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Statutory interpretation

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Full-Text Articles in Supreme Court of the United States

Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder Jan 1996

Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.


Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, And The Interpretation Of Statutes, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 1994

Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, And The Interpretation Of Statutes, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist is often viewed as the ultimate "political" judge. According to Mark Tushnet, for example, "[o]ne could account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist' s bottom-line results by looking, not at anything in the United States Reports, but rather at the platforms of the Republican Party." Nowhere is this attitude more prevalent than with respect to issues of statutory interpretation. When I informed colleagues I was working on an article about Chief Justice Rehnquist's theory of statutory interpretation, the almost universal response was: "What theory?"

Contrary to the common view that Chief Justice Rehnquist …


Textualism And The Future Of The Chevron Doctrine, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 1994

Textualism And The Future Of The Chevron Doctrine, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The last decade has been a remarkable one for statutory interpretation. For most of our history, American judges have been pragmatists when it comes to interpreting statutes. They have drawn on various conventions – the plain meaning rule, legislative history, considerations of statutory purpose, canons of construction – "much as a golfer selects the proper club when he gauges the distance to the pin and the contours of the course." The arrival of Justice Scalia on the Supreme Court has changed this. Justice Scalia is a foundationalist, insisting that certain interpretational tools should be permanently banned from judicial use. What …


The Meaning Of "Under Color Of" Law, Steven L. Winter Dec 1992

The Meaning Of "Under Color Of" Law, Steven L. Winter

Michigan Law Review

The argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, I examine why the conceptual problem of who or what is "the State" is so intractable. In Part II, I present the historical evidence that establishes beyond doubt the pedigree and meaning of the phrase under color of law. I explain why Frankfurter would have indulged in such an obvious historical error to take the position he did. I suggest that, as was the case with the invention of modem standing doctrine, Frankfurter was here engaged in a stealthy, anachronistic campaign against the jurisprudence of the Lochner era - attempting to …


A Reevaluation Of The Canons Of Statutory Interpretation, Joseph H. Bates Apr 1992

A Reevaluation Of The Canons Of Statutory Interpretation, Joseph H. Bates

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Symposium has its genesis in the Vanderbilt Law Review's inaugural symposium, A Symposium on Statutory Construction, published in 1950.' Although the 1950 Symposium included a Foreword by Justice Felix Frankfurter and contributions by several preeminent scholars in the field, Karl Llewellyn's clumsily titled but succinctly written Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed has eclipsed the Symposium which brought it to light and has persevered as a highly influential, if not definitive, critique of the canons of statutory construction.

Llewelyn's article, in general, attacks legal formalism and …


Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall Aug 1990

Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall

Michigan Law Review

In the law school tradition of "suspending belief," Professor Eskridge has created a hypothetical in which I, in my first case as Chief Justice of the United States, must decide whether to adhere to various antiquated and seemingly erroneous precedents interpreting the Mann Act. Eskridge assumes that I will feel compelled to adhere to these decisions, for to do otherwise, he contends, would force me to abandon the proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that I advanced recently in this Law Review. Eskridge then offers a variety of critiques of my thesis, coming from perspectives as diverse …


The Case Of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis For Statutory Cases, William N. Eskridge Jr. Aug 1990

The Case Of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis For Statutory Cases, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Earlier in this the first year of the new millennium, Professor Larry Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of the United States. The first important case coming before the Marshall Court involved the government's prosecution of Frankly Amorous under the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 1910 (the Mann Act), as amended. Defendant Amorous was a law student in Virginia who paid for the airplane ticket of his female lover to travel from North Carolina to Virginia for the admitted purpose of having extramarital sexual relations. The U.S. Attorney prosecuted Amorous for violating the Mann Act, which criminalizes the knowing …


Legislative Inaction And The Patterson Case, Earl M. Maltz Feb 1989

Legislative Inaction And The Patterson Case, Earl M. Maltz

Michigan Law Review

In its October 1988 issue,1 the Michigan Law Review published a symposium on Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, a case in which the Supreme Court has requested reargument on the question of whether Runyon v. McCrary should be overruled or modified. Each of the three distinguished contributors to the symposium concludes that the Court should not overrule Runyon. In reaching this conclusion, Professor William N. Eskridge and Professor Daniel A. Farber rely heavily on the view that because Congress has recognized the existence of the Runyon doctrine and has refused to overrule the decision, the doctrine of stare decisis …


Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, And Civil Rights, Daniel A. Farber Oct 1988

Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, And Civil Rights, Daniel A. Farber

Michigan Law Review

This month the Supreme Court will hear reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union on the question of whether section 1981 prohibits discrimination by private parties. Professor Farber identifies three issues which lie at the heart of Patterson: Must statutes be construed to conform to the intent of the drafters? Does legislative inaction provide reliable guidance to interpreters of statutes? And should the nature of the claim at issue - here a claim of civil rights - influence the interpreters? On this last point, Professor Farber argues that public values must be relevant to statutory interpretation and that judges …


Interpreting Legislative Inaction, William N. Eskridge Jr. Oct 1988

Interpreting Legislative Inaction, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Michigan Law Review

This month the Supreme Court will hear reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union on the question of whether section 1981 prohibits discrimination by private parties. In this article, Professor Eskridge addresses the issue of how legislative inaction should affect statutory interpretation. He begins by constructing a detailed analysis of the Court's legislative inaction cases, arguing that the case law is much more coherent than previous analysts have suggested. Professor Eskridge then considers Justice Scalia's critique of that case law and provides support for Justice Scalia's views by distinguishing actual and presumed legislative intent, arguing that, based on a conception …


Updating Statutory Interpretation, T. Alexander Aleinikoff Oct 1988

Updating Statutory Interpretation, T. Alexander Aleinikoff

Michigan Law Review

This month the Supreme Court will hear reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union on the question of whether section 1981 prohibits discrimination by private parties. Professor Aleinikoff examines in depth the first issue raised by Professor Farber. Using metaphors of the archeological and the nautical Professor Aleinikoff describes theories of originalism and their application to statutory interpretation. Concluding that there are nonoriginalist (or nonarcheological) elements implicit in these theories, he proceeds to consider how an explicitly nonoriginalist (or nautical) theory of interpretation might work He concludes by commenting on the application of such a theory to Patterson.


Making Uncle Sam Pay: A Review Of Equal Access To Justice Act Cases In The Sixth Circuit, 1983-1987, Martin Geer, Paul D. Reingold Jan 1988

Making Uncle Sam Pay: A Review Of Equal Access To Justice Act Cases In The Sixth Circuit, 1983-1987, Martin Geer, Paul D. Reingold

Articles

Despite the recent admonition of the Supreme Court that a "request for attorneys' fees should not result in a second major litigation,"12 the courts have been frequently called on to interpret the often ambiguous language of the EAJA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not been spared this difficult chore. While the 1985 amendments have clarified some provisions of the Act and affected some major decisions in the Sixth Circuit, the recent changes have also left other previously settled areas in a state of flux. This article will review the Sixth Circuit's EAJA decisions from 1983-1987, …


The Delegation Doctrine: Could The Court Give It Substance?, David Schoenbrod Apr 1985

The Delegation Doctrine: Could The Court Give It Substance?, David Schoenbrod

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this Article demonstrates the need for a new approach to the delegation doctrine. It shows that the Court has failed to articulate a coherent test of improper delegation and that the alternative tests offered by commentators are not sufficient. Part II then sets forth a proposed test of improper delegation. The basic principles of an approach prohibiting delegations of legislative power are outlined and illustrated. This Article does not, however, attempt anything so grand as to suggest a final definition of the doctrine or to pass broadly on the validity of statutes. Such an encompassing analysis is …


The Canons Of Indian Treaty And Statutory Construction: A Proposal For Codification, Jill De La Hunt Apr 1984

The Canons Of Indian Treaty And Statutory Construction: A Proposal For Codification, Jill De La Hunt

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that the canons of construction should play a central role in the interpretation of Indian treaties and statutes. The Note proposes revitalization of the canons through congressional action codifying the rules of construction into federal law. Part I traces the historical development of the canons to further the federal-Indian trust relationship. Part II analyzes recent Supreme Court decisions that demonstrate decreased use of the canons. Part III argues that strong canons of construction are necessary to the development of self-determining Indian tribes and proposes federal legislation to ensure the continued vitality and importance of the canons of …


Guides To Harmonizing Section 5 Of The Federal Trade Commission Act With The Sherman And Clayton Acts, S. Chesterfield Oppenheim Apr 1961

Guides To Harmonizing Section 5 Of The Federal Trade Commission Act With The Sherman And Clayton Acts, S. Chesterfield Oppenheim

Michigan Law Review

This topic is a constellation of antitrust highlights. Within the past five years the Federal Trade Commission has ventured into borderlands of its claim of jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in testing the scope of section 5 itself and its relation to the Commission's jurisdiction under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.


Reappraisal Of Federal Question Jurisdiction, G. Merle Bergman Nov 1947

Reappraisal Of Federal Question Jurisdiction, G. Merle Bergman

Michigan Law Review

For some time I have been reading and listening to criticisms directed toward decisions which the Supreme Court has rendered in cases involving federal question jurisdiction. The general 'tenor of this criticism is that these decisions demonstrate a surprising lack of uniformity and conscious purpose. Writers profess to search in vain for sound logic in the Court's opinions. They point up instead the anomaly which is reflected when cases involving a substantial federal issue are tried in state courts, while those in which no real federal issue is involved are nevertheless accepted for trial in the federal courts. This result, …


Limitation As To The Amount Of Liability For Loss Of Goods By Carriers, Edwin C. Goddard Jan 1915

Limitation As To The Amount Of Liability For Loss Of Goods By Carriers, Edwin C. Goddard

Articles

A carload of automobiles was shipped by express, under an express receipt limiting recovery to $50, unless a greater value was named and a greater carrying charge paid. The shipper knew of this stipulation, and deliberately chose the restricted liability so as to secure the lower rate. On a suit for loss of the automobiles, recovery was limited to $50. Geo. N. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 189 Fed. 561, commented on in 10 MICH. L. REB. 317. The United States Supreme Court has just affirmed this decision, 35 Sup. Ct. 351.


A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon The Legislative Power Of The States Of The American Union, Thomas M. Cooley, Victor H. Lane Jan 1903

A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon The Legislative Power Of The States Of The American Union, Thomas M. Cooley, Victor H. Lane

Books

“At the request of the late Judge Cooley I have undertaken the preparation of this edition of the Constitutional Limitations. It seemed desirable, in view of all the circumstances, that the text of the last edition should stand as the text for this, and the work of the present editor has been confined to the bringing of the book down to date, by the addition of such matter to the notes as will fairly present the development of this branch of the law since the publication of the last edition.” --Preface to the Seventh Edition, Victor H. Lane, Ann Arbor, …


A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon The Legislative Power Of The States Of The American Union, Thomas M. Cooley Dec 1877

A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon The Legislative Power Of The States Of The American Union, Thomas M. Cooley

Books

In the Preface to the first edition of this work. the author stated its purpose to be, to furnish to the practitioner and the student of the law such a presentation of elementary constitutional principles as should serve, with the aid of its references to judicial decisions, legal treatises, and historical events, as a convenient guide in the examination of questions respecting the constitutional limitations which rest upon the power of the several State legislatures. …

Preface to the 4th Edition: "New topics in State Constitutional Law are not numerous; but such as are suggested by recent decisions have been …