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Full-Text Articles in Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Designing For Incentives: Better Information Sharing For Better Software Engineering, Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Kurt Wallnau
Designing For Incentives: Better Information Sharing For Better Software Engineering, Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Kurt Wallnau
Gabriel A. Moreno
Software-reliant systems permeate all aspects of modern society. The resulting interconnectedness and associated complexity has resulted in a proliferation of diverse stakeholders with conflicting goals. Thus, contemporary software engineering is plagued by incentive conflicts, in settling on design features, allocating resources during the development of products, and allocating computational resources at runtime. In this position paper, we describe some of these problems and outline a research agenda in bridging to the economic theory of mechanism design, which seeks to align incentives in multi-agent systems with private information and conflicting goals. The ultimate goal is to advance a principled methodology for …
What The 2007 Tac Market Design Game Tells Us About Effective Auction Mechanisms, Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Peter Mcburney, Enrico Gerding
What The 2007 Tac Market Design Game Tells Us About Effective Auction Mechanisms, Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Peter Mcburney, Enrico Gerding
Publications and Research
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.