Rule of Law Commons^™

When The Judge Is Not The Primary Official With Responsibility To Read: Agency Interpretation And The Problem Of Legislative History, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

As the other pages of this journal reflect, writing about statutory interpretation commonly builds on unarticulated assumptions about the occasion for interpretation, the identity of the interpreter, and the character of the interpreted text. In this paradigm, the occasion for interpretation is a litigated case – an episode has occurred for which the application of the statute is problematic. The interpreter is a judge, a person who resolves litigation – typically episodic, typically backwards – working outside of politics, and bearing no generic responsibility (that is, responsibility outside the decision of the case before her) for the statutory regime. And …

What's Next?: The Future Of Rico, G. Robert Blakey, John C. Coffee Jr., Paul E. Coffey, L. Gordon Crovitz

Faculty Scholarship

Opening Statement of Mr. Crovitz: Coming to the Notre Dame Law School to debate Robert Blakey on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law makes me feel like Daniel approaching the lion's den. I'm tempted to offer my own prayer, "Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no RICO."

The Rule Of Law And The Two Realms Of Welfare Administration, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

Although it was not the first case in which the Supreme Court upheld a welfare claim, Goldberg v. Kelly is often thought of as the case that extended the rule of law to the welfare system. In doing so, it repudiated the "right/privilege" distinction that would confine procedural protections of economic interests to private law claims.

But Goldberg did not challenge basic assumptions about the nature of procedural fairness that the legal culture had developed principally in connection with private law claims. Its conception of fairness focused on claims initiated by individuals for relief for themselves, and on an adjudicatory …

Legislative Theory And The Rule Of Law: Some Comments On Rubin, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Rubin's article is an admirable piece of work on many levels, from its attention to jurisprudence to its concern with the practical changes in the Congress and its function, and their implications. In commenting on it, I mean to restrict myself to the latter subjects. These are the matters that have the closest tangency to my own work and produce for me the strongest response. Professor Rubin has given us a compelling statement of the problems posed for contemporary constitutional and legislative theory by one transformation in statutory practice accompanying the rise of the administrative state, the change from …

Facing Up: A Reply, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

We are all familiar with the peculiar feeling of coming across one's past objectified, as when one overhears others telling how they perceived a certain event in which one played the hero's role. Reading the contributions to this issue was a bit like that. In particular, it made me realise how I have abused the tolerant paper by writing all too much, while leaving so many hostages to fortune, so many loose ends, and expressing so many half-baked ideas. It is also embarrassing because it is like a summons to the confessional, to repent my sins of omission and commission, …

The Role Of Strategic Reasoning In Constitutional Interpretation: In Defense Of The Pathological Perspective Comments, Vincent A. Blasi

Faculty Scholarship

I am indebted to Professor Christie, not only for noticing my work but also for challenging it in so forthright a manner. He has identified a feature of my thesis that deserves to be a focal point for additional debate. Any reader of my original article who was undecided whether to agree with it ought to be aided considerably in the task of critical evaluation by the exchange Professor Christie has initiated. I know my own understanding of the premises and implications of my thesis has been enhanced by the experience of working out a response to his challenge.

The …

Two Modes Of Legal Thought, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

We should begin with a confession of ignorance. We have no jurisprudence of legal scholarship. Scholars expatiate at length on the work of other actors in the legal culture – legislators, judges, prosecutors, and even practicing lawyers. Yet we reflect little about what we are doing when we write about the law. We have a journal about the craft of teaching, but none about the craft of scholarship.

In view of our ignorance, we should pay particular heed to our point of departure. I start with the observation that legal scholarship expresses itself in a variety of verbal forms. Descriptive …