Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Per Se Non-Takings, Nestor M. Davidson, Timothy M. Mulvaney

Faculty Scholarship

In the discourse on the Takings Clause, disputes over methodology have long formed a kind of proxy war, with per se rules ordinarily underwriting strong constitutional protection for property rights and ad hoc standards more often vindicating public interests. At a moment when the Supreme Court is increasingly embracing the rules end of this rules–standards spectrum, this Article offers a novel perspective to challenge the conventional link between categorical reasoning and classical liberal conceptions of constitutional property.

To do so, the Article excavates a vast body of law denying takings liability through rule-like reasoning, an approach the Article calls per …

Not-So-Special Solicitude, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Scholarship

In a high-profile case last term about state standing to sue in federal court, Justice Gorsuch deemed it “hard not to wonder why” the majority said “nothing about ‘special solicitude.’” The silence was indeed surprising, for in a landmark decision several years earlier, the Supreme Court had declared that states were “entitled to special solicitude”—presumably meaning some sort of preferential treatment—“in [the] standing analysis.” And since then, commentators had depicted the concept as permitting opportunistic states to wage ideological crusades in courts across the country, especially through administrative-law attacks on federal-government defendants.

But what if “special solicitude” is not so …

Reconceptualizing Property Law's Background Principles In Takings Law, Timothy M. Mulvaney

Faculty Scholarship

Both libertarians and progressives celebrated the result in Tyler v. Hennepin County. This Article asserts that this unified celebration has overshadowed the extent to which the Supreme Court’s reasoning calls into question even our most foundational assumptions about the meaning of property and the takings protections the constitution affords to it. Followed to its literal end, Tyler remarkably suggests that owners may well need to ground their expectations in the property laws endorsed by a majority of states rather than in the laws of their own state.

Suspicious that the Court intended such a revolutionary upheaval of the state variations …

Transforming Fair Use, Glynn Lunney

Faculty Scholarship

In the United States, the fate of fair use, and by extension, copyright itself, hang in the balance. In recent years, courts have disagreed over fair use’s proper scope. On the one side are appellate decisions that interpret fair use broadly. While these decisions do not go so far as to suggest that every reuse is fair, they typically use the talismanic phrase “transformative use” and give it a generous and flexible interpretation. On the other side are appellate decisions that interpret fair use restrictively. While again they do not go so far as to suggest no reuse is fair, …

Section 1: Defining Arbitration And Addressing Structural Bias, Nancy A. Welsh

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has successfully encouraged the use of arbitration to resolve disputes of all types, including those arising out of contracts of adhesion. Meanwhile, with one very limited exception, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has done anything to assure those bound by adhesive contracts that the required arbitration process will be fair, impartial, and consistent with due process principles. The FAA does not even include a definition of arbitration to guide arbitration providers and individual arbitrators. This chapter proposes the addition of a definition of arbitration to the FAA to …

Chevron Deference Is Dead, Long Live Deference, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The demise of Chevron deference standing alone may turn out to be much less important for the future of administrative law and agency regulation than many believe. The Court explicitly approved of deference under the Skidmore factors, which instruct reviewing courts to “resort for guidance, even on legal questions” to “the interpretations and opinions of the relevant agency, made in pursuance of official duty and based upon specialized experience.”8 Further, the Court had already created numerous limitations to the reach of Chevron deference and, as the Court noted, it had not deferred under Chevron in nearly a decade. Chevron deference …

Law, Fact, And Appellate Review, Adam N. Steinman

Faculty Scholarship

For centuries, courts have been called upon to distinguish between law and fact. That distinction played a key role in recent Supreme Court decisions on two critical components of appellate review. Dupree v. Younger considered an important question regarding what a party must do at trial to preserve an issue for appellate review. And Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. addressed how to select and apply the standard of appellate review--specifically, whether and how the appellate court must show deference to particular decisions made at the trial level.
Both decisions were partially right. Dupree correctly focused on whether certain early …

Affirmative Action’S Asian American Problem, Huyen Pham, Joseph Thai

Faculty Scholarship

Asian American opponents of affirmative action have received both credit and blame for their pivotal role in toppling racial preferences in university admissions in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (SFFA). Allied conservatives highlighted evidence of discrimination against Asian American applicants as a compelling reason to dismantle affirmative action; liberals either denied this discrimination existed or tolerated it as an acceptable cost of helping other minority applicants. But largely unacknowledged is the precipitating history of the Supreme Court’s marginalization of Asian American applicants and its decades of tacit approval of their exclusion from affirmative action programs. This unwritten …

A New Era Of Deference: From Chevron To Loper Bright, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions has been a hallmark of administrative law and regulatory policy for the past forty years. The Supreme Court recently upended that settled allocation of power between agencies and courts, granting interpretive primacy to courts even where statutes essentially require policy choices. However, questions remain about precisely how courts will exercise this policymaking authority that agencies used to exercise, as well as about the multiple “offramps” from this nondeferential standard that the Court left open. Rather than a new era of nondeference, it is just as likely we are embarking on a …

Major Questions, Common Sense?, Kevin Tobia, Daniel E. Walters, Brian Slocum

Faculty Scholarship

The Major Questions Doctrine (“MQD”) is the newest textualist interpretive canon, and it has driven consequential Supreme Court decisions concerning vaccine mandates, environmental regulation, and student loan relief. But the new MQD is a canon in search of legitimization. Critics allege that the MQD displaces the Court’s conventional textual analysis with judicial policymaking. Textualists have now responded that the MQD is a linguistic canon, consistent with textualism. Justice Barrett recently argued in Biden v. Nebraska that the MQD is grounded in ordinary people’s understanding of language and law, and scholarship contends that the MQD reflects ordinary people’s understanding of textual …

Understanding 303 Creative Llc In A Polycentric Constitutional World, Meg Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

The evolution of rights following Obergefell is not over. Creative 303 LLC marked a new phase in the ongoing legal challenges over the rights and ceremonies attending same-sex marriage. This Essay addresses the anticipated limits of 303 Creative LLC.

The Essay proceeds in three parts. First, how does 303 Creative LLC impact government employees? What rights, if any, should government employees be able to raise in light of 303 Creative LLC? Second, what does 303 Creative LLC mean for private marketplace vendors engaging in expressive commerce? Vendors, particularly wedding vendors, often create unique items for weddings. Will the law focus …

Do Public Accommodations Laws Compel “What Shall Be Orthodox”?: The Role Of Barnette In 303 Creative Llc V. Eleni, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

This article addresses the U.S. Supreme Court's embrace, in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, of a First Amendment objection to state public accommodations laws that the Court avoided in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission: such laws compel governmental orthodoxy. These objections invoke West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette 's celebrated language: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith …

Adoption As Substitute For Abortion?, Malinda L. Seymore

Faculty Scholarship

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, Justice Samuel Alito relied on adoption as part of the justification for holding that abortion is not constitutionally protected: “States have increasingly adopted ‘safe haven’ laws, which generally allow women to drop off babies anonymously; and that a woman who puts her newborn up for adoption today has little reason to fear that the baby will not find a suitable home.” Using adoption as an adequate substitute for abortion is a long-standing strategy for the antiabortion movement; but it is often embraced by pro-choice advocates as well. This position is supportable only if the …

The Perennial Eclipse: Race, Immigration, And How Latinx Count In American Politics, Rachel F. Moran

Faculty Scholarship

In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Evenwel v. Abbott, a case challenging the use of total population in state legislative apportionment as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs sued Texas, alleging that the State impermissibly diluted their voting power because they lived in areas with a high proportion of voting-age citizens. When total population was used to draw district lines, the plaintiffs had to compete with more voters to get their desired electoral outcomes than was true for voters in districts with low proportions of voting-age citizens. The Court rejected the argument, finding that states enjoy …

Constitutional Rights And Remedial Consistency, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Scholarship

When the Supreme Court declined definitively to block Texas’s S.B. 8, which effectively eliminated pre-enforcement federal remedies for what was then a plainly unconstitutional restriction on abortion rights, a prominent criticism was that the majority would have never tolerated the similar treatment of preferred legal protections—like gun rights. This refrain reemerged when California enacted a copycat regime for firearms regulation. This theme sounds in the deep-rooted idea that judge-made law should adhere to generality and neutrality values requiring doctrines to derive justification from controlling a meaningful class of cases ascertained by objective legal criteria.

This Article is about consistency, and …

The Rise, Fall, And Rise Of Cyber Civil Libertarianism, Hannah Bloch-Wehba

Faculty Scholarship

Using sexual speech as its focal point, this essay explores the ambiguous legacy of cyber civil liberties and the ascent of alternative paradigms for digital freedom. From its inception, cyberlaw was characterized by a moral panic over sexual speech, pornography, and the protection of children familiar to First Amendment scholars. Important civil libertarian victories recognized that sexual speech and pornography were constitutionally protected from state intervention. The civil libertarian paradigm saw government regulation as the primary threat to free speech online, the marketplace as the more appropriate mechanism for regulating expression, and courts as the rightful arbiters of these disputes. …

The Anti-Innovation Supreme Court: Major Questions, Delegation, Chevron And More, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court of the United States has generally been a very aggressive enforcer of legal limitations on governmental power. In various periods in its history, the Court has gone far beyond enforcing clearly expressed and easily ascertainable constitutional and statutory provisions and has suppressed innovation by the other branches that do not necessarily transgress widely held social norms. Novel assertions of legislative power, novel interpretations of federal statutes, statutes that are in tension with well-established common law rules and state laws adopted by only a few states are suspect simply because they are novel or rub up against tradition. …

Orders Without Law, Thomas P. Schmidt

Faculty Scholarship

This Review has two goals. The book, by design, largely steers clear of concrete reform proposals; its object is to trace the ways that the Court’s practices around emergency applications shifted over the Trump years and to urge that these developments warrant critical attention (pp. 24–25). My first goal, then, is to propose some reforms. These proposals orbit around a central contention: Any critique of the shadow docket and any proposed solution must depend, explicitly or implicitly, on a theory of the Court — its role in the constitutional order and how it can best serve that role. As a …

The Foreshadow Docket, Bert I. Huang

Faculty Scholarship

Imagine the Supreme Court issuing an emergency order that signals interest in departing from precedent, as if foreshadowing a change in the law. Seeing this, should the lower courts start ruling in ways that also anticipate the law of the future? They need not do so in their merits rulings. That much is clear. Such a signal does not create new binding precedent. Rather, it reflects the Justices’ guess about the future of the law — and what if that guess is wrong?

Yet for a lower court ruling on a temporary stay or injunction, the task seems to call …

Charging Abortion, Milan Markovic

Faculty Scholarship

As long as Roe v. Wade remained good law, prosecutors could largely avoid the question of abortion. The Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization has now placed prosecutors at the forefront of the abortion wars. Some chief prosecutors in antiabortion states have pledged to not enforce antiabortion laws, whereas others are targeting even out-of-state providers. This post-Dobbs reality, wherein the ability to obtain an abortion depends not only on the politics of one’s state but also the policies of one’s local district attorney, has received minimal scrutiny from legal scholars.

Prosecutors have broad charging discretion, …

Outcome Reasons And Process Reasons In Normative Constitutional Theory, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional theory is a mess. Disagreements about originalism and living constitutionalism have become intractable. Constitutional theorists make some arguments that seem clearly fallacious and advance proposals that are pie in the sky. One of the reasons for the mess is an overreliance by constitutional theorists on “outcome reasons,” justifications that rely on the theorist’s beliefs about what outcomes are good and what outcomes are bad. This outcome-drive approach is exemplified by the so-called “canonical cases” argument, which evaluates positions in normative constitutional theory on the basis of its counterfactual implications for a handful of prior decisions of the Supreme Court. …

The Wages Of Crying Roe: Some Realism About Dobbs V. Jackson Women’S Health Organization, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organizationcannot be taken seriously. The Court’s stated rationale for rejecting continued protection of the abortion right—that abortion is not deeply rooted in nineteenth century history and tradition—applies with equal force to other substantive due process rights that the DobbsCourt repeatedly insisted were not under threat even without considering stare decisis, including contraception, sexual intimacy between consenting adults, and same-sex marriage. One should add inter-racial marriage and protection from involuntary sterilization to that list. Rather than applying its draconian version of the “history and tradition” test in a …

Corpus Linguistics And The Original Public Meaning Of The Sixteenth Amendment, Thomas R. Lee, Lawrence B. Solum, James C. Phillips, Jesse A. Egbert

Faculty Scholarship

Moore v. United States raises the question whether unrealized gains, such as an increase in property value or a stock portfolio, constitute “incomes, from whatever source derived” under the original meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. Moore is widely viewed as the most important tax case to reach the United States Supreme Court in decades. It is also an opportunity for the Court to refine its theory and method of finding original meaning.

We focus here on the original public meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment—the ordinary, common meaning attributed to its text by the general public in 1913. So far, the …

Abortion Politics And The Rise Of Movement Jurists, Robert L. Tsai, Mary Ziegler

Faculty Scholarship

This Article employs the Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization and litigation in its wake as the jumping off point to reconsider the connections between judges, the Constitution, and social movements. That movements influence constitutional law, and that judicial pronouncements in turn are reshaped by politics, is well-established. But, while these accounts of legal change depend upon judges to embrace movement ideas, less has been written about the conditions under which judicial entrenchment can be expected to take place. There may, in fact, be different types of judicial dispositions towards external political phenomena.

In this Article, …

Judicial Preferences And Aggrandizement Effects, Jason Marisam

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars increasingly portray the Supreme Court as power hungry and self-aggrandizing. This aggrandizement literature, though, lacks a robust causal theory. This essay argues that judicial aggrandizement is not the product of a power-maximizing agenda but a function of judicial preferences and legal background conditions. Aggrandizement occurs in cases where legal background conditions do not align with judicial policy preferences and the justices assert power to create their preferred policy outcomes. This theory has significant prescriptive and normative implications. For example, counterintuitively, this essay shows that more judicial aggrandizement could be a sign of a healthier institution under some conditions.

The Major Questions Doctrine At The Boundaries Of Interpretive Law, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s apparent transformation of the major questions doctrine into a clear statement rule demanding clear congressional authorization for “major” agency actions has already had, and will continue to have, wide-ranging impacts on American public law. Not the least of these is the impact it will have on the enterprise of statutory interpretation. Indeed, while it is easy to focus on the policy repercussions of a newly constrained Congress and newly hamstrung administrative state, this Article argues that equally important is the novel precedent that is set in this particular formulation of a clear statement rule, which stands almost …

Being An Icon: Reflections On Sandra Day O'Connor, Lisa Kern Griffin

Faculty Scholarship

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's passing in December inspired an outpouring of tributes to the rancher's daughter who blazed a trail through Stanford, legal practice, the Arizona legislature, and the state trial and appellate courts to arrive at the Supreme Court of the United States. She served as the Court's 102nd Justice and the first woman Justice in the institution's almost 200-year history. Justice O'Connor was both a world historical figure and a one-of-a-kind personality. She has been justly celebrated for her tremendous accomplishments as well as her extraordinary personal grace. This reflection offers some insight into what she looked like …

Taking Liberties: The Supreme Court’S New Hierarchy Of Rights And Its Victims, Richard B. Katskee

Faculty Scholarship

The legitimacy of our unelected Supreme Court comes from the nature and structural limitations on judicial power. Courts do not make policy in the abstract. Rather, Article III requires federal judges to decide only real, live disputes, on the facts before them. Stare decisis then prevents the courts from changing legal rules willy-nilly. The big, important changes come instead through collective decision-making by our elected representatives. When courts do break from stare decisis, it is normally to expand protections for the politically disempowered. Those protections then make legislatures more representative and act as brakes on abuses of minorities by an …

Loper Bright And The Future Of Chevron Deference, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The question presented in Loper Bright Industries v. Raimondo¹ is “[w]hether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.” The Court denied certiorari on another question focused on the merits of the case,² indicating that at least four of the Justices are anxious to revisit or at least clarify Chevron. It’s about time, although it’s far from certain that the Court will actually follow through with the promise the certiorari grant indicates.^{3 …}

Roads Not Taken On Affirmative Action, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

The law of affirmative action is a mess. In the short term, legal doctrine is constrained by path dependence, but its long-term future is murkier due to the many unforeseen contingencies. To regain a sense of the possible, this Article looks forward to the future of equality jurisprudence by looking backward. It recovers three roads not taken. First, the Supreme Court could have kept expectations minimal by hewing closely to the methods and rhetoric of fairness rather than ratifying a consumerist model of entitlement by deploying an individualistic vision of equality. Second, the justices might have endorsed a robust right …