Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Is Bruen The New Usery?, Tonja Jacobi, Cory Conley

William & Mary Law Review

In 2022, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the Supreme Court revolutionized the Second Amendment, achieving the long-held conservative goal of limiting gun restrictions by imposing an expansive, originalist view of the right to bear arms. However, within just three years, Bruen is showing cracks. Lower court judges are struggling mightily to apply it and are expressing their frustrations in exceptionally frank ways. And already the Supreme Court, in Rahimi v. United States, was forced to reconsider its approach. The Court has been here before, when it tried to revitalize the Tenth Amendment in …

Grants Pass And The Innocence Limit, Gregory Cui, Emily Clark

William & Mary Law Review

This Article examines City of Grants Pass v. Johnson as an important development in the Supreme Court’s doctrine concerning the Constitution’s “innocence limit.” This limit is a fundamental boundary on the state’s power to punish; it provides that criminal punishment may only apply to that which is morally culpable or blameworthy and thus may not apply to wholly innocent conduct. This principle was famously expressed in Robinson v. California, but this Article identifies a broader network of cases in which the Court has consistently effectuated the innocence limit and intervened against prosecutions of the innocent. This Article observes that …

Skrmetti And The Problem Of Incidental Intent, Martin Katz

William & Mary Law Review

The modern Supreme Court has defined “discriminatory intent” as a strict-liability concept. It does not matter why the government sorts people by a protected characteristic, such as race or sex; it matters only that the government does sort people by such a characteristic. This principle is the key holding of affirmative-action cases, such as Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College. Yet, in the recent case United States v. Skrmetti, the Court seemed to focus not on the question of whether the government sorted people by sex (it did), but on the question …

Domestic Military Deployments After Trump V. United States, Chris Mirasola

William & Mary Law Review

The current legal regime governing domestic military deployments was, largely, born of the Civil War. While conflict was ongoing, Congress enacted what are now a pair of statutes criminalizing military interference with federal elections. And as a coda to Reconstruction, Congress criminalized using the military as a civilian law enforcement force. Over the past 160 years, successive Congresses and Presidents have steadily chipped away at these crucial criminal-law protections. In 2024, the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. United States further undermined the limitations that remained.

In Trump, the Supreme Court held that Presidents enjoy, at minimum, a presumption …

Bostock And The Limits Of Textualism: A Doctrinal Structuralist Approach, Martin Katz

William & Mary Law Review

In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. This result, the majority claimed, was required by the interpretive theory called textualism. But textualist Justices in the dissent vehemently disagreed. This split, and the controversy that has followed it, has had two consequences. First, it added fuel to the ongoing debate about the value of textualism. Second, it opened the door for lower courts to decline to apply Bostock to similar antidiscrimination laws, such as Title IX in education or the Equal Protection Clause.

This Article argues …

Brown Now: The Surprising Possibility Of Progressive Reform, Louis Michael Seidman

William & Mary Law Review

For four decades, the Supreme Court has engaged in a determined, systematic, and successful effort to transform and tame Brown v. Board of Education. But there is a surprising counterweight to this standard narrative. If one takes modern doctrine seriously, the Supreme Court’s refashioning of Brown has the potential to support some progressive goals. The modern Court’s decisions provide a basis for upholding race-conscious but facially neutral measures that promote racial diversity, striking down legacy admission standards in colleges and universities, and strictly scrutinizing laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation. The last Part of this Article speculates about …

Why You Cannot Find A Swing Justice When You Really Need One, Neal Devins

William & Mary Law Review

From Richard Nixon’s 1972 appointment of swing Justice Lewis Powell until Donald Trump’s 2018 appointment of Brett Kavanaugh (to replace swing Justice Anthony Kennedy), the swing Justice ruled the roost. Sometimes voting with the Court’s conservatives and other times with its liberals, the swing Justice often cast the deciding vote and often embraced a sui generis middle ground. Those days now seem like a distant memory. An ideologically simpatico majority coalition drives the post-2018 Roberts Court (especially after Justice Amy Coney Barrett filled Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s seat in 2020). In this Article, I will use the Court’s affirmative action …

The Fourteenth Amendment And The Vénus Noire, Farah Peterson

William & Mary Law Review

This Essay makes two points. The first is that originalism is not a promising path for progressive causes. The second is that as the Constitution is amended, the meaning of the entire document is altered, and earlier text should be interpreted in light of what has changed. But instead of making these observations in the usual law review style, I’m calling on a figure out of nineteenth-century art, the Vénus Noire, to serve as our companion and guide.

This abstract has been taken from the author's introductory paragraphs.

The Anti-Innovation Supreme Court: Major Questions, Delegation, Chevron, And More, Jack M. Beermann

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court of the United States has generally been a very aggressive enforcer of legal limitations on governmental power. In various periods in its history, the Court has gone far beyond enforcing clearly expressed and easily ascertainable constitutional and statutory provisions and has suppressed innovation by the other branches that do not necessarily transgress widely held social norms. Novel assertions of legislative power, novel interpretations of federal statutes, statutes that are in tension with well-established common law rules, and state laws adopted by only a few states are suspect simply because they are novel or rub up against tradition. …

State Sovereign Immunity And The New Purposivism, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

William & Mary Law Review

Since the Constitution was first proposed, courts and commentators have debated the extent to which it alienated the States’ preexisting sovereign immunity from suit by individuals. During the ratification period, these debates focused on the language of the citizen-state diversity provisions of Article III. After the Supreme Court read these provisions to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia, Congress and the States adopted the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit this construction. The Court subsequently ruled that States enjoy sovereign immunity independent of the Eleventh Amendment, which neither conferred nor diminished it. In the late twentieth-century, Congress began enacting …

The Summary Judgment Revolution That Wasn't, Jonathan Remy Nash, D. Daniel Sokol

William & Mary Law Review

The U.S. Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases on summary judgment in 1986. Questions remain as to how much effect these cases have had on judicial decision-making in terms of wins and losses for plaintiffs. Shifts in wins, losses, and what cases get to decisions on the merits impact access to justice. We assemble novel datasets to examine this question empirically in three areas of law that are more likely to respond to shifts in the standard for summary judgment: antitrust, securities regulation, and civil rights. We find that the Supreme Court’s decisions had a statistically significant effect in …

Retconning Heller: Five Takes On New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. V. Bruen, Brannon P. Denning, Glenn H. Reynolds

William & Mary Law Review

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen was the first significant Second Amendment case that the Supreme Court had heard in nearly fifteen years since its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. This Article offers some preliminary observations about the opinion itself, as well as its likely effects, some of which are starting to manifest.

Our first take concerns the question of opinion assignment. Why did Chief Justice Roberts—whose support for the Second Amendment has been suspect—assign the opinion to Justice Thomas?

Takes Two and Three concern Justice Thomas’s substitution of text, history, and tradition …

Justice Alito's Laundry List: Highlights From Appendix C Of Bostock And A Roadmap For Lgbtq+ Legal Advocates, Peter Quinn

William & Mary Law Review

After a brief background on Bostock [v. Clayton County] in Part I, the bulk of this Note seeks to examine Justice Alito’s Bostock dissent and its potential future usefulness for LGBTQ+ advocates. Part II will analyze Justice Alito’s dissent and Appendix C, arguing that his concerns about Bostock’s consequences across other federal statutes fall into three primary categories of usefulness. The remaining Parts will survey these categories, including the “small potatoes” in Part III, the “blockbusters” in Part IV, and the “under-the-radar” areas in Part V. Part V takes particular notice of potential applications of Bostock’s …

Religious Liberty Interest Convergence, Asma T. Uddin

William & Mary Law Review

Americans are deeply polarized on a plethora of issues. One of the most prominent areas of polarization is religious liberty, which in recent years has increasingly pitted conservative, white Christians against a range of marginalized minorities, particularly Muslims. The divide threatens Muslims’ rights and the vitality of religious liberty more broadly. This Article assesses the extent to which self-interest— especially the self-interest of the conservative Justices of the Supreme Court—can help depolarize religious liberty.

Professor Derrick Bell’s theory of “interest convergence” helps connect different self-interests that, in turn, enable issue-specific coalitions strong enough to effect serious cultural and legal change. …

Ford V. Where Are We?: The Revival Of The Sliding Scale To Govern The Supreme Court's New "Relating To" Personal Jurisdiction, Zois Manaris

William & Mary Law Review

This Note proposes a test to govern “relating to” specific jurisdiction, a variation on a theme to those familiar with the doctrine: a “sliding scale” approach to contacts and relatedness, accompanied by a separate assessment of reasonableness factors the Supreme Court has outlined in previous cases to serve as a check on the sliding scale. Part I of this Note explains the “sliding scale” approach, its unpleasant first interaction with the Court, and its revival by the Ford majority. Part II defines this Note’s proposed test and demonstrates its consistency with Supreme Court precedent. Finally, Part III applies this Note’s …

The Qualitative Fourth Amendment: The Case For A Refined, Information-Focused Approach To Fourth Amendment Cases Involving Non-Trespassatory Government Surveillance, Joshua L. Wagner

William & Mary Law Review

In his 2001 majority opinion for Kyllo v. United States, Justice Scalia adopted his characteristic chiding tone to gently reproach what he saw as a notably liberal departure from the original textual interpretation of the Constitution. The Katz test for Fourth Amendment violations, to Scalia, was plainly “circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.” That it was one of the most influential and oft-discussed decisions the Supreme Court has ever handed down made little difference; regardless of whatever Justice Harlan and his successors had said, the Fourth Amendment was, at its heart, a protection against government interference with property and had …

Against Congressional Case Snatching, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Atticus Deprospro

William & Mary Law Review

Congress has developed a deeply problematic habit of aggrandizing itself by snatching cases from the Article III courts. One form of contemporary case snatching involves directly legislating the outcome of pending litigation by statute. These laws do not involve generic amendments to existing statutes but rather dictate specific rulings by the Article III courts in particular cases. Another form of congressional case snatching involves rendering ongoing judicial proceedings essentially advisory by unilaterally permitting a disgruntled litigant to transfer a pending case from an Article III court to an executive agency for resolution. Both practices involve Congress reallocating the business of …

Janus-Faced Judging: How The Supreme Court Is Radically Weakening Stare Decisis, Michael Gentithes

William & Mary Law Review

Drastic changes in Supreme Court doctrine require citizens to reorder their affairs rapidly, undermining their trust in the judiciary. Stare decisis has traditionally limited the pace of such change on the Court. It is a bulwark against wholesale jurisprudential reversals. But, in recent years, the stare decisis doctrine has come under threat.

With little public or scholarly notice, the Supreme Court has radically weakened stare decisis in two ways. First, the Court has reversed its long-standing view that a precedent, regardless of the quality of its reasoning, should stand unless there is some special, practical justification to overrule it. Recent …

Courts, Culture, And The Lethal Injection Stalemate, Eric Berger

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Bucklew v. Precythe reiterated the Court’s great deference to states in Eighth Amendment lethal injection cases. The takeaway is that when it comes to execution protocols, states can do what they want. Events on the ground tell a very different story. Notwithstanding courts’ deference, executions have ground to a halt in numerous states, often due to lethal injection problems. State officials and the Court’s conservative Justices have blamed this development on “anti-death penalty activists” waging “guerilla war” on capital punishment. In reality, though, a variety of mostly uncoordinated actors motivated by a range of …

Crisis? Whose Crisis?, Jack M. Beermann

William & Mary Law Review

Every moment in human history can be characterized by someone as “socially and politically charged.” For a large portion of the population of the United States, nearly the entire history of the country has been socially and politically charged, first because they were enslaved and then because they were subjected to discriminatory laws and unequal treatment under what became known as “Jim Crow.” The history of the United States has also been a period of social and political upheaval for American Indians, the people who occupied the territory that became the United States before European settlement. Although both African-Americans and …

Packing And Unpacking State Courts, Marin K. Levy

William & Mary Law Review

When it comes to court packing, questions of “should” and “can” are inextricably intertwined. The conventional wisdom has long been that federal court packing is something the President and Congress simply cannot do. Even though the Constitution’s text does not directly prohibit expanding or contracting the size of courts for political gain, many have argued that there is a longstanding norm against doing so, stemming from a commitment to judicial independence and separation of powers. And so (the argument goes), even though the political branches might otherwise be tempted to add or subtract seats to change the Court’s ideological makeup, …

The Judicial Reforms Of 1937, Barry Cushman

William & Mary Law Review

The literature on reform of the federal courts in 1937 understandably focuses on the history and consequences of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ill-fated proposal to increase the membership of the Supreme Court. A series of decisions declaring various components of the New Deal unconstitutional had persuaded Roosevelt and some of his advisors that the best way out of the impasse was to enlarge the number of justiceships and to appoint to the new positions jurists who would be “dependable” supporters of the administration’s program. Yet Roosevelt and congressional Democrats also were deeply troubled by what they perceived as judicial obstruction …

The Court Should Not Let Politically Divided Times Affects Its Choices And Decisions, Erwin Chemerinsky

William & Mary Law Review

The Court should not let politically divided times affect its choices or decisions. Altering the Court’s role in politically divided times would require a definition of what qualifies as such an era and a theory of how to act in such times. Almost every era in American history could be deemed a politically divided time. Changing the Court’s role in politically divided times is inconsistent with its preeminent role: interpreting and enforcing the Constitution. This role does not change, and should not change, in politically charged moments. Indeed, history shows that the Court cannot know what is likely to lessen …

Summary Dispositions As Precedent, Richard C. Chen

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court’s practice of summarily reversing decisions based on certiorari filings, without the benefit of merits briefing or oral argument, has recently come under increasing scrutiny. The practice is difficult to square with the Court’s stated criteria for granting certiorari and its norms against reviewing fact-bound cases to engage in mere error correction. Nonetheless, there is growing acceptance that the practice is likely to continue in some form, and the conversation has shifted to asking when the use of summary dispositions should be considered proper. Commentators have had no trouble identifying the Court’s tendencies: summary dispositions are most commonly …

A Brief History Of Judical Appointments From The Last 50 Years Through The Trump Administration, Donald F. Mcgahn Ii

William & Mary Law Review

Thank you so much for that kind introduction. I really appreciate the opportunity to be here today. I am going to talk about the confirmation process generally. There is no better place to talk about it than here. Let me begin with some numbers and statistics, before I turn to the main thrust of my talk, to give some context as to what recent Presidents have done with respect to judicial appointments. President Trump has appointed two Supreme Court Justices, Neil Gorsuch and Brett of Appeals; twenty-nine so far have been confirmed. The Senate Leader, Senator Mitch McConnell, has already …

The State Of Exactions, Timothy M. Mulvaney

William & Mary Law Review

In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the Supreme Court slightly expanded the range of land use permitting situations in which heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate in a constitutional “exaction” takings case. In crafting a vision of regulators as strategic extortionists of private property interests, though, Koontz prompted many takings observers to predict that the case would provide momentum for a more significant expansion of such scrutiny in takings cases involving land use permit conditions moving forward, and perhaps even an extension into other regulatory contexts, as well.

Five years on, this Article evaluates the extent to which …

A Voice In The Wilderness: John Paul Stevens, Election Law, And A Theory Of Impartial Governance, Cody S. Barnett, Joshua A. Douglas

William & Mary Law Review

Justice John Paul Stevens retired from the Supreme Court almost a decade ago and turned ninety-eight years old in April 2018. How should we remember his legacy on the Supreme Court? This Article places his legacy within his election law jurisprudence. Specifically, Justice Stevens provided a consistent theory, which we term “impartial governance,” that has had a lasting impact on the field. This theory undergirds Justice Stevens’s creation of the important Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing test that federal courts use to construe the constitutionality of laws that impact the right to vote, such as voter ID laws. It is part of his …

Legislative Exhaustion, Michael Sant’Ambrogio

William & Mary Law Review

Legislative lawsuits are a recurring by-product of divided government. Yet the Supreme Court has never definitively resolved whether Congress may sue the executive branch over its execution of the law. Some scholars argue that Congress should be able to establish Article III standing when its interests are harmed by executive action or inaction just like private parties. Others, including most prominently the late Justice Antonin Scalia, argue that intergovernmental disputes do not constitute Article III “cases” or “controversies” at all. Rather, the Framers envisioned the political branches resolving their differences through nonjudicial means.

This Article proposes a different approach to …

Some Thoughts On The Study Of Judicial Behavior, Lee Epstein

William & Mary Law Review

Back in the 1940s the political scientist C. Herman Pritchett began tallying the votes and opinions of Supreme Court Justices. His goal was to use data to test the hypothesis that the Justices were not only following the “law,” but were also motivated by their own ideological preferences.

With the hindsight of nearly eighty years, we know that Pritchett’s seemingly small project helped to create a big field: Judicial Behavior, which I take to be the theoretical and empirical study of the choices judges make. Political scientists continue to play a central role, but they are now joined by economists, …

The Second Dimension Of The Supreme Court, Joshua B. Fischman, Tonja Jacobi

William & Mary Law Review

Describing the Justices of the Supreme Court as “liberals” and conservatives” has become so standard— and the left-right division on the Court is considered so entrenched— that any deviation from that pattern is treated with surprise. Attentive Court watchers know that the Justices are not just politicians in robes, deciding each case on a purely ideological basis. Yet the increasingly influential empirical legal studies literature assumes just that— that a left-right ideological dimension fully describes the Supreme Court. We show that there is a second, more legally-focused dimension of judicial decision making. A continuum between legalism and pragmatism also divides …