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Full-Text Articles in Life Sciences
Dissociation Between Conscious And Unconscious Processes As A Criterion For Sentience, Ivan Ivanchei, Nicolas Coucke, Axel Cleeremans
Dissociation Between Conscious And Unconscious Processes As A Criterion For Sentience, Ivan Ivanchei, Nicolas Coucke, Axel Cleeremans
Animal Sentience
Based on the literature on human consciousness, we suggest that to demonstrate sentience in a system, one needs to demonstrate both conscious and unconscious processing in the system. Major theories of consciousness require the existence of both conscious and unconscious processes. Contrasting effects of conscious and unconscious processes have been successfully used in human studies and have begun being applied in animal sentience research as well.
Plant Sentience: Getting To The Roots Of The Problem, Krzysztof Dolega, Savannah Siekierski, Axel Cleeremans
Plant Sentience: Getting To The Roots Of The Problem, Krzysztof Dolega, Savannah Siekierski, Axel Cleeremans
Animal Sentience
Segundo-Ortin’s (2023) target article invites us to consider the possibility that plants can experience subjectively felt states. We discuss this speculation on the basis of the functional neurobiology of consciousness. We suggest that demonstrating plant sentience would require that we identify not only behaviors analogous to those exhibited by sentient creatures, but also the functional analogues of the mechanisms causing such behaviors. The lack of clear evidence for any kind of integration between self-states, self-movement, environmental states, memory, or affective communication within plants suggests that plant sentience remains an admittedly fascinating, but ultimately merely provocative speculation.
Disentangling Sentience From Developmental Plasticity, Jonathan Birch
Disentangling Sentience From Developmental Plasticity, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
Plants, like animals, display remarkable developmental plasticity, inviting the metaphorical use of terms like “decision” and “choice”. In the animal case, this is not taken to be evidence of sentience, because sentience is a complex product of development, not something that guides it. We should apply the same standards when evaluating the evidence in plants. It is hard to overstate the contrast with the case of invertebrates such as octopuses, where pain markers that were originally developed for use in mammals have been clearly demonstrated and plausible neural substrates for sentience have been identified.
Do Plants Have The Cognitive Complexity For Sentience?, Ricard V. Solé
Do Plants Have The Cognitive Complexity For Sentience?, Ricard V. Solé
Animal Sentience
Are plants sentient? Like other aspects of the cognitive potential of plants, this is a controversial issue, often driven by analogies and seldom supported on solid theoretical grounds. Sentience is understood in cognitive sciences as the capacity to feel. I suggest that because of plants’ evolved adaptations to morphological plasticity, sessile nature and ecological constraints, they are unlikely to have the requisite cognitive complexity for sentience.
Sensing Is A Far Cry From Sentience, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio
Sensing Is A Far Cry From Sentience, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio
Animal Sentience
The hypothesis that plants might be sentient confuses the notion of sentience (or consciousness) with that of sensing. Sentience/consciousness implies feeling, experience, and subjectivity. Sensing does not. Plants can sense/detect and even respond appropriately in the absence of any sentience/consciousness.
Plant Sentience: A Hypothesis Based On Shaky Premises, Carel Ten Cate
Plant Sentience: A Hypothesis Based On Shaky Premises, Carel Ten Cate
Animal Sentience
Plants may produce fascinating behavioural phenomena for which the label ‘cognitive process’ may be applicable, at least by some definitions. Segundo-Ortin & Calvo (2023) base their hypothesis that plants might be sentient on the premise of demonstrated presence of cognitive complexity. However, the way phenomena are ascribed, and how the term ‘cognitive’ is used by Segundo-Ortin & Calvo, deviates from the common practice in studies of animal cognition, implying greater complexity than seems justified. It thus provides a questionable basis for attributing sentience to plants.
Plant Sentience And The Case For Ethical Veganism, Josh Milburn
Plant Sentience And The Case For Ethical Veganism, Josh Milburn
Animal Sentience
Does the possibility of plant sentience pose a problem for ethical veganism? It has not yet been demonstrated that plants are sentient (i.e., that they can feel). Moreover, even if it were demonstrated that plants could feel, it would also have to be demonstrated that they can feel the affectively “valenced” feelings that are ethically significant, such as pain and fear, rather than just neutral sensations such as darker/lighter, or wetter/drier. Finally, if plants could feel valenced feelings, veganism would likely still be the ethical option, on the principle of causing the least harm.
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
Animal Sentience
Starting with its title, Key’s (2016) target article advocates the view that fish do not feel pain. The author describes the neuroanatomical, physiological and behavioural conditions involved in the experience of pain in humans and rodents and confidently applies analogical arguments as though they were established facts in support of the negative conclusion about the inability of fish to feel pain. The logical reasoning, unfortunately, becomes somewhat incoherent, with the arbitrary application of the designated human criteria for an analogical argument to one animal species (e.g., rodents) but not another (fish). Research findings are reported selectively, and questionable interpretations are …