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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Towards Quantifiable Metrics Warranting Industry-Wide Corporate Death Penalties, Joshua M. Pearce
Towards Quantifiable Metrics Warranting Industry-Wide Corporate Death Penalties, Joshua M. Pearce
Joshua M. Pearce
In the singular search for profits, some corporations inadvertently kill humans. If this routinely occurs throughout an industry, it may no longer serve a net positive social purpose for society and should be eliminated. This article provides a path to an objective quantifiable metric for determining when an entire industry warrants the corporate death penalty. First, a theoretical foundation is developed with minimum assumptions necessary to provide evidence for corporate public purposes. This is formed into an objective quantifiable metric with publicly-available data and applied to two case studies in the U.S.: the tobacco and coal mining industries. The results …
Polluters’ Profits And Political Response: Direct Control Versus Taxes: Comment, Robert S. Main, Charles W. Baird
Polluters’ Profits And Political Response: Direct Control Versus Taxes: Comment, Robert S. Main, Charles W. Baird
Robert S. Main
In a recent issue of this Review, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (B-T) presented a public choice analysis of the relative merits of direct controls and taxes in externality control. In Section IV of their paper, B-T consider the case of reciprocal external diseconomies of consumption. They ask whether "... persons in this sort of interaction, acting through the political processes of the community, will impose on themselves either a penalty tax or direct regulation" (p. 143). Their analysis is carried out within the context of a two-person model in which each person consumes the same quantity of a good …
Subsidizing Non-Polluting Goods Vs. Taxing Polluting Goods For Pollution Reduction, Robert S. Main
Subsidizing Non-Polluting Goods Vs. Taxing Polluting Goods For Pollution Reduction, Robert S. Main
Robert S. Main
Pigovian taxes on polluters are politically unpopular, but subsidies for non-polluting sources are politically attractive. This paper presents a linear demand and supply model and numerical example to explore the trade-offs between taxing polluting sources of a good versus subsidizing non-polluting sources of the same good. While the model (along with the associated numerical example) shows the optimality of Pigovian taxes, it also shows how much welfare is reduced if subsidies for nonpolluters are employed instead. Further, it shows the optimal tax, given any level of subsidy and the optimal subsidy, given any level of tax.
Balancing The Seesaw: How Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Can Fail, Andrew S. Tan, Mary A. Kaidonis, Lee C. Moerman
Balancing The Seesaw: How Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Can Fail, Andrew S. Tan, Mary A. Kaidonis, Lee C. Moerman
Mary Kaidonis
Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the recent release of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper affirm the Government’s commitment toward carbon emissions reduction and the advancement of the environmental cause. Using a naïve model which maximises the environmental cause at the expense of financial impact on the economy, this paper highlights how the failure of the first phase of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme can be attributed to the over-relaxation of parameters crucial to the success of the scheme as measured by verified reduction in emissions. The Government’s preferred position as elucidated in the Green Paper …