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2006

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Full-Text Articles in Supreme Court of the United States

"Framing Affirmative Action", Kimberlé W. Crenshaw Jan 2006

"Framing Affirmative Action", Kimberlé W. Crenshaw

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

With the passage of the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”), Michigan joins California and Washington to constitute the new postaffirmative action frontier. For proponents such as Ward Connerly, affirmative action is on the edge of extinction. Connerly plans to carry his campaign against what he calls “racial preferences” to eight states in 2008, scoring a decisive Super-Tuesday repudiation of a social policy that he portrays as the contemporary face of racial discrimination. On the other side of the issue, proponents of affirmative action are struggling to regroup, fearful that the confluence of lukewarm support among Democratic allies, messy presidential politics …

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What Is Dilution, Anyway?, Stacey L. Dogan Jan 2006

What Is Dilution, Anyway?, Stacey L. Dogan

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Ever since the Supreme Court decided Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. in 2003, an amendment to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) has appeared inevitable. Congress almost certainly meant to adopt a “likelihood of dilution” standard in the original statute, and the 2006 revisions correct its sloppy drafting. Substituting a “likelihood of dilution” standard for “actual dilution,” however, does not resolve a deeper philosophical question that has always lurked in the dilution debate: what is dilution, and how does one prove or disprove its probability? The statutory definition notwithstanding, this issue remains largely unanswered, leaving the courts with the …

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Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Mark D. Janis Jan 2006

Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Mark D. Janis

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Dilution looked to be a potent weapon when Congress introduced it as § 43(c) of the Lanham Act in 1995. Indeed, some observers feared that it would be too potent (and in some contexts, such as cybersquatting, it successfully augmented traditional causes of action). But a series of court decisions, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2003 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue opinion, weakened dilution protection so profoundly that what remained wasn’t of much consequence. Congress has recently sought to breathe new life into dilution law, enacting the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”). Some might see this as a …

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Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien Jan 2006

Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it “incon-testable” that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted “by reason of [the defendant’s] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capi-tal crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the Court’s concerns focused on …

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The Revolution Enters The Court: The Constitutional Significance Of Wrongful Convictions In Contemporary Constitutional Regulation Of The Death Penalty, Jordan Steiker Jan 2006

The Revolution Enters The Court: The Constitutional Significance Of Wrongful Convictions In Contemporary Constitutional Regulation Of The Death Penalty, Jordan Steiker

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Over the last decade, the most important events in American death pen-alty law have occurred outside the courts. The discovery of numerous wrongfully convicted death-sentenced inmates in Illinois led to the most substantial reflection on the American death penalty system since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republi-can, first declared a moratorium on executions in 2000 and eventually commuted all 167 inmates on Illinois’s death row in 2003. The events in Illinois reverberated nationwide. Almost overnight, state legislative agendas shifted from expanding or maintaining the prevailing reach of the death penalty to studying its …

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Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman Jan 2006

Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has sought to harmonize competing constitutional demands under Eighth Amendment rules regulat-ing the two-step eligibility and selection stages of the capital decision-making process. Furman’s demand for rationality and consistency requires that, at the eligibility stage, the sentencer’s discretion be limited and guided by clear and objective fact-based standards that rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. The selection stage requires a determination of whether a specific death-eligible defendant actually deserves that punish-ment, as distinguished from other death-eligible defendants. Here, fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual are the cornerstones of …

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This Way To The Egress And Other Reflections On Partisan Gerrymandering Claims In Light Of Lulac V. Perry, Bernard Grofman Jan 2006

This Way To The Egress And Other Reflections On Partisan Gerrymandering Claims In Light Of Lulac V. Perry, Bernard Grofman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

After winning control of both houses of the legislature and the governorship, Texas Republicans eventually succeeded in redistricting Texas’s congressional seats in 2003, replacing a 2001 court-drawn plan. LULAC v. Perry reviewed a number of challenges to that second redistricting. The decision deals with a multiplicity of issues, including, most importantly, the standard for violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the nature of tests for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. While there are some clear holdings in the case, several of them reflect different combinations of Justices in the majority and, since there are six different opinions, it …

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Anthony Kennedy's Blind Quest, Scot Powe, Steve Bickerstaff Jan 2006

Anthony Kennedy's Blind Quest, Scot Powe, Steve Bickerstaff

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

League of United Latin American Citizens [LULAC] v. Perry embraced, in the context of partisan gerrymandering, Felix Frankfurter’s conclusion that the Supreme Court should not enter the political thicket of legislative apportionment. Two years earlier in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court split 4–1–4 on the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering. O’Conner and the three conservatives held it was nonjusticiable. Each of the four moderate liberals offered a test showing it was justiciable. Kennedy dissented from the conservatives while simultaneously rejecting each of the four tests offered. He announced he was waiting for a better test. When far superior tests were offered …

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Lulac On Partisan Gerrymandering: Some Clarity, More Uncertainty, Richard Briffault Jan 2006

Lulac On Partisan Gerrymandering: Some Clarity, More Uncertainty, Richard Briffault

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In League of United Latin American Citizens (“LULAC”) v. Perry, the Supreme Court, for the second time in two years, agonized over partisan gerrymandering. LULAC’s rejection of a Democratic challenge to the Texas legislature’s mid-decade pro-Republican congressional redistricting resembles the Court’s 2004 dismissal of a Democratic gerrymandering suit against Pennsylvania’s pro-Republican congressional redistricting plan in Vieth v. Jubelirer. As in Vieth, the Justices wrangled over justiciability, the substantive standard for assessing the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering claims, and the interplay of justiciability and constitutionality. As in Vieth, the Court was highly fragmented: Vieth produced five separate opinions, while LULAC took …

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Strict In Theory, Loopy In Fact, Nathaniel Persily Jan 2006

Strict In Theory, Loopy In Fact, Nathaniel Persily

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Most Supreme Court-watchers find the decision in LULAC v. Perry notable for the ground it breaks concerning Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the ground it refuses to break on the topic of partisan gerrymandering. I tend to think the Court’s patchwork application of Section 2 to strike down a district on vote dilution grounds is not all that dramatic, nor is its resolution of the partisan gerrymandering claims all that surprising. The truly unprecedented development in the case for me was Justice Scalia’s vote to uphold what he considered a racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause, …

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The Story Of Crawford, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2006

The Story Of Crawford, Richard D. Friedman

Book Chapters

Michael Crawford had been charged with assault. At his trial, the prosecution offered a statement made in the police station on the night of the incident by Crawford's wife Sylvia, who did not testify at trial. He objected, in part on the ground that this violated his right under the Confrontation Clause. The trial court nevertheless admitted the statement, and Crawford was convicted. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment. In rejecting the Confrontation Clause challenge, that court purported to apply the then governing doctrine of Ohio v. Roberts, under which the Clause posed no obstacle to admissibility if …

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The Story Of Sony V. Universal Studios: Mary Poppins Meets The Boston Strangler., Jessica Litman Jan 2006

The Story Of Sony V. Universal Studios: Mary Poppins Meets The Boston Strangler., Jessica Litman

Book Chapters

Sony v. Universal Studios may be the most famous of all copyright cases. People who know nothing about copyright know that the Sony-Betamax case held that home videotaping of television programs is fair use. Paradoxically, although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case to decide whether the copyright law permitted consumers to engage in private home copying of television programs, the majority ended up crafting its analysis to avoid answering that question definitively. Instead, it ruled that even if consumers sometimes violated the copyright law when they taped television programs off the air, that violation did not make the …

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Dickerson V. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics - And Then Its Supporters, Yale Kamisar Jan 2006

Dickerson V. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics - And Then Its Supporters, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss Dickerson1 intelligently without discussing Miranda whose constitutional status Dickerson reaffirmed (or, one might say, resuscitated). It is also difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the Dickerson case intelligently without discussing cases the Court has handed down in the five years since Dickerson was decided. The hard truth is that in those five years the reaffirmation of Miranda's constitutional status has become less and less meaningful. In this chapter I focus on the Court's characterization of statements elicited in violation of the Miranda warnings as not actually "coerced" or "compelled" but obtained merely …

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The Color Of Perspective: Affirmative Action And The Constitutional Rhetoric Of White Innocence, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 477 (2006), Cecil J. Hunt Ii Jan 2006

The Color Of Perspective: Affirmative Action And The Constitutional Rhetoric Of White Innocence, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 477 (2006), Cecil J. Hunt Ii

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

This Article discusses the Supreme Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in deciding racially-inflected claims of constitutional shelter. It argues that the Court's use of this rhetoric reveals its adoption of a distinctly White-centered perspective, representing a one-sided view of racial reality that distorts the Court's ability to accurately appreciate the true nature of racial reality in contemporary America. This Article examines the Court's habit of using a White-centered perspective in constitutional race cases. Specifically, it looks at the Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in the context of the Court's concern with protecting "innocent" Whites …

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Snoop Dogs: An Analysis Of Narcotics Canine Sniffs Of Storage Units Under The Fourth Amendment, Eugene D. Bryant Jan 2006

Snoop Dogs: An Analysis Of Narcotics Canine Sniffs Of Storage Units Under The Fourth Amendment, Eugene D. Bryant

Georgia Law Review

A recent development in the nation's war on drugs is the increased use of narcotics canines to indiscriminately search storage facilities. Although the Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court of the United States in U.S. v. Place deemed a canine sniff to be sui generis and not a "search"subject to analysis under the Fourth Amendment. With its decision in Illinois v. Caballes, the Court extended this analysis to canine sniffs outside of vehicles. Various state courts, in order to better protect the rights of state citizens, have rejected the Supreme Court's sui generis analysis …

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Contents Jan 2006

Contents

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Rebus Sic Stantibus: Notification Of Consular Rights After Medellin, Aaron A. Ostrovsky, Brandon E. Reavis Jan 2006

Rebus Sic Stantibus: Notification Of Consular Rights After Medellin, Aaron A. Ostrovsky, Brandon E. Reavis

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Comment examines, through principles of public international law and U.S. jurisprudence, the relationship between U.S. courts and the ICJ to determine if the former are indeed bound by the latter's decisions, proprio motu, or if instead some Executive action is required to make the decisions binding on the judiciary. Part of this examination will entail a discussion of the potential for dialogue between the ICJ and U.S. courts to "pierce the veil of sovereignty" that traditionally conceals the inner workings of sovereign states from the scrutiny of international tribunals. Based on this assessment, the Comment then addresses how …

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Has The Supreme Court Incorrectly Expanded § 271(E)(1) To Risk A Regulatory Taking?, 5 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 216 (2006), Tara Stuart Jan 2006

Has The Supreme Court Incorrectly Expanded § 271(E)(1) To Risk A Regulatory Taking?, 5 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 216 (2006), Tara Stuart

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

The U.S.S.C. expanded the scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s safe harbor provision in Merck III to include protection for infringing use of any type of invention as long as a researcher intended to perform research reasonably relevant to FDA approval. This broad interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the policies of the U.S. patent system. Many patent owners may unnecessarily experience such a reduction in their property rights as to constitute a regulatory taking. The proposed narrow interpretation would rectify the constitutional problems and inconsistencies in infringement exemptions. Section 271(e)(1) should apply only to …

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Recent Developments In Copyright Law: Selected U.S. Supreme Court, Court Of Appeals, And District Court Opinions Between February 1, 2005 And May 1, 2006, 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 40 (2006), Tyler T. Ochoa Jan 2006

Recent Developments In Copyright Law: Selected U.S. Supreme Court, Court Of Appeals, And District Court Opinions Between February 1, 2005 And May 1, 2006, 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 40 (2006), Tyler T. Ochoa

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

This article highlights nine selected U.S. copyright law decisions handed down between February 1, 2005 and May 1, 2006. Two of the decisions concern peer-to-peer file sharing, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in MGM v. Grokster. One of the decisions questions the applicability of the idea/expression dichotomy to works of visual art. Two of the decisions discuss ownership of the renewal rights in a work under the 1909 Act when the author is deceased. One of the decisions interprets the requirement that an author register his or her work before filing an infringement action. Two of the decisions …

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Against Idols: The Court As A Symbol-Making Or Rhetorical Institution, Marie Failinger Jan 2006

Against Idols: The Court As A Symbol-Making Or Rhetorical Institution, Marie Failinger

Faculty Scholarship

Symbolic politics can be quite powerful. This article pursues the question of how the Supreme Court signifies itself, how it discovers and enacts the metaphors from which it will play its part in the American political drama aimed at containing some of the nightmares of human existence, while affirming and encouraging the possibilities for human flourishing. Embedded in this inquiry is the question of how the Court can signify itself while still preserving the truth-telling and humility necessary to legitimize Court decisions.

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The Irrepressible Myth Of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After The Trilogy, Adam N. Steinman Jan 2006

The Irrepressible Myth Of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After The Trilogy, Adam N. Steinman

Faculty Scholarship

Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases on summary judgment. These cases have had a profound impact on federal litigation. Empirical data presented in this article demonstrate that federal courts have cited these three cases more than any Supreme Court decisions in history. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett is widely recognized as the most significant decision of the trilogy, both because it expanded the availability of summary judgment and because it remains the Court's most current instructions on how burdens are allocated between the party seeking and the party opposing summary judgment. However, Celotex failed to clarify …

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From Laredo To Fort Worth: Race, Politics And The Texas Redistricting Case, Ellen D. Katz Jan 2006

From Laredo To Fort Worth: Race, Politics And The Texas Redistricting Case, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

LULAC v. Perry held that Texas violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when it displaced nearly 100,000 Latino residents from a congressional district in Laredo to protect the Republican incumbent they refused to support. At the same time, the Justices let stand the dismantling of a so-called “coalition” district in Fort Worth where African-American voters comprising a minority of the district’s population allegedly enjoyed effective control in deciding the district’s representative. Only Justice Kennedy supported the outcome in both Laredo and Fort Worth. His opinion marks the first time that he, or indeed a majority of the Justices, …

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Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar Jan 2006

Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar

Articles

June marks the 40th anniversary of one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-U.S. Supreme Court cases in American history, Miranda v. Arizona. The opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren conditions police questioning of people in custody on the giving of warnings about the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the waiver of those rights. 384 U.S. 436. This ruling represents a compromise of sorts between the former elusive, ambiguous and subjective voluntariness/totality-of-the-circumstances test and extreme proposals that would have eliminated police interrogation altogether. But William H. Rehnquist didn't see Miranda that …

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Comparative Fiscal Federalism: What Can The U.S. Supreme Court And The European Court Of Justice Learn From Each Other's Tax Jurisprudence?, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah Jan 2006

Comparative Fiscal Federalism: What Can The U.S. Supreme Court And The European Court Of Justice Learn From Each Other's Tax Jurisprudence?, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

In October 2005, a group of distinguished tax experts from the European Union and the United States, who had never met before, convened at the University of Michigan Law School for a conference on "Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court of Justice Tax Jurisprudence." The purpose of the conference was to shed comparative light on the very different approaches taken by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the U.S. Supreme Court to the question of fiscal federalism. The conference was sponsored by the U-M Law School, U-M's European Union Center, and Harvard Law School's …

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Aggravating Youth: Roper V Simmons And Age Discrimination, Elizabeth F. Emens Jan 2006

Aggravating Youth: Roper V Simmons And Age Discrimination, Elizabeth F. Emens

Faculty Scholarship

In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court confronted a difficult question: Given that being younger than eighteen is merely a proxy for diminished culpability, why not let jurors decide whether youth mitigates the culpability of an individual sixteen- or seventeen-year-old offender? The Court's subtle answer draws on psychological literature about the differences between juveniles and adults, but ultimately depends as much on concerns about the mind of the adult juror as on the distinctive traits of juveniles. Read in its best light, Kennedy's opinion seems to turn on the insight that while age-based classifications are rational – they are a …

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Post-Admissions Educational Programming In A Post-Grutter World: A Response To Professor Brown, Evan H. Caminker Jan 2006

Post-Admissions Educational Programming In A Post-Grutter World: A Response To Professor Brown, Evan H. Caminker

Articles

When asked to provide commentary on another scholar's reflections on Grutterl and Gratz and affirmative action, I am usually struck by two fears. First, because so much ink has been spilled on this topic, I worry the main presenter will have nothing new and interesting to say. Today this worry has been put to rest; I am so pleased that Professor Dorothy Brown offers a number of novel and intriguing observations and, in the end, advances a novel and intriguing proposal about the role Critical Race Theory ought to play in our nation's law school classrooms. Second, for the same …

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We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2006

We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

I closed my petition for certiorari in Hammon v. Indiana by declaring, “ ‘We really mean it!’ is the message that lower courts need to hear, and that decision of this case can send.” The prior year, Crawford v. Washington had transformed the law of the Confrontation Clause, holding that an out-ofcourt statement that is testimonial in nature may be admitted against an accused only if the maker of the statement is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine her. But Crawford deliberately left undetermined what the term “testimonial” meant. Many lower courts gave it a grudging …

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Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat In The Marsh, Samuel R. Gross Jan 2006

Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat In The Marsh, Samuel R. Gross

Articles

Kansas law provides that unless a capital sentencing jury concludes that the mitigating factors that apply to the defendant’s crime outweigh the aggravating factors, it must sentence the defendant to death. The Kansas Supreme Court held that this law violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it “impermissibly mandates the death penalty when the jury finds that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are in equipoise.” On June 26, in Kansas v. Marsh, the Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 4 opinion by Justice Thomas.

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But I Didn't Do Anything Wrong: Revisiting The Rights Of Non-Offending Parents In Child Protection Proceedings, Vivek Sankaran Jan 2006

But I Didn't Do Anything Wrong: Revisiting The Rights Of Non-Offending Parents In Child Protection Proceedings, Vivek Sankaran

Articles

Steven, a minor living with his mother, enjoyed a nurturing relationship with his father, Mark. He saw his father every weekend and looked forward to their time together. Mark looked for ways in which to stay involved in his child's life. Two days ago, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed Steven from his mother's custody because, unbeknown to Mark, Stevens mother was selling drugs in the home. At the time of removal, the police did not inquire about the whereabouts of Stevens father; DHS immediately placed Steven in a foster home.

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The Riddle Of Hiram Revels, Richard A. Primus Jan 2006

The Riddle Of Hiram Revels, Richard A. Primus

Articles

In 1870, a black man named Hiram Revels was named to represent Mississippi in the Senate. Senate Democrats objected to seating him and pointed out that the Constitution specifies that no person may be a senator who has not been a citizen of the United States for at least nine years. Before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Democrats argued, Revels had not been a citizen on account of the Supreme Court's 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Thus, even if Revels were a citizen in 1870, he had held that status for only two years. …

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