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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Decentralized Decision Support For An Agent Population In Dynamic And Uncertain Domains, Pradeep Reddy Varakantham, Shih-Fen Cheng, Thi Duong Nguyen
Decentralized Decision Support For An Agent Population In Dynamic And Uncertain Domains, Pradeep Reddy Varakantham, Shih-Fen Cheng, Thi Duong Nguyen
Shih-Fen CHENG
This research is motivated by problems in urban transportation and labor mobility, where the agent flow is dynamic, non-deterministic and on a large scale. In such domains, even though the individual agents do not have an identity of their own and do not explicitly impact other agents, they have implicit interactions with other agents. While there has been much research in handling such implicit effects, it has primarily assumed controlled movements of agents in static environments. We address the issue of decision support for individual agents having involuntary movements in dynamic environments . For instance, in a taxi fleet serving …
Would Position Limits Have Made Any Difference To The 'Flash Crash' On May 6, 2010, Wing Bernard Lee, Shih-Fen Cheng, Annie Koh
Would Position Limits Have Made Any Difference To The 'Flash Crash' On May 6, 2010, Wing Bernard Lee, Shih-Fen Cheng, Annie Koh
Shih-Fen CHENG
On May 6, 2010, the US equity markets experienced a brief but highly unusual drop in prices across a number of stocks and indices. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell by approximately 9% in a matter of minutes, and several stocks were traded down sharply before recovering a short time later. Earlier research by Lee, Cheng and Koh (2010) identified the conditions under which a “flash crash” can be triggered by systematic traders running highly similar trading strategies, especially when they are “crowding out” other liquidity providers in the market. The authors contend that the events of May 6, …
Lagrangian Relaxation For Large-Scale Multi-Agent Planning, Geoff Gordon, Pradeep Reddy Varakantham, William Yeoh, Ajay Srinivasan, Hoong Chuin Lau, Shih-Fen Cheng
Lagrangian Relaxation For Large-Scale Multi-Agent Planning, Geoff Gordon, Pradeep Reddy Varakantham, William Yeoh, Ajay Srinivasan, Hoong Chuin Lau, Shih-Fen Cheng
Shih-Fen CHENG
Multi-agent planning is a well-studied problem with applications in various areas. Due to computational constraints, existing research typically focuses either on unstructured domains with many agents, where we are content with heuristic solutions, or domains with small numbers of agents or special structure, where we can find provably near-optimal solutions. In contrast, here we focus on provably near-optimal solutions in domains with many agents, by exploiting influence limits. To that end, we make two key contributions: (a) an algorithm, based on Lagrangian relaxation and randomized rounding, for solving multi-agent planning problems represented as large mixed-integer programs; (b) a proof of …
Notes On Equilibria In Symmetric Games, Shih-Fen Cheng, Daniel M. Reeves, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman
Notes On Equilibria In Symmetric Games, Shih-Fen Cheng, Daniel M. Reeves, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman
Shih-Fen CHENG
In a symmetric game, every player is identical with respect to the game rules. We show that a symmetric 2strategy game must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We also discuss Nash’s original paper and its generalized notion of symmetry in games. As a special case of Nash’s theorem, any finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, symmetric infinite games with compact, convex strategy spaces and continuous, quasiconcave utility functions have symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Finally, we discuss how to exploit symmetry for more efficient methods of finding Nash equilibria.
Distributing Complementary Resources Across Multiple Periods With Stochastic Demand, Shih-Fen Cheng, John Tajan, Hoong Chuin Lau
Distributing Complementary Resources Across Multiple Periods With Stochastic Demand, Shih-Fen Cheng, John Tajan, Hoong Chuin Lau
Shih-Fen CHENG
In this paper, we evaluate whether the robustness of a market mechanism that allocates complementary resources could be improved through the aggregation of time periods in which resources are consumed. In particular, we study a multi-round combinatorial auction that is built on a general equilibrium framework. We adopt the general equilibrium framework and the particular combinatorial auction design from the literature, and we investigate the benefits and the limitation of time-period aggregation when demand-side uncertainties are introduced. By using simulation experiments, we show that under stochastic conditions the performance variation of the process decreases as the time frame length (time …
Designing The Market Game For A Commodity Trading Simulation, Shih-Fen Cheng
Designing The Market Game For A Commodity Trading Simulation, Shih-Fen Cheng
Shih-Fen CHENG
In this paper, we propose to design a market game that (a) can be used in modeling and studying commodity trading scenarios, and (b) can be used in capturing human traders' behaviors. Specifically, we demonstrate the usefulness of this commodity trading game in a single-commodity futures trading scenario. A pilot experiment was run with a mixture of human traders and an autonomous agent that emulates the aggregatedmarket condition, with the assumption that this autonomous agent would hint each of its action through a public announcement. We show that the information collected from this simulation can be used to extract the …
Would Price Limits Have Made Any Difference To The 'Flash Crash' On May 6, 2010, Wing Bernard Lee, Shih-Fen Cheng, Annie Koh
Would Price Limits Have Made Any Difference To The 'Flash Crash' On May 6, 2010, Wing Bernard Lee, Shih-Fen Cheng, Annie Koh
Shih-Fen CHENG
On May 6, 2010, the U.S. equity markets experienced a brief but highly unusual drop in prices across a number of stocks and indices. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (see Figure 1) fell by approximately 9% in a matter of minutes, and several stocks were traded down sharply before recovering a short time later. The authors contend that the events of May 6, 2010 exhibit patterns consistent with the type of "flash crash" observed in their earlier study (2010). This paper describes the results of nine different simulations created by using a large-scale computer model to reconstruct the critical elements …
An Analysis Of Extreme Price Shocks And Illiquidity Among Trend Followers, Bernard Lee, Shih-Fen Cheng, Annie Koh
An Analysis Of Extreme Price Shocks And Illiquidity Among Trend Followers, Bernard Lee, Shih-Fen Cheng, Annie Koh
Shih-Fen CHENG
We construct an agent-based model to study the interplay between extreme price shocks and illiquidity in the presence of systematic traders known as trend followers. The agent-based approach is particularly attractive in modeling commodity markets because the approach allows for the explicit modeling of production, capacities, and storage constraints. Our study begins by using the price stream from a market simulation involving human participants and studies the behavior of various trend-following strategies, assuming initially that their participation will not impact the market. We notice an incremental deterioration in strategy performance as and when strategies deviate further and further from the …
A Mechanism For Organizing Last-Mile Service Using Non-Dedicated Fleet, Shih-Fen Cheng, Duc Thien Nguyen, Hoong Chuin Lau
A Mechanism For Organizing Last-Mile Service Using Non-Dedicated Fleet, Shih-Fen Cheng, Duc Thien Nguyen, Hoong Chuin Lau
Shih-Fen CHENG
Unprecedented pace of urbanization and rising income levels have fueled the growth of car ownership in almost all newly formed megacities. Such growth has congested the limited road space and significantly affected the quality of life in these megacities. Convincing residents to give up their cars and use public transport is the most effective way in reducing congestion; however, even with sufficient public transport capacity, the lack of last-mile (from the transport hub to the destination) travel services is the major deterrent for the adoption of public transport. Due to the dynamic nature of such travel demands, fixed-size fleets will …
An Agent-Based Commodity Trading Simulation, Shih-Fen Cheng, Yee Pin Lim
An Agent-Based Commodity Trading Simulation, Shih-Fen Cheng, Yee Pin Lim
Shih-Fen CHENG
In this paper, an event-centric commodity trading simulation powered by the multiagent framework is presented. The purpose of this simulation platform is for training novice traders. The simulation is progressed by announcing news events that affect various aspects of the commodity supply chain. Upon receiving these events, market agents that play the roles of producers, consumers, and speculators would adjust their views on the market and act accordingly. Their actions would be based on their roles and also their private information, and collectively they shape the market dynamics. This simulation has been effectively deployed for several training sessions. We will …
Iterated Weaker-Than-Weak Dominance, Shih-Fen Cheng, Michael P. Wellman
Iterated Weaker-Than-Weak Dominance, Shih-Fen Cheng, Michael P. Wellman
Shih-Fen CHENG
We introduce a weakening of standard gametheoretic δ-dominance conditions, called dominance, which enables more aggressive pruning of candidate strategies at the cost of solution accuracy. Equilibria of a game obtained by eliminating a δ-dominated strategy are guaranteed to be approximate equilibria of the original game, with degree of approximation bounded by the dominance parameter. We can apply elimination of δ-dominated strategies iteratively, but the for which a strategy may be eliminated depends on prior eliminations. We discuss implications of this order independence, and propose greedy heuristics for determining a sequence of eliminations to reduce the game as far as possible …
Niche-Seeking In Influence Maximization With Adversary, Long Foong Liow, Shih-Fen Cheng, Hoong Chuin Lau
Niche-Seeking In Influence Maximization With Adversary, Long Foong Liow, Shih-Fen Cheng, Hoong Chuin Lau
Shih-Fen CHENG
In hotly contested product categories dominated by a few powerful firms, it is quite common for weaker or late entrants to focus only on particular segments of the whole market. The rationale for such strategy is intuitive: to avoid direct confrontation with heavy-weight firms, and to concentrate in segments where these weaker firms have comparative advantages. In marketing, this is what people called “go niche or go home". The niche-building strategy may rely on “homophily", which implies that consumers in a particular market segment might possess certain set of attributes that cause them to appreciate certain products better (in other …
Multi-Period Combinatorial Auction Mechanism For Distributed Resource Allocation And Scheduling, Hoong Chuin Lau, Shih-Fen Cheng, Thin Yin Leong, Jong Han Park, Zhengyi Zhao
Multi-Period Combinatorial Auction Mechanism For Distributed Resource Allocation And Scheduling, Hoong Chuin Lau, Shih-Fen Cheng, Thin Yin Leong, Jong Han Park, Zhengyi Zhao
Shih-Fen CHENG
We consider the problem of resource allocation and scheduling where information and decisions are decentralized, and our goal is to propose a market mechanism that allows resources from a central resource pool to be allocated to distributed decision makers (agents) that seek to optimize their respective scheduling goals. We propose a generic combinatorial auction mechanism that allows agents to competitively bid for the resources needed in a multi-period setting, regardless of the respective scheduling problem faced by the agent, and show how agents can design optimal bidding strategies to respond to price adjustment strategies from the auctioneer. We apply our …