President/Executive Department Commons^™

Trump As Constitutional Failure, Jamal Greene

Indiana Law Journal

As Part I explains, the American constitutional system assumes a certain sort of democratic culture. That assumption is encapsulated in Chief Justice John Marshall’s dictum, in M’Culloch v. Maryland, that the Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” The U.S. Constitution indeed lacks “the prolixity of a legal code,” but subsequent history confirms that its relative sparseness is not, as Marshall maintained, because it is “a constitution we are expounding.” The U.S. Constitution is among the world’s least prolix and most difficult to amend. These attributes …

The Abraham Lincoln Lecture On Constitutional Law, Steven G. Calabresi

Northwestern University Law Review

These introductory remarks to the Inaugural Abraham Lincoln Lecture on Constitutional Law were delivered at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law on April 6, 2017.

The Vice Presidency In The Twenty-First Century, Jody C. Baumgartner

Pepperdine Law Review

The vice presidency has undergone almost revolutionary change since its inception 227 years ago. Conceived as a convenient solution to a problem created by the Electoral College, the Vice President has only two constitutional functions—to serve as a successor to the President and as the President of the Senate. However, over the past sixty years, vice presidents have become increasingly part of and integral to American governance, and the last three (Al Gore, Dick Cheney, and Joe Biden) have been exceptionally active executive actors. What was once an all-but forgotten office is now an essential part of a president’s administration. …

The Vice President-More Than An Afterthought?, Richard B. Cheney, Edwin Meese Iii, Douglas W. Kmiec

Pepperdine Law Review

A round-table discussion among former U.S. Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Caruso Family Professor of Law and retired U.S. Ambassador Douglas Kmiec, and former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese III considered the practical implications of conceiving the Vice President as a legislative officer, an executive officer, or both. It was noted that until the second half of the twentieth century, the Office of the Vice President was conceived as legislative. Funding for the Office appeared in budget lines relating to Congress and physically, the Vice President’s office was in the Capitol. Beginning with Walter Mondale’s service as Vice President, presidents …

A Constitutional Afterthought: The Origins Of The Vice Presidency, 1787 To 1804, Edward J. Larson

Pepperdine Law Review

At the origins of the office, even though the Vice President was, as its first occupant John Adams declared, “only one breath” away from the presidency, the Office of the Vice President was an afterthought of the Constitutional Convention. Never discussed during the first three months of the four-month long Convention, the Committee of Eleven introduced the vice presidency as a byproduct of how it resolved to fix the presidential selection process. Under this process, the Electoral College emerged, with each state assigned the same number of electors as its members in the House of Representatives and Senate. Each elector …

The Constitutional Nature Of The United States Tax Court, Brant J. Hellwig

Scholarly Articles

Is the United States Tax Court part of the Executive Branch of government? One would expect that question would be capable of being definitively answered without considerable difficulty. And as recently expressed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that indeed is the case. In the course of addressing a challenge to the President's ability to remove a judge of the Tax Court for cause on separation of powers grounds, the D.C. Circuit rejected the premise that the removal power implicates two branches of government: "the Tax Court exercises Executive authority as part of the Executive …

Is The Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act Constitutional?, Robert J. Delahunty

Cardozo Law Review de•novo

My topic is both timely and perennial: The Electoral College. More specifically, I will first discuss the constitutional problem known as the “Faithless Elector” and, then, I will attempt to solve such problem. My proposed solution is the Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act (UFPEA), a statute that several states have adopted.

The Architecture Of Constitutional Time, Richard Alexander Izquierdo

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Bruce Ackerman’s account in his We the People series urges the legal recognition of constitutional amendments enacted outside of Article V as part of a larger descriptive project concerning the creation of distinct republics within the Constitution of 1787. One of its limitations is that he and other scholars have not fully appreciated the way in which the original institutional design of the Constitution has facilitated—and perhaps even anticipated—the construction of subregimes during extraordinary times. This Article presents constitutional time and presidential incentives for a lasting legacy as the most important factors influencing constitutional meaning. It is constitutional time—the extraordinary …

The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, Joshua D. Hawley

William & Mary Law Review

Scholars have long treated the Twelfth Amendment as a constitutional obscurity, a merely mechanical adjustment to the electoral college—and perhaps a less than successful one at that. This consensus is mistaken. In fact, the Twelfth Amendment accomplished one of the most consequential changes to the structure of our constitutional government yet. It fundamentally altered the nature of the Executive and the Executive’s relationship to the other branches of government. The Amendment changed the Executive into something it had not been before: a political office. The presidency designed at Philadelphia was intended to be neither a policymaking nor a representative institution, …

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …

The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash

Faculty Publications

Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the duties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence, while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional. Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its independence and status. By …

Executive Aggrandizement In Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, Michael P. Van Alstine

Faculty Scholarship

This article analyzes the power of the President to create federal law on the foundation of the executive’s status as the constitutional representative of the United States in foreign affairs. Executive branch advocates have claimed such a power throughout constitutional history. Recent events also have revived this constitutional controversy with particular vigor. In specific, President Bush recently issued a surprise “Determination” which asserted that the implied executive powers of Article II of the Constitution permit the President to enforce in domestic law the obligations owed to foreign states under international law.

The article first sets the legal and factual context …

Popular Sovereignty And The Electoral College, John O. Mcginnis

Articles

No abstract provided.

The World Trade Constitution, John O. Mcginnis, Mark L. Movsesian

Articles

Conventional wisdom holds that the World Trade Organization (WTO) necessarily poses a threat to sovereignty and representative government within its member nations. Professors McGinnis and Movsesian refute this view. They argue that the WTO can be understood as a constitutive structure that, by reducing the power of protectionist interest groups, can simultaneously promote international trade and domestic democracy. Indeed, in promoting both free trade and accountable government, the WTO reflects many of the insights that inform our own Madisonian Constitution. Professors McGinnis and Movsesian reject recent proposals to grant the WTO regulatory authority, endorsing instead the WTO's limited adjudicative power …

Ronald V. Dellums V. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus Curiae Of Law Professors, Bruce A. Ackerman, Abram Chayes, Lori Fisler Damrosch, John Hart Ely, Erwin N. Griswold, Gerald Gunther, Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, Philip B. Kurland, Laurence H. Tribe, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Publications

This joint memorandum is submitted to the court hearing Dellums v. Bush. This amicus brief advocates that the President may not order American armed forces to make war without consultation with and approval by Congress. The brief also argues that the case is justiciable.

Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Executive Orders And The Development Of Presidential Power, William Hebe

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Congress, The President, And The Power To Declare War: A Requiem For Vietnam, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Publications

Several arguments have been advanced in support of the President's authority to continue use of the Armed Forces in Vietnam without a congressional declaration of war as provided by the Constitution. Congressional ratification of the Southeast Asia Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as enactment of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, are often urged as constituting sufficient congressional authorization for the President's actions. Some have gone further and contended that congressional authorization was not a prerequisite in the Vietnam conflict because the President never exceeded his historically recognized authority to act unilaterally in defense of the …

Comment, John J. Sparkman

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Comment, Birch Bayh

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Comment, Karl E. Mundt

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Toward The Techno-Corporate State - An Essay In American Constitutionalsim, Arthur Selwyn Miller

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Some Doubts Concerning The Proposal To Elect The President By Direct Popular Vote, Albert J. Rosenthal

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis Of The Electoral College, John F. Banzhaf Iii

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

The Release Of Government-Owned Technical Data Under The Freedom Of Information Law: Between Scylla And Charybdis, James A. Dobkin

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

The Power Index And The Electoral College: A Challenge To Banzhaf's Analysis, Robert J. Sickels

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Comment, Neal R. Peirce

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

The President: Office And Powers, By Edward S. Corwin, David Fellman

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Appointing And Removal Powers Of The President Under The Constitution Of The United States, Guy Despard Goff

James Goold Cutler Lecture

No abstract provided.