Second Amendment Commons^™

Historical Firearm Licensing And Permitting Laws, Robert J. Spitzer

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

No abstract provided.

The Waiting Is The Hardest Part: The Constitutionality Of Firearm Waiting Periods, F. Lee Francis

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This Article examines the constitutionality of firearm waiting period laws through the lens of the Supreme Court’s evolving Second Amendment jurisprudence. Although such laws are frequently defended as prudent public safety measures, their validity turns not on legislative purpose but on constitutional principle, particularly as framed in District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.

Under those decisions, the scope of the Second Amendment is determined not by judicial balancing of contemporary interests, but by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Article surveys that tradition and finds no …

When Rights Require Permission: The Discriminatory History Of Licensing Laws For Firearm Possession, Bob Barr, Joseph G.S. Greenlee

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

No abstract provided.

The Wrongly Read Right: Insurrection And The Second Amendment Right To Bear Arms, Aman Mcleod, Jacob M. Jones

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Several judges and scholars have interpreted the Second Amendment as creating a right to bear arms to facilitate armed resistance against the government whenever it threatens to impose tyranny. These arguments have been made in books, scholarly articles, and court decisions. Many of the proponents of the pro-armed insurrection interpretation of the Second Amendment root this point of view in the history of the right to bear arms in the Anglo-American legal tradition. This Article argues that the Second Amendment does not create a right to bear arms to resist government authority because such a right is inconsistent with several …

Big Business As Gun Control, David B. Kopel, George A. Mocsary, Bhav Ninder Singh

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Gun control increasingly bypasses direct legislative enactments by co-opting the commercial marketplace. Financial institutions and insurers often face regulatory pressures, frequently articulated through vague notions of “reputational risk,” to terminate or restrict services for lawful firearms businesses and advocacy groups. The debanking tactic, seen in initiatives such as Operation Choke Point, can deny essential financial products to firearm owners, merchants, and organizations, curtailing the practical exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Simultaneously, government agencies sometimes pursue warrantless data collection from bank records and merchant category codes, building profiles of lawful purchasers and eroding privacy and due-process norms.

Social media platforms compound …

Dangerous And Unusual: How Heller’S Ahistorical Assumption Violates The Founders’ Original Intent, Oliver Krawczyk, Gilbert Ambler

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

When the U.S. Supreme Court ended its generational silence on the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that “a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society” is “invalid.” In so holding, the Court suggested that the Constitution protects only those weapons “in common use at the time,” a limitation thought to be “fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” The Court defined none of these terms then, and it has not since.

Over a decade of constitutional infidelity ensued. …

Just To Be Safe, Let’S Keep Ignoring What “Arms” Meant In 1791, Jack Thorlin

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller and reaffirmed in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen that “arms,” referred to in the Second Amendment, are common weapons useful for lawful purposes. The majority argued that militiamen fought with whatever common weapons they had on hand for civilian purposes, such as self-defense and hunting. Therefore, under Heller, only those weapons are covered by the Second Amendment. However, Heller did little to ground the “self-defense” theory of “arms” in original public meaning or even actual history. Commonality and lawful purpose have proved difficult for lower …

Lewd, Rude, Obscene, And… Violent? Analyzing Student Clothing Depicting Firearms Under The First Amendment’S Obscenity Test, Luke Gorman

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Today’s national news and social media have repeatedly exposed our school-age children to the effects of shootings occurring within their schools and communities. Each shooting brings with it commentary, sometimes from the students themselves. While in-school student speech is more limited than speech levied in the outside world, students do not shed their speech rights at the “schoolhouse gate.” As a result, courts have failed to outline a consistent approach for when a student will be punished for wearing a shirt depicting a firearm to school. This Comment addresses this delicate balance by proposing a consistent three-part test framed by …

“What’S Brewin’ With Bruen?” Why, And How, We Must Permit Certain Felons To Possess Firearms, Samuel Roos

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

In the summer of 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court decided New York Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, outlining a new test for the constitutionality of statutes regulating firearm possession. The result has been chaos. In less than a year, U.S.C. § 922(n) and § 922(g)(8), which criminalize possession by specific people involved in the criminal justice system, have been held unconstitutional. Challenges to other federal firearm regulations are flooding the courts.

Notably, § 922(g)(1), which criminalizes possession of a firearm by any person with a felony in their criminal history, has been vigorously challenged. Few courts have yet …

Dangerous And Unusual: How An Expanding National Firearms Act Will Spell Its Own Demise, Oliver Krawczyk

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA) is the strictest federal gun control law currently in effect. It criminalizes the mere possession and transfer of specifically enumerated categories of firearms deemed to be especially dangerous and unusual, such as machine guns and silencers. Commensurate with this viewpoint, the NFA imposes on violators harsh felony penalties, from lengthy prison sentences to six-figure fines. However, the NFA permits lawful civilian ownership of these firearms under a taxation and registration scheme administered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). In its 2008 District of Columbia v. Heller decision, the United …

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …