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Full-Text Articles in Organisms
Pantomime In Great Apes: Evidence And Implications, Ann E. Russon, Kristin Andrews
Pantomime In Great Apes: Evidence And Implications, Ann E. Russon, Kristin Andrews
Kristin Andrews, PhD
We recently demonstrated, by mining observational data, that forest-living orangutans can communicate using gestures that qualify as Pantomime. Pantomimes, like other iconic gestures, physically resemble their referents. More elaborately, pantomimes involve enacting their referents. Holding thumb and finger together at the lips and blowing between them to mean balloon is one example. Here we sketch evidence of pantomime in other great apes, methodological concerns, and sophisticated cognitive capabilities that great ape pantomimes suggest.
Politics Or Metaphysics? On Attributing Psychological Properties To Animals, Kristin Andrews
Politics Or Metaphysics? On Attributing Psychological Properties To Animals, Kristin Andrews
Kristin Andrews, PhD
Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part general method for determining whether a psychological property can be accurately attributed to a member of another species: folk expert opinion and functionality. This method is based on well-known assessments used to attribute mental states to humans who are unable to self-ascribe due to an early stage of development or impairment, and can be used to describe social and emotional development as well …
Are Apes’ Responses To Pointing Gestures Intentional?, Olivia Sultanescu, Kristin Andrews
Are Apes’ Responses To Pointing Gestures Intentional?, Olivia Sultanescu, Kristin Andrews
Kristin Andrews, PhD
This paper examines the meaningfulness of pointing in great apes. We appeal to Hannah Ginsborg’s conception of primitive normativity, which provides an adequate criterion for establishing whether a response is meaningful, and we attempt to make room for a conception according to which there is no fundamental difference between the responses of human infants and those of other great apes to pointing gestures. This conception is an alternative to Tomasello’s view that pointing gestures and reactions to them reveal a fundamental difference between humans and other apes.
Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties To Animals, Kristin Andrews
Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties To Animals, Kristin Andrews
Kristin Andrews, PhD
In the context of animal cognitive research, “anthropomorphism” is defined as the attribution of uniquely human mental characteristics to non-human animals. Those who worry about anthropomorphism in research are confronted with the question of which properties are uniquely human. As animals, humans and non-human animals1 share a number of biological, morphological, relational, and spatial properties. In addition, it is widely accepted and humans and animals share some psychological properties such as the ability to fear or desire. These claims about the properties animals share with humans are often the products of empirical work.