the FCC designate one license for a wholesale operation that provides open access nationwide on nondiscriminatory terms. This is necessary to enable entry of new businesses offering wireless services in retail markets. It also enables local operators to offer roaming at competitive prices. The new license accords with the Commission’s policy to encourage competition, and recognizes the benefits to consumers from low prices and expanded services.

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Affidavit arguing that the Illinois auction for energy for small customers was a competitive auction. On behalf of J. Aron & Company and Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.

Product Design For Colombia’S Regulated Market, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper presents a product design for Colombia’s regulated market (MOR), which is scheduled to began in 2008. The regulated market consists of residential and other small customers. Currently, regulated customers represent 69% of the total load. I propose a market based on a single load-following product in which each supplier bids to serve its desired share of the Colombia regulated load. Thus, a supplier that wins a 10% share at auction has an obligation to serve 10% of the actual regulated load in every hour of the commitment period. The supplier is paid the MOR clearing price for every …

Why Large Licenses Are Best For The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Market-Based Alternatives For Managing Congestion At New York’S Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton, Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, George Donohue, Mark Hansen, Karla Hoffman

Peter Cramton

We summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for more than 30 years. The scope of the project included the analysis of several administrative measures, congestion pricing options and slot auctions. The research output includes a congestion pricing procedure and also the specification of a slot auction mechanism. The research results are based in part on two strategic simulations. These were multi-day events that included the participation of airport operators, most notably the Port Authority of New York and …

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Affidavit identifying manipulation of New York's capacity market by KeySpan and the need for market monitoring and mitigation. On behalf of Consolidated Edison Company of New York.

Konwergencja Bezrobocia W Polsce W Latach 1999-2006, Joanna Tyrowicz

Joanna Tyrowicz

W artykule analizie poddana została dynamika stóp bezrobocia na poziomie powiatów w Polsce w latach 1999-2006. Wykorzystano miesięczne dane rejestrowe. Celem badania jest zweryfikowanie, do jakiego stopnia zachodzą procesy konwergencji regionalnych stóp bezrobocia. Zbadana została zarówno konwergencja typu beta, czyli zależność między dynamiką stopy bezrobocia a jej poziomem wyjściowym, jak i konwergencja typu sigma polegająca na analizie dyspersji rozkładu i jej zmian w czasie. Zastosowane zostały również metody pozwalające zbadać dynamikę pełnego rozkładu analizowanej zmiennej – macierze przejścia oraz nieparametryczna metoda estymacji jądrowej. Macierze przejścia pozwalają określić prawdopodobieństwo z jakim w powiatach stopa bezrobocia utrzyma się na stałym poziomie, wzrośnie …

Optimality And Synchronicity - Where Do We Stand? Oca Theory And Its Empirical Application For Emu, Joanna Tyrowicz

Joanna Tyrowicz

Should Poland join EMU? The answer to this question has already been determined by both economists and politicians - by joining EU Poland has agreed to eventually join EMU, which barely any serious economists find to be harmful to our economy. However, the moment of joining the currency union has not been determined and its choice is largely left to the decision of Polish policy makers. Obviously, there are some costs to entering the currency union, as well as some benefits. However, since both the process of accessing and the very participation in the EMU are dynamic in nature, the …

Podmioty Ekonomii Społecznej A Perspektywy Rozwojowe Polski 2007-2013, Joanna Tyrowicz

Joanna Tyrowicz

No abstract provided.

Healthy Competition: What’S Holding Back Health Care And How To Free It, Michael F. Cannon

Michael F. Cannon

No abstract provided.

Fee-Shifting Rules In Litigation With Contingency Fees, Kong-Pin Chen

Kong-Pin Chen

This article theoretically compares the British and American fee-shifting rules in their influences on the behavior of the litigants and the outcomes of litigation. We build up a comprehensive litigation model with asymmetric information and agency costs, which makes it possible to make comparison on a broad arrays of issues in a single unified framework. We then solve for the equilibria under both American and British rules, and thereby compare their equilibrium settlement amounts and rates, expenditures incurred in trials, as well as the plaintiff’s chances of winning and incentive to sue. The theoretical results are broadly consistent with existing …

Why We Need To Stick With Uniform-Price Auctions In Electricity Markets, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft

Peter Cramton

Wholesale electricity markets are commonly organized around a spot energy market. Buyers and suppliers submit bids and offers for each hour and the market is cleared at the price that balances supply and demand. Buyers with bids above the clearing price pay that price, and suppliers with offers below the clearing price are paid that same price. This uniform-price auction, which occurs both daily and throughout the day, is complemented by forward energy markets. In practice, between 80 and 95 percent of wholesale electricity is traded in forward energy markets, often a month, or a year, and sometimes many years …

Colombia Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft

Peter Cramton

A firm energy market for Colombia is presented. Firm energy—the ability to provide energy in a dry period—is the product needed for reliability in Colombia’s hydro-dominated electricity market. The firm energy market coordinates investment in new resources to assure that sufficient firm energy is available in dry periods. Load procures in an annual auction enough firm energy to cover its needs. The firm energy product includes both a financial call option and the physical capability to supply firm energy. The call option protects load from high spot prices and improves the performance of the spot market during scarcity. The market …

How Best To Auction Oil Rights, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I study the design of oil rights auctions. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take by reducing oil company risk.