Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

2019-2020 Supreme Court Preview: Contents, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Stays Asylum Injunction: Signal On The Merits Or Procedural Snag?, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Janus, Union Member Speech, And The Public Employee Speech Doctrine, M. Linton Wright

Pace Law Review

In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), the Supreme Court held that public sector unions can no longer collect fees from nonmembers to fund the costs of representing them in collective bargaining and grievance proceedings. The Court determined that virtually all union speech is political speech and that collection of these fees is impermissible compelled speech under the First Amendment. However, not everything in Janus harms public union interests. The Janus Court’s discussion of Garcetti v. Cabellos and Connick v. Myers actually helps protect union member speech in the context of First Amendment retaliation cases. …

Politics And Authority In The U.S. Supreme Court, Joshua Fischman

Cornell Law Review

Public discourse on the Supreme Court often focuses on the divide between the liberal and conservative Justices. There has been a second persistent divide in the Court, however, which has been largely overlooked by scholars, the media, and the public. This second divide has arisen most often in cases involving the jury trial right, the Confrontation Clause, the Fourth Amendment, punitive damages, and the interpretation of criminal statutes. This Article argues that this divide represents disagreements among the Justices over how to determine the limits of the authority of legal actors, particularly juries, executive officials, and trial judges. On one …

The Rise Of The Viewpoint-Discrimination Principle, Lackland H. Bloom Jr.

SMU Law Review Forum

The Supreme Court’s freedom-of-speech jurisprudence is complicated. There are few hard and fast rules. One is that judicially-imposed prior restraints on speech are hardly ever permissible. In recent years, another hard and fast rule appears to have developed. It is that the government may never prohibit speech simply on account of its viewpoint. It remains unclear whether this is a per se prohibition or whether such viewpoint-focused regulation must overcome the all but insurmountable burden of serious strict scrutiny. In any event, any governmental rule that attempts to regulate speech based on its point of view will almost certainly be …

Overwriting And Under-Deciding: Addressing The Roberts Court's Shrinking Docket, Meg Penrose

SMU Law Review Forum

No abstract provided.

Overwriting And Under-Deciding: Addressing The Roberts Court's Shrinking Docket, Meg Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

How do we evaluate a Supreme Court that writes more than it decides? Despite having the lowest decisional output in the modern era, the Roberts Court is the most verbose Supreme Court in history. The current Justices are more likely than past Justices to have their individual say in cases, writing more concurring and dissenting opinions than prior Courts. These opinions are longer, often strongly worded, and rarely add clarity to the underlying decision. The Roberts Court has shifted from being a decisional body to becoming an institution that comments on more cases than it decides.

This article critiques the …

Spoiler Alert: When The Supreme Court Ruins Your Brief Problem Mid-Semester, Margaret Hannon

Articles

Partway through the winter 2019 semester,1 the Supreme Court ruined my favorite summary judgment brief problem while my students were working on it. I had decided to use the problem despite the Court granting cert and knowing it was just a matter of time before the Court issued its decision. In this Article, I share some of the lessons that I learned about the risks involved in using a brief problem based on a pending Supreme Court case. I conclude that, while I have not typically set out to base a problem on a pending Supreme Court case, doing so …

The Broader Implications Of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Douglas Laycock

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Financial Oversight And Management Board For Puerto Rico V. Aurelius Investment, Llc, Rafael Cox Alomar

Court Briefs

No abstract provided.

"Believe Me," We Do Not Have A Foreign Emoluments Clause Violation, Scotty N. Teal

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

President Trump was sued in New York District Court for allegedly violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause. In its brief, the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) alleged that the president's international businesses and real estate holdings positioned him to receive money from foreign governments. These business interests, or entanglements, could "sway" or create an opportunity for negative foreign influence in violation of the Emoluments Clause. CREW states that these "entanglements between American officials and foreign powers could pose a creeping, insidious threat to the Republic." CREW argued that President Trump violated the Emoluments Clause because the clause "cover[s] …

Peña-Rodriguez V. Colorado: Carving Out A Racial-Bias Exception To The No-Impeachment Rule, John Austin Morales

St. Mary's Law Journal

The Sixth Amendment safeguards an accused in criminal proceedings and affords them “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” Consistent with this right, the no-impeachment rule prohibits a juror from testifying after a verdict has been handed down about the jurors’ deliberations. While there are limited exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, juror expressed racial bias is not one of them. When presented with the dilemma of a juror using racial bias in deliberations, courts must weigh two competing doctrines that serve as the foundation to our judicial system: (1) affording a defendant his or her …

The Claims And Limits Of Justice Scalia's Textualism: Lessons From His Statutory Standing Decisions, Michael P. Healy

Cardozo Law Review

Two decisions written by Justice Scalia near the end of his life, Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 479 (2014), and Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011), reshaped the law of statutory standing and provide important insights into the claims and limits of textualism. These decisions have reshaped the law of statutory standing in three ways. They have changed the legal terminology; expanded the range of cases to which the zone-of-interests test applies; and changed the application of the zone-of-interests test when it applies to determine statutory standing. This Article discusses these …

A Constellation Of Benefits And A Universe Of Equal Protection: The Extension Of The Right To Marry Under Pavan V. Smith, Brad Aldridge

Arkansas Law Review

In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States in Obergefell v. Hodges recognized the constitutional right of all persons, including same-sex couples, to lawfully marry. In 2017, in Pavan v. Smith, the Court recognized that Obergefell extends that right to much more than the act of marriage in itself. Any person who would have been denied the right to marry the person of her choice before Obergefell now enjoys not only the rights of marriage licensing and recognition, but also the full “constellation” of rights and responsibilities that attend marriage among traditional opposite-sex couples. The Court believed that this …

Defying Mcculloch? Jackson’S Bank Veto Reconsidered, David S. Schwartz

Arkansas Law Review

On July 10, 1832, President Andrew Jackson issued the most famous and controversial veto in United States history. The bill in question was “to modify and continue” the 1816 “act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States. This was to recharter of the Second Bank of the United States whose constitutionality was famously upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland. The bill was passed by Congress and presented to Jackson on July 4. Six days later, Jackson vetoed the bill. Jackson’s veto mortally wounded the Second Bank, which would forever close its doors four years later at the …

Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber

Arkansas Law Review

Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress. This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster was a close association of Justice Joseph Story. The justices at this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial sentiments on the issues of the day. Even if Webster lacked first-hand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig pessimism. …

M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck

Arkansas Law Review

M’Culloch v. Maryland is rightly regarded as a landmark opinion, one that affirmed the ability of Congress to exercise implied powers, articulated a rule of deference to Congressional judgments about whether given legislative actions were in fact “necessary,” and limited the ability of the states to impair or restrict the operations of the federal government. Most scholarly discussions of the case and its legacy emphasize these aspects of the decision. Less common are attempts to place M’Culloch within the ebb and flow of the Marshall Court and the political and social realities of the time. So, for example, very few …

The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson

Arkansas Law Review

All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition …

Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz

Arkansas Law Review

March 6, 2019 marked the 200th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, the successor to Alexander Hamilton’s national bank. McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge by the Second Bank of the United States to a Maryland tax on the banknotes issued by the Bank’s Baltimore branch. The tax was probably designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing loans and thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own state-chartered banks. Marshall’s opinion famously rejected the Jeffersonian strict-constructionist argument that implied powers …

State Standing's Uncertain Stakes, Aziz Z. Huq

Notre Dame Law Review

I offer a quite modest contribution to debates on state standing. I do not offer “right answers.” Rather, I posit that it is useful to understand the “stakes” of state standing. By “stakes,” I mean the practical consequences of resolving, one way or another, the unsettled doctrinal choices respecting the ability of states to initiate a matter in federal courts. Why, that is, does state standing matter? An inquiry into stakes can usefully proceed stepwise. A first task is to identify the subset of state standing cases that presently elicit division among the Justices. A second task is to articulate …

How The Boogeyman Saved Brett Kavanaugh, Cathren Page

Articles

We love to hate these boogeymen. When the societal narrative creates these invisible boogeymen, people can pour their rage against sexual abuse into these faceless antagonists. At the same time, the enraged survivors and protectors avoid conflicts with family, neighbors, colleagues, and social acquaintances who might actually commit or enable sexual abuse. We can dodge sticky questions regarding how a churchgoer, a judge, or an Ivy Leaguer could have committed a heinous act. The survivors can avoid all the victim-blaming backlash, threats of violence, and invalidation that accompanies reporting a sexual offense. Moreover, having less power on their own, survivors …

Ordinary Causation: A Study In Experimental Statutory Interpretation, James Macleod

Indiana Law Journal

In a series of recent split decisions interpreting criminal and tort-like legislation, the Supreme Court has purported to give statutory causation requirements their ordinary, plain meaning. Armed with dictionaries, examples from everyday speech, and commonsense intuitions, the Court’s majority has explained that statutory phrases like “because of” and “results from” entail but-for causation as a matter of ordinary usage. There’s just one problem: The Court’s majority (and the many state and federal courts following its lead) is wrong on the facts—specifically, the facts about how people ordinarily interpret, understand, and use causal language.

This Article considers a novel approach to …

Brief Amici Curiae Of Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1851 Center For Constitutional Law, And Profs. Jonathan Entin, David F. Forte, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Stephen Lazarus, Kevin Francis O’Neill, Margaret Tarkington, Aaron H. Caplan, And Eugene Volokh In Support Of Respondent-Appellant, Joni Bey And Rebecca Rasawehr V. Jeffrey Rasawehr, Supreme Court Of Ohio (Case No. 2019-0295), David Forte, Stephen R. Lazarus, Kevin F. O'Neill, Jonathan L. Entin, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Margaret Tarkington, Aaron H. Kaplan, Eugene Volokh

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

The brief argues that the Third District Court of Appeals, in violation of the First Amendment, erred in upholding an injunction that barred defendant from any online postings regarding plaintiff, whether or not those postings were to plaintiff or to third parties.

Taming Sherman's Wilderness, Derrian Smith

Indiana Law Journal

This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines the interpretive difficulties spawned by the vagueness of the Sherman Act—particularly, the judiciary’s necessary but undeniable departures from the text of the statute and the resulting doctrinal confusion. Part II considers ways in which the judiciary’s decision-making in Sherman Act cases approximates agency rulemaking and whether it makes sense to delegate interpretive authority to an antitrust agency. Yet, while the agency solution has upside, it would not easily escape criticisms that the Act does not provide sufficient notice of the conduct it proscribes and that the Act is an impermissible delegation …

Elite Patent Law, Paul Gugliuzza

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last twenty years, one of the most significant developments in intellectual property law has been the dramatic increase in the number of patent cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. That same time period has also seen the emergence of a small, elite group of lawyers specializing not in any particular area of substantive law but in litigation before the Supreme Court. In recent empirical work, I linked the Court’s growing interest in patent law to the more frequent participation of elite Supreme Court lawyers in patent cases, particularly at the cert. stage. Among other things, I found …

Symposium: In “Gundy Ii,” Auer Survives By A Vote Of 4.6 To 4.4, Michael Herz

Online Publications

Under the “Auer doctrine,” named for the 1997 decision Auer v. Robbins, courts accept an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous, or flatly inconsistent with the text of the regulation, or unreasonable, or something like that. Auer is a principle of long standing. Just how long is one of the sources of disagreement in Kisor v. Wilkie, but however you count, it is a doctrine universally understood as well-settled until relatively recently. But a revolt has been brewing.

Confining Cases To Their Facts, Daniel P. Rice, Jack Boeglin

Faculty Publications

Stare decisis is the mainstay of doctrinal stability. But through the little-known expedient of “confining a case to its facts,” courts can evade the pull of stare decisis by overruling everything a decision stands for except its precise result. This doctrinal workaround has enabled courts to sidestep the formal requirements that attend overruling and quietly undermine precedent without stirring public interest. But confining’s conveniences are offset by its considerable dangers: it cuts courts loose from the constraints of stare decisis; it requires judges to engage in unprincipled, fact-bound adjudication; it dilutes the integrity of the law by enshrining contradictory legal …

The Locke Exception: What Trinity Lutheran Means For The Future Of State Blaine Amendments, Christopher Tyler Prosser

Pepperdine Law Review

At its core, this Article is about whether states have the discretion to discriminate against religious organizations by excluding them from generally available secular government aid programs. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey, the federal courts have developed conflicting interpretations of whether the Court’s holding in Locke permits states to exclude religious organizations from generally available secular aid programs. However, the Court’s 2017 decision in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer has cast doubt on the ability of states to exclude religious organizations from such programs and seemingly restricts the Court’s prior decision in Locke …

Digital Realty, Legislative History, And Textualism After Scalia, Michael Francus

Pepperdine Law Review

There is a shift afoot in textualism. The New Textualism of Justice Scalia is evolving in response to a new wave of criticism. That criticism presses on the tension between Justice Scalia’s commitment to faithful agency (effecting the legislature’s will) and his rejection of legislative history in the name of ordinary meaning (which ignores legislative will). And it has caused some textualists to shift away from faithful agency, even to the point of abandoning it as textualism’s grounding principle. But this shift has gone unnoticed. It has yet to be identified or described, let alone defended, even as academic and …

Correspondence With The Chief Justice Of The Supreme Court Of The United States, William H. Rehnquist, Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Powell Correspondence

No abstract provided.