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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos
Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos
Michael Diathesopoulos
In this paper, we will analyse the issue of concurrence between competition and sector rules and the relation between parallel concepts within the two different legal frameworks. We will firstly examine Third Party Access in relation to essential facilities doctrine and refusal of access and we will identify the common points and objectives of these concepts and the extent to which they provide a context to each other’s implementation. Second, we will focus on how Commission uses sector regulation and objectives as a context within the process of implementation of competition law in the energy sector and third, we will …
Los Enredos Por La Fibra Oscura, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor
Los Enredos Por La Fibra Oscura, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor
Víctor Pavón-Villamayor
No abstract provided.
It Works For Mergers, Why Not Finance, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert
It Works For Mergers, Why Not Finance, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han
Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han
Martijn A. Han
Compliance programs entail monitoring of employees' behavior with the claimed objective of fighting corporate crime. (Competition) Authorities promote such intra-firm monitoring. In a three-tier hierarchy model, authority-shareholder-manager, we study the impact of monitoring through a compliance program on contracting within the firm and the authority's optimal sanctions and leniency policy. We find that compliance programs are beneficial in the fight against corporate crime if and only if the managerial sanction is low. Moreover, when the shareholder blows the whistle, the authority optimally grants partial corporate leniency, while not granting individual leniency to the involved employees. Conversely, when the employee blows …
Normative Dynamics Of Competition Laws, Piyabutr Bunaramrueang
Normative Dynamics Of Competition Laws, Piyabutr Bunaramrueang
piyabutr bunaramrueang
This article aims at providing a review on normative dynamics of competition laws. Although legal norms seem to be very stable, those norms governing economic activities are changing relatively fast. It is therefore an attempt to illustrate dynamic quality of laws by using competition laws as a major example of laws governing economic activities. I would like to discuss mainly over U.S. antitrust laws as the major model of competition laws, perhaps, for all other countries pursuing economic growth of free market. The dynamic quality of U.S. antitrust laws is essentially derived from its legal tradition that invites legal reasoning …