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Full-Text Articles in Life Sciences
Spineless And Sentient: A Challenge For Moral Comparison, Patrick Forber, Robert C. Jones
Spineless And Sentient: A Challenge For Moral Comparison, Patrick Forber, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
We agree with Mikhalevich & Powell but take issue with their criteria for attributing sentience. This problem is connected with difficult issues concerning moral comparisons and evaluating moral decisions when interspecific moral interests conflict.
Avoiding Anthropocentrism In Evolutionarily Inclusive Ethics, Simon Fitzpatrick
Avoiding Anthropocentrism In Evolutionarily Inclusive Ethics, Simon Fitzpatrick
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell are to be commended for challenging the “invertebrate dogma” that invertebrates are unworthy of ethical concern. However, developing an evolutionarily inclusive ethics requires facing some of the more radical implications of rejecting hierarchical scala naturae and human-centered conceptions of the biological world. In particular, we need to question the anthropocentric assumptions that still linger in discussions like these.
Invertebrate Welfare In The Wild, Asher Soryl
Invertebrate Welfare In The Wild, Asher Soryl
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that certain cognitive-affective biases might distort people’s consideration of invertebrate minds and that the moral risks of false negatives in sentience research deserve greater consideration under precautionary frameworks. In this commentary, I draw comparisons between biases that concern wild animals and conditions in nature, arguing that the moral risks of disregarding the possible mental welfare of invertebrates are compounded by facts about their lives in the wild.
Preserving Nature For The Benefit Of All Sentient Individuals, Eze Paez
Preserving Nature For The Benefit Of All Sentient Individuals, Eze Paez
Animal Sentience
I agree with Treves et al.’s proposal for a preservation ethics based on the principle that nonhuman well-being is a matter of justice and compassion. In this commentary, I advance two objections. First, only sentient beings, rather than all life, belong in the moral community. Second, given that nature is probably harmful overall for sentient individuals, preserving it for the benefit of future human and nonhuman generations requires us to modify it as far as practicable.