Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Legislative Exhaustion, Michael Sant’Ambrogio

William & Mary Law Review

Legislative lawsuits are a recurring by-product of divided government. Yet the Supreme Court has never definitively resolved whether Congress may sue the executive branch over its execution of the law. Some scholars argue that Congress should be able to establish Article III standing when its interests are harmed by executive action or inaction just like private parties. Others, including most prominently the late Justice Antonin Scalia, argue that intergovernmental disputes do not constitute Article III “cases” or “controversies” at all. Rather, the Framers envisioned the political branches resolving their differences through nonjudicial means.

This Article proposes a different approach to …

Federalist Court: How The Federalist Society Became The De Facto Selector Of Republican Supreme Court Justices, Lawrence Baum, Neal Devins

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned The Supreme Court Into A Partisan Court, Neal Devins, Lawrence Baum

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Amicus Machine, Allison Orr Larsen, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court receives a record number of amicus curiae briefs and cites to them with increasing regularity. Amicus briefs have also become influential in determining which cases the Court will hear. It thus becomes important to ask: Where do these briefs come from? The traditional tale describes amicus briefs as the product of interest-group lobbying. But that story is incomplete and outdated. Today, skilled and specialized advocates of the Supreme Court Bar strategize about what issues the Court should hear and from whom they should hear them. They then “wrangle” the necessary amici and “whisper” to coordinate the message. …

Anti-Disruption Statutory Construction, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

The claim of this brief Essay is that Chief Justice [John Roberts]’s approach to statutory interpretation exhibits a “Burkean minimalism” that seeks to reduce [the] seismic effect of the Court’s decisions. In particular, the Chief Justice is drawn toward statutory interpretations that avoid constitutional questions and preserve legislative enactments against constitutional challenge. Avoiding disruption is not an unyielding imperative, as the Chief Justice is sometimes willing to join broad judgments with significant effects. Avoiding disruption does, however, appear to be among the Chief Justice’s preferences when deciding cases, and when interpreting federal statutes in particular.

This abstract has been adapted …

Legal Scholarship Highlight: The Amicus Machine, Allison Orr Larsen, Neal Devins

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Justice Scalia’S Bottom-Up Approach To Shaping The Law, Meghan J. Ryan

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Justice Antonin Scalia is among the most famous Supreme Court Justices in history. He is known for his originalism and conservative positions, as well as his witty and acerbic legal opinions. One of the reasons Justice Scalia’s opinions are so memorable is his effective use of rhetorical devices, which convey colorful images and understandable ideas. One might expect that such powerful opinions would be effective in shaping the law, but Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy was often too conservative to persuade a majority of his fellow Justices on the Supreme Court. Further, his regular criticisms of his Supreme Court colleagues were …

The Death Knell For The Death Penalty And The Significance Of Global Realism To Its Abolition From Glossip V. Gross To Brumfield V. Cain, Linda A. Malone

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the death penalty, whether or not cruel, has most certainly been unusual in the annals of criminal punishment. In the short span of four years, the Court foreclosed and then reopened this form of punishment in Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia. One year later the Court would categorically exclude the punishment for the rape of an adult. Five years later the Court would again preclude the punishment, for any defendant convicted of felony-murder who did not participate or share in the homicidal act or intent. In 1986 the Court would struggle with …

The Senate Has No Constitutional Obligation To Consider Nominees, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

[After Justice Antonin Scalia's death in 2016 and i]n response to the Senate Republican leadership's stated intention to refuse to consider any nominee to replace Justice Scalia, some began to argue that the Senate has a constitutional obligation to act on a Supreme Court nomination.

The argument that the Senate has a constitutional obligation to act on a Supreme Court nomination is anything but "clear." This claim finds no support in the relevant constitutional text, constitutional structure, or the history of judicial nominations. While there are strong policy and prudential arguments that the Senate should promptly consider any and all …

Restoring Chevron'S Domain, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

For some three decades, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has stood at the center of administrative law. Although Chevron may have been somewhat "accidental," Chevron has been among the most important and consequential administrative law decisions of all time. It is, according to Cass Sunstein, a "foundational, even a quasi-constitutional text" in administrative law.

Foundational or not, Chevron's domain is under siege. In recent years, commentators have raised doubts about the doctrine's continued vitality and ultimate desirability. Indeed, some have suggested Chevron should be ditched altogether - if not by the courts, then perhaps by Congress. …

2016-2017 Supreme Court Preview: Schedule And Panel Members, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 4: Criminal, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 7: Immigration Law, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 3: Business, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 2: The Court And The 2016 Election, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 5: Civil Rights And Liberties, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 1: Moot Court: Pena-Rodriguez V. Colorado, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 6: Immigration, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

2016-2017 Supreme Court Preview: Contents, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Tiers Of Scrutiny In A Hierarchical Judiciary, Tara Leigh Grove

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Book Review Of Constitutional Personae, Michael N. Umberger

Library Staff Publications

No abstract provided.

The United States Supreme Court (Mostly) Gives Up Its Review Role With Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Cases, Paul Marcus

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Some Thoughts On The Study Of Judicial Behavior, Lee Epstein

William & Mary Law Review

Back in the 1940s the political scientist C. Herman Pritchett began tallying the votes and opinions of Supreme Court Justices. His goal was to use data to test the hypothesis that the Justices were not only following the “law,” but were also motivated by their own ideological preferences.

With the hindsight of nearly eighty years, we know that Pritchett’s seemingly small project helped to create a big field: Judicial Behavior, which I take to be the theoretical and empirical study of the choices judges make. Political scientists continue to play a central role, but they are now joined by economists, …

The Second Dimension Of The Supreme Court, Joshua B. Fischman, Tonja Jacobi

William & Mary Law Review

Describing the Justices of the Supreme Court as “liberals” and conservatives” has become so standard— and the left-right division on the Court is considered so entrenched— that any deviation from that pattern is treated with surprise. Attentive Court watchers know that the Justices are not just politicians in robes, deciding each case on a purely ideological basis. Yet the increasingly influential empirical legal studies literature assumes just that— that a left-right ideological dimension fully describes the Supreme Court. We show that there is a second, more legally-focused dimension of judicial decision making. A continuum between legalism and pragmatism also divides …

Does The 'Mcconnell Principle' Make Sense?, Jeffrey Bellin

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

How Merrick Garland Could Help Heal America, Jeffrey Bellin

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Ideological Imbalance: Why Democrats Usually Pick Moderate-Liberal Justices And Republicans Usually Pick Conservative Ones, Lawrence Baum, Neal Devins

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Stanley V. Illinois’S Untold Story, Josh Gupta-Kagan

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Stanley v. Illinois is one of the Supreme Court’s more curious landmark cases. The holding is well known: the Due Process Clause both prohibits states from removing children from the care of unwed fathers simply because they are not married and requires states to provide all parents with a hearing on their fitness. By recognizing strong due process protections for parents’ rights, Stanley reaffirmed Lochner-era cases that had been in doubt and formed the foundation of modern constitutional family law. But Peter Stanley never raised due process arguments, so it has long been unclear how the Court reached this decision. …

Neutral Principles And Some Campaign Finance Problems, John O. Mcginnis

William & Mary Law Review

This Article has both positive and normative objectives. As a positive matter, it shows that the Roberts Court’s campaign finance regulation jurisprudence can be best explained as a systematic effort to integrate that case law with the rest of the First Amendment, making the neutral principles refined in other social contexts govern this more politically salient one as well. It demonstrates that the typical Roberts Court majority in campaign finance cases follows precedent, doctrine, and traditional First Amendment theory, while the dissents tend to carve out exceptions at each of these levels.

As a normative matter, it argues that following …

Spencer: Chief Justice John Roberts And The Loss Of Access To Justice, A. Benjamin Spencer

Popular Media

No abstract provided.