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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Keyword
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- Sentience (9)
- Animal welfare (8)
- Pain (5)
- Consciousness (4)
- Animal sentience (3)
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- Ethics (3)
- Invertebrates (3)
- Animal suffering (2)
- Cognitive dissonance (2)
- Feeling (2)
- Fish sentience (2)
- Welfare (2)
- Activism (1)
- Affective neuroscience (1)
- Agent causation (1)
- Ahimsa (1)
- Animal Welfare (1)
- Animal abuse (1)
- Animal consciousness (1)
- Animal emotions (1)
- Animal feelings (1)
- Animal minds (1)
- Animal pain (1)
- Animal rights (1)
- Animal suicide (1)
- Animal well-being (1)
- Aquaculture (1)
- Artificial intelligence (1)
- Associative learning (1)
- Attention (1)
Articles 1 - 30 of 40
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Unconscious Humans, Autonomous Machines And The Difficulty Of Knowing Which Animals Are Sentient, Marian Stamp Dawkins
Unconscious Humans, Autonomous Machines And The Difficulty Of Knowing Which Animals Are Sentient, Marian Stamp Dawkins
Animal Sentience
The framework proposed by Crump et al. still leaves much doubt about whether invertebrates such as crabs are sentient. For example, many complex behaviours - even in humans - occur without sentience. Also, simple machines could easily meet all of Crump et al.’s eight proposed criteria for sentience. Acknowledging the limitations of what we currently know about sentience is important both for formulating legislation correctly and for advancing scientific understanding of this most puzzling of biological phenomena.
Time To Stop Pretending We Don’T Know Other Animals Are Sentient Beings, Marc Bekoff
Time To Stop Pretending We Don’T Know Other Animals Are Sentient Beings, Marc Bekoff
Animal Sentience
Rowan et al.’s target article is an outstanding review of some of the history of the science of sentience, but one would have liked to see a much stronger “call to action.” We don’t need any more data to know that many other animals are sentient beings whose lives must be protected from harm in a wide variety of contexts. It is not anti-science to want more action on behalf of other animals right now.
Sentience In Decapod Crustaceans: A General Framework And Review Of The Evidence, Andrew Crump, Heather Browning, Alex Schnell, Charlotte Burn, Jonathan Birch
Sentience In Decapod Crustaceans: A General Framework And Review Of The Evidence, Andrew Crump, Heather Browning, Alex Schnell, Charlotte Burn, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
We outline a framework for evaluating scientific evidence of sentience, focusing on pain experience. It includes eight neural and cognitive-behavioural criteria, with confidence levels for each criterion reflecting the reliability and quality of the evidence. We outline the rationale for each criterion and apply our framework to a controversial sentience candidate: decapod crustaceans. We have either high or very high confidence that true crabs (infraorder Brachyura) satisfy five criteria, amounting to strong evidence of sentience. Moreover, we have high confidence that both anomuran crabs (infraorder Anomura) and astacid lobsters/crayfish (infraorder Astacidea) meet three criteria—substantial evidence of sentience. The case is, …
Animal Sentience Research: Synthesis And Proposals, Andrew Crump, Heather Browning, Alex Schnell, Charlotte Burn, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience Research: Synthesis And Proposals, Andrew Crump, Heather Browning, Alex Schnell, Charlotte Burn, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
Most commentaries on our target article broadly support our approach to evaluating evidence of animal sentience. In this Response, we clarify the framework’s purpose and address criticisms of our criteria. A recurring theme is that a framework to synthesise current evidence of sentience is not the same as an agenda for future directions in animal sentience research. Although future directions are valuable, our framework aims to evaluate existing evidence and inform animal welfare legislation.
All Living Organisms Are Sentient, Arthur S. Reber, Frantisek Baluska, William B. Miller Jr.
All Living Organisms Are Sentient, Arthur S. Reber, Frantisek Baluska, William B. Miller Jr.
Animal Sentience
We argue that all living organisms, from the simplest unicellular prokaryotes to Homo sapiens, have valenced experiences—feelings as states of preference—and are capable of cognitive representations. Bacteria can learn, form stable memories, and communicate, hence solve problems. Rowan et al.'s statement that "Subjective feelings are just that — subjective — and are available only to the animal (or human) experiencing them" is true but irrelevant. When we see a fish flopping about in the bottom of a boat we immediately recognize suffering without having a glimpse of the nature of piscine distress. Some controlled anthropomorphism can go a …
Legal Recognition Of Animal Sentience: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Jane Kotzmann
Legal Recognition Of Animal Sentience: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Jane Kotzmann
Animal Sentience
Rowan et al.’s target article provides a valuable indication of the work that was required to reach the point where animals are recognised as sentient in various laws. To ensure this work was not in vain, the language of sentience needs to be used as a moral currency to demand further cultural change involving greater human respect for animals.
The Science Of Animal Sentience And The Politics Of Animal Welfare Should Be Kept Separate, Marian Stamp Dawkins
The Science Of Animal Sentience And The Politics Of Animal Welfare Should Be Kept Separate, Marian Stamp Dawkins
Animal Sentience
Although linked historically by Rowan et al., the scientific study of animal sentience and political campaigns to improve animal welfare should be kept separate, for at least two reasons. First, the separation makes it clear that standards of evidence acceptable for ethical or political decisions on animal welfare can be lower than those required for a rigorously scientific approach to animal sentience. Second, it helps to avoid confirmatory bias in the form of giving undue weight to results that are in line with pre-conceived ideas and political views.
Revisiting Donald Griffin, Founder Of Cognitive Ethology, Carolyn A. Ristau
Revisiting Donald Griffin, Founder Of Cognitive Ethology, Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
Donald Griffin’s writings, beginning with The Question of Animal Awareness (1976), strove to persuade scientists to study the possibility of animal sentience, the basis of Rowan et al.’s efforts to promote animal well-being. Facing great hostility (but also some acceptance) for his ideas, Griffin initially avoided animal welfare advocacy, fearing it would further undermine his efforts to gain recognition of animal sentience. In later years, however, he began to ponder the ethical implications of animal sentience, intending to study wild elephants’ communication and social behavior to better understand their experienced life and apply it to improving conservation methods. As he …
Defining And Assessing Sentience, Barry O. Hughes
Defining And Assessing Sentience, Barry O. Hughes
Animal Sentience
Precisely what is meant by the term sentience and how does it overlap with being conscious? We accept that animals have feelings but how do we know what they are and can we measure them? It is important that we clarify the terminology underlying these difficult concepts. Over the last 50 years a scientific discipline has developed to tackle these questions in a systematic way. We have to avoid thoughtless anthropomorphism yet we have to try to relate sentience in animals, as appropriate, to corresponding experiences in humans.
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Animal Sentience
On the basis of the target article by Crump and colleagues, we suggest a more parsimonious scheme for evaluating the evidence for sentience. Since some of the criteria used by Crump et al. are not independent and some are uninformative we exclude some criteria and amalgamate others. We propose that evidence of flexible learning and prioritization, in conjunction with relevant data on brain organization, is sufficient for assigning pain-sentience to an animal and we suggest a scoring scheme based on four criteria.
Free Will And Animal Suicide, Sabina Schrynemakers
Free Will And Animal Suicide, Sabina Schrynemakers
Animal Sentience
David Peña-Guzmán presents two arguments against the view that because only humans have free will only humans can commit suicide: (1) nonhuman animals may possess free will, and (2) the libertarian notion of free will is incompatible with scientific explanation. The free will objection to animal suicide is indeed mistaken, but Peña-Guzmán’s criticism of the libertarian notion of free will seems misplaced. His target should instead be the assumption that free choices must be made consciously or self-reflectively or the assumption that freedom cannot come in degrees.
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Animal Sentience
The criteria for determining animal sentience proposed in the target article are sensible but they lack an explicit functional justification for the focus on pain. This commentary provides an abbreviated account of the most basic functional principles that underpin animal sentience and articulates some minimal criteria for determining its presence.
Crustacean Pain, Michael Tye
Crustacean Pain, Michael Tye
Animal Sentience
This commentary discusses the target article’s methodology, the relevance of the claim that crustaceans lack a neocortex to the thesis that they feel pain, and the evaluation of the results of some trade-off experiments done with hermit crabs.
Of Course Crustaceans Are Sentient: But There's More To The Story, Arthur S. Reber, Frantisek Baluska, William B. Miller Jr.
Of Course Crustaceans Are Sentient: But There's More To The Story, Arthur S. Reber, Frantisek Baluska, William B. Miller Jr.
Animal Sentience
We are in basic agreement with Crump et al. that animal welfare, particularly with regard to the experience of pain, is a topic of importance. However, we come to the issue from a different perspective, one in which all species are sentient and can feel pain. The implications of this theory are discussed.
No Need For Certainty In Animal Sentience, Yew Kwang Ng
No Need For Certainty In Animal Sentience, Yew Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
This commentary supports Crump et al.’s (2022) point that where risks to welfare are severe, strong evidence of sentience is sufficient to warrant protecting welfare. Crump et al.’s eight criteria for sentience are also useful. Flexible decision-making (5) and flexible behaviour (6) are consistent with Ng (1995). The concession that the “no-need-for-sentience” proposition is unnecessary also strengthens the importance of the target article’s conclusions.
Independence, Weight And Priority Of Evidence For Sentience, Elizabeth Irvine
Independence, Weight And Priority Of Evidence For Sentience, Elizabeth Irvine
Animal Sentience
This commentary maps out relationships of dependency between the criteria proposed in the target article (Crump et al. 2022), identifying the criteria that carry most of the weight of the evidence, and suggesting which criteria should have priority in research on sentience.
Decapod Sentience: Broadening The Framework, Cecilia De Souza Valente
Decapod Sentience: Broadening The Framework, Cecilia De Souza Valente
Animal Sentience
A framework for studying sentience in decapods is of great value, but how high a cost (in suffering) to each individual decapod (or any animal) is warranted for collecting scientific evidence of sentience? The lack of evidence for some of the target article’s proposed criteria surely results from the fact that research is focused mainly on biomedical studies, ecotoxicology, and commercial production, with decapod sentience and welfare seen as only a secondary research topic. I draw attention also to the possibility of a wider framework that includes all felt experiences, from suffering to pleasure.
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
In the target article Crump et al. present 8 criteria to assess whether decapods experience pain. Four of these -- sensory integration, motivational trade-offs, flexible self-protection, and associative learning -- could be used to assess sentience in general. In this commentary I discuss difficulties with using these criteria to provide evidence of sentience in decapods, particularly if this evidence is to change public opinion and policies. These difficulties are lack of evidence, the potential to eventually explain the neurobiological basis of the behaviors chosen as criteria, thereby eliminating any explanatory work for sentience, and the reluctance to bring animals that …
Generalizing Frameworks For Sentience Beyond Natural Species, Michael Levin
Generalizing Frameworks For Sentience Beyond Natural Species, Michael Levin
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. (2022) offer a well-argued example of an essential development: a rigorous framework for assessing sentience from the perspective of moral concern over an agent’s welfare. Current and forthcoming developments in bioengineering, synthetic morphology, artificial intelligence, biorobotics, and exobiology necessitate an expansion and generalization of this effort. Verbal reports (the Turing Test) and homology to human brains are utterly inadequate criteria for assessing the status of novel, unconventional agents that offer no familiar touchstone of phylogeny or anatomy. We must develop principled approaches to evaluating the sentience of (and thus, our responsibility to) beings of unfamiliar provenance and …
Distinguishing Epistemic And Moral Grounds For Legal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Distinguishing Epistemic And Moral Grounds For Legal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Animal Sentience
The criteria proposed by Crump et al. are based on various cognitive roles associated with sentience. A subset of them may be sufficient for certain kinds of welfare, but the presence of all of them should be considered as clearly sufficient for substantial kinds of legal protection based on their relation to capacities that we consider essential for moral standing in human beings.
What Might Decapod Sentience Mean For Policy, Practice, And Public?, Richard Gorman
What Might Decapod Sentience Mean For Policy, Practice, And Public?, Richard Gorman
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. provide eight criteria for evaluating sentience in decapods, with scope for for application to other taxa. Their work has attracted the interest of policymakers. This commentary discusses the limitations of conceptual and legal acknowledgement of sentience in chainging practice and public attitudes. More work is needed. Social science may be able to help.
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Animal Sentience
The eight criteria proposed in Crump et al.’s framework for evaluating pain sentience in decapod crustaceans are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to markers that could increase confidence in an animal’s sentience more generally. Some of the commentaries have already pointed out that pain is only one kind of sentience (Souza Valente). It has also already been pointed out that there are other criteria for pain that could be usefully added to the framework’s eight (Burrell). This expansive thinking about criteria that can be used to increase confidence in sentience raisess the question: in an expansive …
Unresolved Issues Of Behavioral Analysis In Invertebrates, Charles I. Abramson, Paco Calvo
Unresolved Issues Of Behavioral Analysis In Invertebrates, Charles I. Abramson, Paco Calvo
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. (2022) provide a framework for determining the presence of sentience in organisms. Their target article is interesting and thought-provoking, but it does not consider the many unresolved issues related to behavioral analysis – especially when it concerns invertebrates. We feel that no real progress can be made until such fundamental issues as the need for a consistent definition of conditioning phenomena, the lack of a generally accepted behavioral taxonomy, and the use of cognitive terms to explain invertebrate behavior are examined critically.
Sentience As Part Of Emotional Lives, Frans B. M. De Waal
Sentience As Part Of Emotional Lives, Frans B. M. De Waal
Animal Sentience
It is high time to explore the sentience of invertebrate animals, but this topic cannot be discussed without also exploring their emotional lives, including positive emotions. Sentience probably evolved to allow the regulation of emotions by endowing them with feelings.
How Much Of A Pain Would A Crustacean “Common Currency” Really Be?, Simon A. B. Brown
How Much Of A Pain Would A Crustacean “Common Currency” Really Be?, Simon A. B. Brown
Animal Sentience
We should be suspicious of the idea that experiencing pain could enable animals to trade off different motivations in a common currency. It is not even clear that humans have a common motivational currency reflected in evaluative experience. Instead, pain may capture attention, inhibiting attention to competing motivations and needs, thereby making genuine trade-offs harder. Our criteria for pain in invertebrates should be part of a more subtle theory of the relationship between pain and decision-making.
Sentience Criteria To Persuade The Reasonable Sceptic, Patrick Butlin
Sentience Criteria To Persuade The Reasonable Sceptic, Patrick Butlin
Animal Sentience
When presented with evidence that Crump et al.’s criteria are satisfied for the animals in some taxon, a sceptic could reasonably continue to suspend judgement about whether those animals are sentient. This is because the criteria refer to abilities which are associated with sentience in humans, but it is not clear that sentience is necessary for these abilities. The criteria could be strengthed by requiring evidence of a contrast in performance between cases in which information is carried by felt and unfelt states.
Decapod Sentience: Promising Framework And Evidence, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg Md
Decapod Sentience: Promising Framework And Evidence, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg Md
Animal Sentience
Strong points of the target article by Crump et al. are that it offers clear criteria for judging whether decapods are sentient, an effective semi-quantitative grading system for this purpose, and an astute, critical review of the literature. It concludes plausibly that major subgroups of decapods are sentient. A minor problem is that it includes classical, Pavlovian learning as a marker of sentience along with the more valid marker of complex (e.g., operant) learning. Another minor problem is that it does not distinguish results that are negative because of likely absence of sentience from results that are negative because they …
Lack Of Imagination Can Bias Our View Of Animal Sentience, Brian Key, Deborah Brown
Lack Of Imagination Can Bias Our View Of Animal Sentience, Brian Key, Deborah Brown
Animal Sentience
How an animal reacts to a sensory stimulus is often used to assess whether that animal can experience feelings such as pain and pleasure. This behavioural path is typically complemented with reference to how a human would normally respond to and experience an analogous stimulus. Together, these approaches can lead to a “hard to imagine otherwise” argument for feelings. It is time to go beyond these qualitative assessments and to now determine whether a nervous system can execute the neural functions necessary for sentience.
Decapods As Food, Companions And Research Animals: Legal Impact Of Ascribing Sentience, Jonathan J. Cooper, Ambrose Tinarwo, Beth A. Ventura
Decapods As Food, Companions And Research Animals: Legal Impact Of Ascribing Sentience, Jonathan J. Cooper, Ambrose Tinarwo, Beth A. Ventura
Animal Sentience
This commentary provides an overview of the practical implications of attributing sentience to protect decapods as food, companion and research animals in the UK context. Recognising their capacity to suffer has implications for humane slaughter in farming and fishing sectors. It should also place a greater duty of care on owners of captive decapods, considering their needs and avoiding unnecessary suffering. The recognition of decapod sentience should also have an impact on their protection as research animals, although research with a potential to cause suffering may be needed to better understand decapods’ capacity to suffer.
Pros And Cons Of A Framework For Evaluating Potential Pain In Decapods, Robert W. Elwood
Pros And Cons Of A Framework For Evaluating Potential Pain In Decapods, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
The rigorous framework for research into potential pain in decapods was successful in allowing legislators in the United Kingdom to evaluate a complex scientific issue. However, it might produce problems for research. I discuss doubts about the usefulness of the eight criteria. Some have yet to receive any investigation and others do not allow much inference about pain. In addition, some existing studies are not covered in the framework. Most worrying, however, is the potential for stifling future research of novel areas that are excluded from the framework.