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Full-Text Articles in Life Sciences
Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and nonhuman animals do not make humans superior to animals. I suggest that humans have domain-general cognitive abilities that make them superior in causing uniquely complex changes in the world not caused by any other species. The ability to conceive of and articulate a claim of rights is an example. However, possession of superior cognitive ability does not entitle humans to superior moral status. It is sentience, not cognitive complexity, that is the basis for the assignment of rights and the protections under the law that accompany them.
Reconciling Just Preservation, Shelley M. Alexander
Reconciling Just Preservation, Shelley M. Alexander
Animal Sentience
Treves et al.’s target article can play an important role in reconciling the needs of future generations and non-human animals in conservation. Human capacities are adequate for interpreting and defining many non-human animal needs. Worldviews are more complex, however, and conservation science, like the target article itself, suffers from a lack of diversity and inclusiveness. This may pose practical impediments to realizing just preservation.
What If All Animals Are Sentient?, Arthur S. Reber
What If All Animals Are Sentient?, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
Birch develops a useful framework for determining when the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) should be invoked. He rightly notes that there is a lack of agreement among social scientists, ethicists, and legislators even about whether the precautionary principle is useful, let alone when and how it should be implemented. His proposal is to establish a kind of cognitive threshold, and only when an animal shows a sufficient level of sentience would the ASPP be appropriate. From the point of view of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness model (Reber, 2016), all animals are sentient. If correct, the problems Birch identifies …
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
Animal Sentience
Starting with its title, Key’s (2016) target article advocates the view that fish do not feel pain. The author describes the neuroanatomical, physiological and behavioural conditions involved in the experience of pain in humans and rodents and confidently applies analogical arguments as though they were established facts in support of the negative conclusion about the inability of fish to feel pain. The logical reasoning, unfortunately, becomes somewhat incoherent, with the arbitrary application of the designated human criteria for an analogical argument to one animal species (e.g., rodents) but not another (fish). Research findings are reported selectively, and questionable interpretations are …
Animal Welfare And Animal Rights, M.E. Rolle
Animal Welfare And Animal Rights, M.E. Rolle
Animal Sentience
This overview of Broom’s book, Sentience and Animal Welfare (2014), considers the role the book could play in the animal rights debate. In a thoroughly researched and objectively presented text, Broom lays out information that could place doubt in the minds of decision-makers. By highlighting not just the ways animals resemble humans, but also the ways humans resemble animals, Broom shines a light on a solidly grey area in the animal rights debate.