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Supreme Court of the United States

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Articles 391 - 420 of 426

Full-Text Articles in Rule of Law

Overcoming Lochner In The Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights And Popular Sovereignty Seriously As We Seek To Secure Equal Citizenship And Promote The Public Good, Thomas B. Mcaffee Jan 2008

Overcoming Lochner In The Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights And Popular Sovereignty Seriously As We Seek To Secure Equal Citizenship And Promote The Public Good, Thomas B. Mcaffee

University of Richmond Law Review

Professor McAffee reviews substantive due process as the textual basis for modern fundamental rights constitutional decision-making. He contends that we should avoid both the undue literalism that rejects the idea of implied rights, as well as the attempt to substitute someone's preferred moral vision for the limits, and compromises, that are implicit in and intended by the Constitution's text. He argues, moreover, that we can largely harmonizethe variousgoals of our constitutionalsystem by taking rights se- riously and by understanding that securing rights does not ex-haustthe Constitution'spurposes.


When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus Jan 2008

When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Constitutional theory lacks an account of when each of the familiar sources of authority-text, original meaning, precedent, and so on-should be given weight. The dominant tendency is to regard all sources as potentially applicable in every case. In contrast, this Article proposes that each source of authority is pertinent in some categories of cases but not in others, much as a physical tool is appropriate for some but not all kinds of household tasks. The Article then applies this approach to identify the categories of cases in which original meaning is, or is not, a valid factor in constitutional decisionmaking.


Rebus Sic Stantibus: Notification Of Consular Rights After Medellin, Aaron A. Ostrovsky, Brandon E. Reavis Jan 2006

Rebus Sic Stantibus: Notification Of Consular Rights After Medellin, Aaron A. Ostrovsky, Brandon E. Reavis

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Comment examines, through principles of public international law and U.S. jurisprudence, the relationship between U.S. courts and the ICJ to determine if the former are indeed bound by the latter's decisions, proprio motu, or if instead some Executive action is required to make the decisions binding on the judiciary. Part of this examination will entail a discussion of the potential for dialogue between the ICJ and U.S. courts to "pierce the veil of sovereignty" that traditionally conceals the inner workings of sovereign states from the scrutiny of international tribunals. Based on this assessment, the Comment then addresses how …


The ‘Rule Of Law’ And The Military Commission, Stephen Ellmann Jan 2006

The ‘Rule Of Law’ And The Military Commission, Stephen Ellmann

Articles & Chapters

No abstract provided.


Comparative Constitutionalism In A New Key, Paul W. Kahn Aug 2003

Comparative Constitutionalism In A New Key, Paul W. Kahn

Michigan Law Review

Law is a symbolic system that structures the political imagination. The "rule of law" is a shorthand expression for a cultural practice that constructs a particular understanding of time and space, of subjects and groups, as well as of authority and legitimacy. It is a way of projecting, maintaining, and discovering meaning in the world of historical events and political possibilities. The rule of law - as opposed to the techniques of lawyering - is not the possession of lawyers. It is a characterization of the polity, which operates both descriptively and normatively in public perception. Ours, we believe, is …


Interpreting U.S. Treaties In Light Of Human Rights Values, Lori Fisler Damrosch Jan 2003

Interpreting U.S. Treaties In Light Of Human Rights Values, Lori Fisler Damrosch

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.


What Is And Is Not Pathological In Criminal Law, Kyron Huigens Dec 2002

What Is And Is Not Pathological In Criminal Law, Kyron Huigens

Michigan Law Review

In a recent article in this law review, William J. Stuntz argues that criminal law in the United States suffers from a political pathology. The incentives of legislators are such that the notorious overcriminalization of American society is deep as well as broad. That is, not only are remote corners of life subject to criminal penalties - such things as tearing tags off mattresses and overworking animals - but now crimes are defined with the express design of easing the way to conviction. Is proof of a tangible harm an obstacle to using wire and mail fraud statutes to prosecute …


Reply: Criminal Law's Pathology, William J. Stuntz Dec 2002

Reply: Criminal Law's Pathology, William J. Stuntz

Michigan Law Review

I thank Kyron Huigens for devoting his time and his considerable talent to responding to my article, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law. I also thank editors of the Michigan Law Review for giving me the opportunity to reply. It is best to begin by defining the contested territory. Huigens and I agree (I think) on three propositions. First, American criminal law, both federal and state, is very broad; it covers a great deal more conduct than most people would expect. Second, American criminal law is very deep: that which it criminalizes, it criminalizes repeatedly, so that a single …


The Search For Incontrovertible Visual Evidence, Paul F. Campos Jan 2001

The Search For Incontrovertible Visual Evidence, Paul F. Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.


Making The Law Safe For Democracy: A Review Of "The Law Of Democracy Etc.", Burt Neuborne Jan 1999

Making The Law Safe For Democracy: A Review Of "The Law Of Democracy Etc.", Burt Neuborne

Michigan Law Review

Henry Hart began his 1964 Holmes Lectures by asking what a "single" would be without baseball. We rolled our eyes at that one, reveling in the maestro's penchant for the occult. As usual, though, Professor Hart was trying to tell us groundlings something precious. He was warning us that conventional legal thinking, by stressing rigorous deconstructive analysis, can obscure an important unity in favor of components that should be analyzed, not solely as freestanding phenomena, but as part of the unity. Without recognition of the unity, analysis of the components risks being carried on in a normative vacuum that will …


The Practice Of Dissent In The Supreme Court, Kevin M. Stack Jun 1996

The Practice Of Dissent In The Supreme Court, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The United States Supreme Court's connection to the ideal of the rule of law is often taken to be the principal basis of the Court's political legitimacy. In the Supreme Court's practices, however, the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's political legitimacy do not always coincide. This Note argues that the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's legitimacy part company with respect to the Court's practice of dissent. Specifically, this Note aims to demonstrate that the practice of dissent-the tradition of Justices publishing their differences with the judgment or the reasoning of their peers--cannot …


Back To The Briarpatch: An Argument In Favor Of Constitutional Meta-Analysis In State Action Determinations, Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr. Nov 1995

Back To The Briarpatch: An Argument In Favor Of Constitutional Meta-Analysis In State Action Determinations, Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Brer Rabbit, after claiming repeatedly that he would prefer almost anything to being thrown into the briarpatch, expressed glee once tossed there. In fact, Brer Rabbit wanted to be in the briarpatch because, like most rabbits, he could navigate the briarpatch with relative ease: the briarpatch was home.

Over the course of a century, the Supreme Court has developed a great degree of familiarity with the state action doctrine, a doctrinal briar patch. Like Brer Rabbit, the Court has disclaimed repeatedly any interest in being there.

In this article, I argue that the existing tests for establishing the presence of …


Disagreement And Interpretation, Robert F. Nagel Jan 1993

Disagreement And Interpretation, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.


The Conflict Concerning Expert Witness And Legal Conclusions, Charles W. Ehrhardt Apr 1990

The Conflict Concerning Expert Witness And Legal Conclusions, Charles W. Ehrhardt

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


The Judiciary's Use Of Supervisory Power To Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity, Department Of Justice Office Of Legal Policy Jun 1989

The Judiciary's Use Of Supervisory Power To Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity, Department Of Justice Office Of Legal Policy

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In McNabb v. United States, the Supreme Court claimed- for the first time in its history-the prerogative of "establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence" in the exercise of "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts." Since then, the Court has used this self-declared oversight power on numerous occasions and for a wide variety of purposes, but it has never adequately explained either the provenance or the scope of this type of judicial authority. Lower federal courts have followed suit, on the largely unexamined assumption that they too are endowed with supervisory …


A Comment On The Rule Of Law Model Of Separation Of Powers, Robert F. Nagel Jan 1989

A Comment On The Rule Of Law Model Of Separation Of Powers, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.


Legislative Theory And The Rule Of Law: Some Comments On Rubin, Peter L. Strauss Jan 1989

Legislative Theory And The Rule Of Law: Some Comments On Rubin, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Rubin's article is an admirable piece of work on many levels, from its attention to jurisprudence to its concern with the practical changes in the Congress and its function, and their implications. In commenting on it, I mean to restrict myself to the latter subjects. These are the matters that have the closest tangency to my own work and produce for me the strongest response. Professor Rubin has given us a compelling statement of the problems posed for contemporary constitutional and legislative theory by one transformation in statutory practice accompanying the rise of the administrative state, the change from …


Federal Court Review Of Arbitrary State Court Decisions, David T. Azrin Aug 1988

Federal Court Review Of Arbitrary State Court Decisions, David T. Azrin

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this Note argues that the Thompson, Logan, and Hicks cases can be read narrowly to deal primarily with concern about protecting specific constitutional guarantees such as criminal procedural protections, equal protection guarantees, and first amendment freedoms. Arguably, in order to avoid dealing explicitly with the broader constitutional questions raised by the state decisions, the Court reversed the state decisions as arbitrary interpretations of state law. Part II argues that the rule against arbitrary state decisions suggested by Thompson, Logan, and Hicks is incompatible with federalism because it interferes with states' ability to develop law over state …


Procedural And Substantive Problems In Complex Litigation Arising From Disasters, Jack B. Weinstein Jan 1988

Procedural And Substantive Problems In Complex Litigation Arising From Disasters, Jack B. Weinstein

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Legality And Empathy, Lynne N. Henderson Jun 1987

Legality And Empathy, Lynne N. Henderson

Michigan Law Review

This article rejects the assumption that legality - by which I mean the dominant belief system about the Rule and role of Law - and empathy are mutually exclusive concepts. Failure to recognize the phenomenon of empathy explicitly in legal decisions more generally may result from a fear of the emotional realm as irrational, rather than a rational. It may stem from a belief that the divide between "subject" and "object" is uncrossable. The resistance to empathy may be attributable to the adversarial ideology acquired during law school understanding the adversary is not important unless it serves one's instrumental …


A Comment On Democratic Constitutionalism, Robert F. Nagel Jan 1987

A Comment On Democratic Constitutionalism, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.


The Public's Right To Know: The Supreme Court As Pandora?, Loren P. Beth Mar 1983

The Public's Right To Know: The Supreme Court As Pandora?, Loren P. Beth

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Public's Right to Know: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment by David M. O'Brien


Justice And The Bureaucratization Of Appellate Courts, Joseph Vining Jan 1982

Justice And The Bureaucratization Of Appellate Courts, Joseph Vining

Articles

The author notes the growing bureaucratization of appellate justice in the United States and, in particular, the drafting of opinions by law clerks rather than by judges. Taking the Supreme Court of the United States as an example, and comparing its internal procedure with that of large administrative agencies, he questions whether the method of analysis familiarly used by lawyers to arrive at an authoritative statement of law is applicable to legal texts bureaucratically produced. He suggests that legal method and its presuppositions are ultimately associated with the authority of law, and concludes that there may be critical losses not …


Constitutional Interpretation, Terrance Sandalow Jan 1981

Constitutional Interpretation, Terrance Sandalow

Articles

"[We] must never forget," Chief Justice Marshall admonished us in a statement pregnant with more than one meaning, "that it is a constitution we are expounding."' Marshall meant that the Constitution should be read as a document "intended to endure for ages.to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."'2 But he meant also that the construction placed upon the document must have regard for its "great outlines" and "important objects."'3 Limits are implied by the very nature of the task. There is not the same freedom in construing the Constitution as in constructing a …


Immunity Under The Speech Or Debate Clause For Republican And From Questioning About Sources, Michigan Law Review May 1973

Immunity Under The Speech Or Debate Clause For Republican And From Questioning About Sources, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Gravel v. United States, which arose out of Senator Mike Gravel's attempt to publicize the Pentagon Papers, concerned the scope of the immunity conferred upon a legislator and his aide under article I, section 6, of the United States Constitution. This provision, commonly called the "speech or debate clause," provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [United States Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." Gravel is one of the few Supreme Court interpretations of this clause.


Judicial Supremacy Re-Examined: A Proposed Alternative, G. Sidney Buchanan Jun 1972

Judicial Supremacy Re-Examined: A Proposed Alternative, G. Sidney Buchanan

Michigan Law Review

A citizen critic recently expressed to me his bitter opposition to the Warren Court's decisions on school prayer and school desegregation. If this critic were elected governor of a state or placed in some other position of governmental authority, he would almost certainly use his power to block public school desegregation and to encourage prayer reading in the public schools. Conceding that our critic would be acting controversially in so using his power, would he be acting unconstitutionally? This is the question which this Article will attempt to answer. More generally, this Article will consider the extent to which a …


Reapportionment--Nine Years Into The "Revolution" And Still Struggling, Michigan Law Review Jan 1972

Reapportionment--Nine Years Into The "Revolution" And Still Struggling, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Malapportioned legislative districts traditionally have inhibited the effective working of government at the federal, state, and local levels. By 1960, the population disparities among legislative districts had attained such great magnitude "that the integrity of representative government was in many instances endangered." The underrepresented victims of malapportionment sought relief through the courts. Initially the Supreme Court, ever hesitant to enter the "political thicket," declined to address itself to reapportionment controversies. This era of judicial inaction ended in 1962 with the Court's ruling in Baker v. Carr, in which the plaintiffs overcame the formidable barrier posed by the political-question doctrine. …


The Warren Court And The Press, John P. Mackenzie Dec 1968

The Warren Court And The Press, John P. Mackenzie

Michigan Law Review

The conventional wisdom about the relationship between the ·warren Court and the news media runs something like this: With a few exceptions, the press corps is populated by persons with only a superficial understanding of the Court, its processes, and the values with which it deals. The Court has poured out pages of legal learning, but its reasoning has been largely ignored by a result-oriented news industry interested only in the superficial aspects of the Court's work. The Court can trace much of its "bad press," its "poor image," to the often sloppy and inaccurate work of news gatherers operating …


Murphy: Congress And The Court, Robert B. Mckay Apr 1962

Murphy: Congress And The Court, Robert B. Mckay

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Congress and the Court. By Walter F. Murphy


The Supreme Court And The Rule Of Law, Paul G. Kauper Feb 1961

The Supreme Court And The Rule Of Law, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

I should like to approach this afternoon's subject along two lines. On the one hand, I propose to develop the subject in terms of the Supreme Court's contribution to our understanding of the Rule of Law, and, on the other hand, I propose to look at the Supreme Court as a governmental institution subject to the Rule of Law. In short, I propose to discuss the Supreme Court both as an instrumentality for the development of the American concept of the Rule of Law and as an institution governed by the Rule of Law. Needless to say, these two approaches …