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Articles 31 - 60 of 199
Full-Text Articles in Supreme Court of the United States
"I'M Leavin' It (All) Up To You": Gundy And The (Sort-Of) Resurrection Of The Subdelegation Doctrine, Gary S. Lawson
"I'M Leavin' It (All) Up To You": Gundy And The (Sort-Of) Resurrection Of The Subdelegation Doctrine, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
In 2000, Cass Sunstein quipped that the conventional nondelegation doctrine, which holds that there are judicially enforceable constitutional limits on the extent to which Congress can confer discretion on other actors to determine the content of federal law, “has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”1 The “one good year,” he said, was 1935, when the Court twice held unconstitutional certain provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act that gave the president power to approve or create codes of conduct for essentially all American businesses, subject only to very vague, and often contradictory, statutory exhortations to pursue …
Securities Law In The Sixties: The Supreme Court, The Second Circuit, And The Triumph Of Purpose Over Text, Adam C. Pritchard, Robert B. Thompson
Securities Law In The Sixties: The Supreme Court, The Second Circuit, And The Triumph Of Purpose Over Text, Adam C. Pritchard, Robert B. Thompson
Articles
This Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s leading securities cases from 1962 to 1972—SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.; and Affiliated Ute of Utah v. United States—relying not just on the published opinions, but also the Justices’ internal letters, memos, and conference notes. The Sixties Court did not simply apply the text as enacted by Congress, but instead invoked the securities laws’ purposes as a guide to interpretation. The Court became a partner of Congress in shaping the securities laws, rather …
Originalism And Congressional Power To Enforce The Fourteenth Amendment, Christopher W. Schmidt
Originalism And Congressional Power To Enforce The Fourteenth Amendment, Christopher W. Schmidt
Washington and Lee Law Review Online
In this Essay, I argue that originalism conflicts with the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence defining the scope of Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the standard established in Boerne v. Flores, the Court limits congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to statutory remedies premised on judicially defined interpretations of Fourteenth Amendment rights. A commitment to originalism as a method of judicial constitutional interpretation challenges the premise of judicial interpretive supremacy in Section 5 jurisprudence in two ways. First, as a matter of history, an originalist reading of Section 5 provides support for broad judicial …
A "Chinese Wall" At The Nation's Borders: Justice Stephen Field And The Chinese Exclusion Case, Polly J. Price
A "Chinese Wall" At The Nation's Borders: Justice Stephen Field And The Chinese Exclusion Case, Polly J. Price
Faculty Articles
First, the sweeping implications of The Chinese Exclusion Case had as much to do with the Supreme Court's concerns about its relationship with both Congress and the President as it did with the Chinese as a disparaged racial group. There are other dimensions beyond race, and one of these was the Supreme Court's view of its role with respect to the other branches of government. Importantly, the Court did not decide the balance of authority between the President and Congress on matters of immigration, an omission that surely lessens its precedential value today.
Second, the Court's pronouncement in the Chinese …
Original Intent: Understanding The Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction In Controversies Between States, Kristen A. Linsley
Original Intent: Understanding The Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction In Controversies Between States, Kristen A. Linsley
The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process
No abstract provided.
Congress To Judges: We’Re The Boss Of You Now, Joanne Doroshow
Congress To Judges: We’Re The Boss Of You Now, Joanne Doroshow
Other Publications
No abstract provided.
The Sec, Administrative Usurpation, And Insider Trading, Adam C. Pritchard
The Sec, Administrative Usurpation, And Insider Trading, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
The history of insider trading law is a tale of administrative usurpation and legislative acquiescence. Congress has never enacted a prohibition against insider trading, much less defined it. Instead, the SEC has led in defining insider trading, albeit without the formality of rulemaking, and subject to varying degrees of oversight by the courts. The reason why lies in the deference that the Supreme Court gave to the SEC in its formative years. The roots of insider trading law are commonly traced to the SEC’s decision in Cady, Roberts & Co. Cady, Roberts was only made possible, however, by the …
Jurisdiction And Resentencing: How Prosecutorial Waiver Can Offer Remedies Congress Has Denied, Leah Litman, Luke C. Beasley
Jurisdiction And Resentencing: How Prosecutorial Waiver Can Offer Remedies Congress Has Denied, Leah Litman, Luke C. Beasley
Articles
This Essay is about what prosecutors can do to ensure that prisoners with meritorious legal claims have a remedy. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes draconian conditions on when prisoners may file successive petitions for post-conviction review (that is, more than one petition for post-conviction review). AEDPA’s restrictions on post-conviction review are so severe that they routinely prevent prisoners with meritorious claims from vindicating those claims.
The Proposed Separation Of Powers Restoration Act Goes Too Far, Jack M. Beermann
The Proposed Separation Of Powers Restoration Act Goes Too Far, Jack M. Beermann
Shorter Faculty Works
If passed, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act would require federal courts conducting judicial review of agency action to decide “de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions and rules.” Although I have long been highly critical of Chevron, see, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 9 (2010), and also have misgivings about Auer deference, I fear that the proposed Act goes too far in completely eliminating deference to agency legal determinations.
Nfib V. Sebelius And The Individual Mandate: Thoughts On The Tax/Regulation Distinction, Kyle D. Logue
Nfib V. Sebelius And The Individual Mandate: Thoughts On The Tax/Regulation Distinction, Kyle D. Logue
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
When Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB) explaining the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) minimum essential coverage provision (sometimes referred to as the individual mandate), he reasoned that the mandate—or, more precisely, the enforcement provision that accompanied the mandate (the Shared Responsibility Payment or SRP)—could be understood as a tax on the failure to purchase health insurance. According to this view, the enactment of the mandate and its accompanying enforcement provisions fell within Congress’s virtually unlimited power to “lay and collect taxes.” This tax-based interpretation …
Law Professors Want Hearing, Vote On Garland, Eric Berger, Kristen M. Blankley, Brian H. Bornstein, Eve M. Brank, Robert C. Denicola, Alan H. Frank, Stephen S. Gealy, Justin Hurwitz, David Landis, Craig M. Lawson, Richard Leiter, William H. Lyons, Richard H. Lawson, Matt Novak, Allen Overcash, Stefanie S. Pearlman, Ross Pesek, Kevin Ruser, Robert F. Schopp, Anthony Schutz, Anna Williams Shavers, Brett C. Stohs, Ryan Sullivan, Richard L. Weiner, Steven L. Willborn, Sandra Zellmer
Law Professors Want Hearing, Vote On Garland, Eric Berger, Kristen M. Blankley, Brian H. Bornstein, Eve M. Brank, Robert C. Denicola, Alan H. Frank, Stephen S. Gealy, Justin Hurwitz, David Landis, Craig M. Lawson, Richard Leiter, William H. Lyons, Richard H. Lawson, Matt Novak, Allen Overcash, Stefanie S. Pearlman, Ross Pesek, Kevin Ruser, Robert F. Schopp, Anthony Schutz, Anna Williams Shavers, Brett C. Stohs, Ryan Sullivan, Richard L. Weiner, Steven L. Willborn, Sandra Zellmer
Nebraska College of Law: Faculty Publications
Dear Senator Fischer and Senator Sasse,
We write this as citizens, but we all teach at the University of Nebraska College of Law. We hold different political viewpoints and disagree frequentIy with each other on political and legal issues. As law professors, however, we share a deep commitment to the rule of law and an impartial judiciary. We therefore urge you to hold confirmation hearings and a vote on President Obama's Supreme Court nominee, Chief Judge Merrick B. Garland.
The Indefinite Deflection Of Congressional Standing, Nat Stern
The Indefinite Deflection Of Congressional Standing, Nat Stern
Pepperdine Law Review
Recent litigation brought or threatened against the administration of President Obama has brought to prominence the question of standing by Congress or its members to sue the President for nondefense or non-enforcement of federal law. While scholars divide over the normative propriety of such suits, the Court has never issued a definitive pronouncement on their viability. Nevertheless, the Court’s rulings when the issue has arisen have displayed a distinct pattern. While the Court has not formally repudiated suits of this nature, neither has it issued a decision that hinges on the presence of congressional standing. On the contrary, the Court …
Does A House Of Congress Have Standing Over Appropriations?: The House Of Representatives Challenges The Affordable Care Act, Bradford Mank
Does A House Of Congress Have Standing Over Appropriations?: The House Of Representatives Challenges The Affordable Care Act, Bradford Mank
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
In U.S. House of Representatives v. Sylvia Matthews Burwell, the District Court for D.C. in 2015 held that the House of Representatives has Article III standing to challenge certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act as violations of the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on legislative standing is complicated. The Court has generally avoided the contentious question of whether Congress has standing to challenge certain presidential actions because of the difficult separation-of-powers concerns in such cases. In Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that individual members of Congress generally do not have Article III standing by simply holding …
When Is An Agency A Court? A Modified Functional Approach To State Agency Removal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Nicholas Jackson
When Is An Agency A Court? A Modified Functional Approach To State Agency Removal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Nicholas Jackson
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Note argues that courts should interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which permits removal from state court to federal court, to allow removal from state administrative agencies when the agency performs “court-like functions.” Circuits that apply a literal interpretation of the statute and forbid removal from state agencies should adopt this “functional” approach. The functional approach, which this Note calls the McCullion-Floeter test, should be modified to comport with legislative intent and public policy considerations: first, state agency adjudications should not be removable when the adjudication requires technical expertise, which federal courts cannot obtain because they adjudicate cases in a …
Delegating Tax, James R. Hines Jr., Kyle D. Logue
Delegating Tax, James R. Hines Jr., Kyle D. Logue
Michigan Law Review
Congress delegates extensive and growing lawmaking authority to federal administrative agencies in areas other than taxation, but tightly limits the scope of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Treasury regulatory discretion in the tax area, specifically not permitting these agencies to select or adjust tax rates. This Article questions why tax policy does and should differ from other policy areas in this respect, noting some of the potential policy benefits of delegation. Greater delegation of tax lawmaking authority would allow administrative agencies to apply their expertise to fiscal policy and afford timely adjustment to changing economic circumstances. Furthermore, delegation of the …
Fun With Administrative Law: A Game For Lawyers And Judges, Adam Babich
Fun With Administrative Law: A Game For Lawyers And Judges, Adam Babich
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
The practice of law is not a game. Administrative law in particular can implicate important issues that impact people’s health, safety, and welfare and change business’ profitability or even viability. Nonetheless, it can seem like a game. This is because courts rarely explain administrative law rulings in terms of the public purposes and policies at issue in lawsuits. Instead, the courts’ administrative law opinions tend to turn on arcane interpretive doctrines with silly names, such as the “Chevron two-step” or “Chevron step zero.” To advance doctrinal arguments, advocates and courts engage in linguistic debates that resemble a smokescreen—tending to obscure …
The Supreme Court's Quiet Revolution: Redefining The Meaning Of Jurisdiction, Erin Morrow Hawley
The Supreme Court's Quiet Revolution: Redefining The Meaning Of Jurisdiction, Erin Morrow Hawley
Faculty Publications
Over the last three decades, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have carried out a quiet revolution in the nature and meaning of jurisdiction. Historically, federal courts generally treated procedural requirements, like filing deadlines and exhaustion prerequisites, as presumptively "jurisdictional. "In case after case, the modern Court has reversed course. The result has been an unobtrusive but seminal redefinition of what jurisdiction means to begin with: the adjudicatory authority of the federal courts. This shift is momentous, but it has been obscured by the Court's erstwhile imposition of a clear statement requirement. For courts to find a statutory requirement jurisdictional, Congress …
Enforcing The Fifteenth Amendment, Ellen D. Katz
Enforcing The Fifteenth Amendment, Ellen D. Katz
Book Chapters
This chapter examines efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in the period from United States v. Reese through Shelby County v. Holder. Reese and Shelby County expose the most rigorous stance the Court has employed to review congressional efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, while the years in-between show Congress and the Court working more in tandem, at times displaying remarkable indifference to blatant violations of the Fifteenth Amendment, and elsewhere working cooperatively to help vindicate the Amendment’s promise. Defying simple explanation, this vacillation between cooperation and resistance captures the complex and deeply consequential way concerns about federal power, …
A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan R. Nash
A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan R. Nash
Faculty Articles
The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-of-powers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors.
Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …
The Ada And The Supreme Court: A Mixed Record, Samuel R. Bagenstos
The Ada And The Supreme Court: A Mixed Record, Samuel R. Bagenstos
Articles
According to conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court has resisted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) at every turn. The Court, the story goes, has read the statute extremely narrowly and, as a result, stripped away key protections that Congress intended to provide. Its departure from congressional intent, indeed, was so extreme that Congress passed a statute that overturned several key decisions and codified broad statutory protections. That statute, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). passed with widespread bipartisan support, and President George W. Bush signed it into law. The conventional wisdom leaves out a major part of the story. …
The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus
The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus
Articles
According to a well-known principle of constitutional interpretation here identified as the “internal-limits canon,” the powers of Congress must always be construed as authorizing less legislation than a general police power would. This Article argues that the internallimits canon is unsound. Whether the powers of Congress would in practice authorize any legislation that a police power would authorize is a matter of contingency: it depends on the relationship between the powers and the social world at a given time. There is no reason why, at a given time, the powers cannot turn out to authorize any legislation that a police …
The Bond Court's Institutional Truce, Monica Hakimi
The Bond Court's Institutional Truce, Monica Hakimi
Articles
As many readers are aware, Bond v. United States is a quirky case. The federal government prosecuted under the implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) a betrayed wife who used chemical agents to try to harm her husband’s lover. The wife argued that, as applied to her, the implementing legislation violated the Tenth Amendment. She thus raised difficult questions about the scope of the treaty power and of Congress’s authority to implement treaties through the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Bond Court avoided those questions with a clear statement rule: “we can insist on a clear indication that …
Dismissing Deterrence, Ellen D. Katz
Dismissing Deterrence, Ellen D. Katz
Articles
The proposed Voting Rights Amendment Act of 20144 (VRAA)[...]’s new criteria defining when jurisdictions become subject to preclearance are acutely responsive to the concerns articulated in Shelby County[ v. Holder]. The result is a preclearance regime that, if enacted, would operate in fewer places and demand less from those it regulates. This new regime, however, would not only be more targeted and less powerful, but, curiously, more vulnerable to challenge. In fact, the regime would be more vulnerable precisely because it is so responsive to Shelby County. Some background will help us see why.
Federalism And Phantom Economic Rights In Nfib V. Sibelius, Matthew Lindsay
Federalism And Phantom Economic Rights In Nfib V. Sibelius, Matthew Lindsay
All Faculty Scholarship
Few predicted that the constitutional fate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act would turn on Congress’ power to lay and collect taxes. Yet in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court upheld the centerpiece of the Act — the minimum coverage provision (MCP), commonly known as the “individual mandate” — as a tax. The unexpected basis of the Court’s holding has deflected attention from what may prove to be the decision’s more constitutionally consequential feature: that a majority of the Court agreed that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to penalize people who decline to purchase health insurance. …
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …
Enacted Legislative Findings And The Deference Problem, Daniel A. Crane
Enacted Legislative Findings And The Deference Problem, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The constitutionality of federal legislation sometimes turns on the presence and sufficiency of congressional findings of predicate facts, such as the effects of conduct on interstate commerce, state discrimination justifying the abrogation of sovereign immunity, or market failures justifying intrusions on free speech. Sometimes a congressional committee makes these findings in legislative history. Other times, Congress recites its findings in a statutory preamble, thus enacting its findings as law. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not distinguished between enacted and unenacted findings in deciding how much deference to accord congressional findings. This is striking because the difference between enactedness and unenactedness …
Viva Conditional Federal Spending!, Samuel R. Bagenstos
Viva Conditional Federal Spending!, Samuel R. Bagenstos
Articles
From the rise of the New Deal through the constitutional litigation over the Affordable Care Act (ACA), conditional federal spending has been a major target for those who have sought to limit the scope of federal power. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, as the Supreme Court narrowed Congress's power to regulate private primary conduct and state conduct in the last twenty years,' conditional spending looked like the way Congress might be able to circumvent the limitations imposed by the Court's decisions. Thus, members of Congress quickly sought to blunt the impact of the Court's decision to …
Election Law's Lochnerian Turn, Ellen D. Katz
Election Law's Lochnerian Turn, Ellen D. Katz
Articles
This panel has been asked to consider whether "the Constitution [is] responsible for electoral dysfunction."' My answer is no. The electoral process undeniably falls well short of our aspirations, but it strikes me that we should look to the Supreme Court for an accounting before blaming the Constitution for the deeply unsatisfactory condition in which we find ourselves.
Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer
Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer
Michigan Law Review
In the critically important area of preemption, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation differs from the approach it follows elsewhere. Whether in politically salient matters, like challenges to Arizona’s immigration laws, or in more conventional cases, such as those in which state tort liability overlaps with federal regulation, the Court’s preemption decisions reflect a highly purposive approach to reading statutes, most notably through the application of “obstacle preemption” analysis. Recently, however, Justice Thomas has objected to the Court’s failure in preemption cases to respect its more textualist approach to issues of statutory interpretation, and he has urged that obstacle …