Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
![Digital Commons Network](http://assets.bepress.com/20200205/img/dcn/DCsunburst.png)
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Law and economics (2)
- 2008 credit crisis (1)
- Administrative law (1)
- Agency reasoning process (1)
- Agency rules (1)
-
- Anti-discrimination law (1)
- Aptitude (1)
- Bailouts (1)
- Banking and finance (1)
- Bankruptcy (1)
- Board Fiduciary Duties (1)
- Board of Directors (1)
- Business necessity (1)
- CBA (1)
- Christianity (1)
- Clawbacks (1)
- Congressional Review Act (1)
- Congressional veto of rules (1)
- Corporate Finance (1)
- Corporate Law (1)
- Corporate purposes (1)
- Corporations Economics (1)
- Cost-benefit analysis (1)
- Delaware Corporate Law (1)
- Delaware Law (1)
- Derivatives (1)
- Director Responsibility (1)
- Disparate impact (1)
- Displacement of regulatory structures with ownership influence (1)
- Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (1)
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Disparate Impact Realism, Amy L. Wax
Disparate Impact Realism, Amy L. Wax
All Faculty Scholarship
In Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine, first articulated by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), that employers can be held liable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for neutral personnel practices with a disparate impact on minority workers. The Griggs Court further held that employers can escape liability by showing that their staffing practices are job related or consistent with business necessity.
In the interim since Griggs, social scientists have generated evidence undermining two key assumptions behind that decision and its …
When The Government Is The Controlling Shareholder, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
When The Government Is The Controlling Shareholder, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
As a result of the 2008 bailouts, the United States Government is now the controlling shareholder in AIG, Citigroup, GM, GMAC, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Corporate law provides a complex and comprehensive set of standards of conduct to protect non-controlling shareholders from controlling shareholders who have goals other than maximizing firm value. In this article, we analyze the extent to which these existing corporate law structures of accountability apply when the government is the controlling shareholder, and the extent to which federal “public law” structures substitute for displaced state “private law” norms. We show that the Delaware restrictions on …
Making Sense Of The New Financial Deal, David A. Skeel Jr.
Making Sense Of The New Financial Deal, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
In this Essay, I assess the enactment and implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress’s response to the 2008 financial crisis. To set the stage, I begin by very briefly reviewing the causes of the crisis. I then argue that the legislation has two very clear objectives. The first is to limit the risk of the shadow banking system by more carefully regulating the key instruments and institutions of contemporary finance. The second objective is to limit the damage in the event one of these giant institutions fails. While the new regulation of the instruments of contemporary finance—including clearing and exchange …
A Cost-Benefit Interpretation Of The "Substantially Similar" Hurdle In The Congressional Review Act: Can Osha Ever Utter The E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, Adam M. Finkel, Jason W. Sullivan
A Cost-Benefit Interpretation Of The "Substantially Similar" Hurdle In The Congressional Review Act: Can Osha Ever Utter The E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, Adam M. Finkel, Jason W. Sullivan
All Faculty Scholarship
The Congressional Review Act permits Congress to veto proposed regulations via a joint resolution, and prohibits an agency from reissuing a rule “in substantially the same form” as the vetoed rule. Some scholars—and officials within the agencies themselves—have understood the “substantially the same” standard to bar an agency from regulating in the same substantive area covered by a vetoed rule. Courts have not yet provided an authoritative interpretation of the standard.
This Article examines a spectrum of possible understandings of the standard, and relates them to the legislative history (of both the Congressional Review Act itself and the congressional veto …
Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
Corporate governance scandals inevitably raise concerns about the extent to which corporate directors failed in their responsibility to monitor the corporation and its managers, especially in terms of the latter's’ misdeeds. Corporate governance reforms strive to shore up directors' roles by seeking to ensure that boards have sufficient incentives to engage in effective oversight and to hold the boards more accountable. The current financial crisis has ushered in an era of significant government reform of the financial system and involvement in corporate governance matters. Such involvement has increased board of directors' responsibilities but has not reconciled those responsibilities with board …
At The Conjunction Of Love And Money: Comment On Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (Or Not) From Economics And Law, William W. Bratton
At The Conjunction Of Love And Money: Comment On Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (Or Not) From Economics And Law, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Political Economy Of Fraud On The Market, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
The Political Economy Of Fraud On The Market, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.