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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Rise Of The 60-Vote Senate, Gregory Koger
The Rise Of The 60-Vote Senate, Gregory Koger
Gregory Koger
How did the Senate transform into a supermajority legislature? To answer this question, we must have a clear understanding of what filibustering was like before 1960, and why senators abandoned this system. I begin with some definitions and a quick historical survey, and then explain the emergence of the sixty-vote Senate.
The Past And Future Of The Supermajority Senate, Gregory Koger
The Past And Future Of The Supermajority Senate, Gregory Koger
Gregory Koger
The distinguishing feature of the modern U.S. Senate is the ability of any senator to block legislation and nominations, forcing the rest of the chamber to limit debate using a slow process that requires a 60-vote supermajority. This article explains the development of this new and powerful veto in the legislative process, its use as a minority party veto, and then reviews options for restoring the balance between governance and deliberation.
Effort, Intensity And Position Taking: Reconsidering Obstruction In The Pre-Cloture Senate, Kathleen Bawn, Gregory Koger
Effort, Intensity And Position Taking: Reconsidering Obstruction In The Pre-Cloture Senate, Kathleen Bawn, Gregory Koger
Gregory Koger
Effort is a crucial element of the legislative process — writing bills, forming coalitions, crafting strategies, and debating. We develop a model in which legislative decisions are the product of competitive effort by two teams, one trying to pass new legislation, and the other to block it. Teams choose effort levels based on preferences over the policy outcome, political rewards for effort, and opportunity costs, and the team that produces more effort wins. We apply this model to four cases of major legislation from the pre-cloture Senate: passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, the Ship Purchase Act of …
Filibustering And Majority Rule In The Senate: The Contest Over Judicial Nominations, 2003-2005, Gregory Koger
Filibustering And Majority Rule In The Senate: The Contest Over Judicial Nominations, 2003-2005, Gregory Koger
Gregory Koger
This chapter proves a simple point: the Senate could be a much more majoritarian chamber than it is. Presumably, as in the House, the majority party would benefit from restrictions on filibustering. Howevver, senators have been reluctant to make major reforms, even when they are members of the majority party and their party’s agenda is being thwarted by Senate minorities. The”nuclear option” contest over judicial nominations from 2003 to 2005 illustrates one source of this stability: the minority party may refrain from obstruction in the face of a threat to curtail the right to filibuster.
Filibuster Reform In The Senate, 1913-17, Gregory Koger
Filibuster Reform In The Senate, 1913-17, Gregory Koger
Gregory Koger
This chapter explains the adoption of the Senate's first cloture rule in 1917, specifically why the Senate adopted a supermajority (2/3) rule and why this event occurred in 1917.
Cloture Reform And Party Government In The Senate, 1918 To 1925, Gregory Koger
Cloture Reform And Party Government In The Senate, 1918 To 1925, Gregory Koger
Gregory Koger
Why does filibustering persist in the U.S. Senate? This article analyzes senators' preferences toward majority cloture from 1918 to 1925, a crucial period in Senate history. I find that majority party members were more likely to support stricter cloture rules, but support for cloture reform diminished within both parties for senators far from the party median. I find little evidence that support or opposition to cloture reform was linked to seniority, prior House experience, legislative activism, or state size. These findings are consistent with the micro-level claims of conditional party government theory.