President/Executive Department Commons^™

Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise In Presidential Leadership, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

In June of 1940, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 in Minersville School District v. Gobitis that the First Amendment posed no barrier to the punishment of two school age Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to pay homage to the American flag. Three years later, the Justices reversed themselves in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. This sudden change has prompted a host of explanations. Some observers have stressed changes in judicial personnel in the intervening years; others have pointed to the wax and wane of general anxieties over the war; still others have emphasized the sympathy-inspiring acts of …

A Wolf In Sheep’S Clothing: The Unilateral Executive And The Separation Of Powers, Thomas J. Cleary

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “The United States Constitution vests all executive powers in a president. This is the unitary executive theory. By virtue of this, many believe the president is vested with the power to act unilaterally. This is the unilateral executive theory. However, the unilateral executive portends more than action. In reality, the unilateral executive theory provides an opportunity to implement a unilateral agenda. Thus, the aim of this paper is to consider executive power, the separation of powers, and the unilateral executive theory to determine if presidential power under the separation of powers doctrine is actually “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” …

The Rhetoric Of Necessity (Or, Sanford Levinson's Pinteresque Conversation), Kevin J. Heller

Georgia Law Review

It may seem odd to begin a discussion of whether the President should have the power to act extraconstitutionally in times of necessity with a quote from The Dwarfs. As I researched this Comment, though, I could not escape the uneasy feeling that I was witnessing what could only be described as a Pinteresque conversation-a conversation in which Professor Levinson and his interlocutors, "while exchanging remarks apparently on a common topic, and using mutually comprehensible vocabulary, are revealed as experiencing a profound failure to communicate with one another."2 Professor Levinson wants to find a workable balance between constitutional restraints and …

Irrational War And Constitutional Design: A Reply To Professors Nzelibe And Yoo, Paul F. Diehl, Tom Ginsburg

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Reply proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the argument of the Nzelibe and Yoo paper. Part II considers their principal-agent analysis in the context of the American political system. Part III elaborates on the "democratic peace" literature, demonstrating that it does not support the conclusions that they draw. Part IV addresses the argument that we are in a new strategic situation, such that old rules ought not apply. Part V concludes.

The President Over The Public: The Plebiscitary Presidency At Center Stage, Lori Cox Han

Political Science Faculty Books and Book Chapters

"In this chapter, I will address the question of the usefulness of the public presidency in the current political environment (that is, can a president’s communication strategy make a difference in terms of what he achieves), as well as the constitutional danger, if any, posed by a president’s attempt at public leadership. Has the public presidency, and its focus on the public aspects of the office, thrown the constitutional balance of power between the three branches out of balance? Does the president really gain political power within the constitutional framework of our government if he is a skilled and effective …

Federal Judicial Selection: The First Decade, Maeva Marcus

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Executive Power Essentialism And Foreign Affairs, Curtis A. Bradley, Martin S. Flaherty

Michigan Law Review

Conflict abroad almost always enhances executive power at home. This expectation has held true at least since the constitutions of antiquity. It holds no less true for modern constitutions, including the Constitution of the United States. Constitutional arguments for executive power likewise escalate with increased perceptions of foreign threat. It is therefore hardly surprising that broad assertions of presidential power have become commonplace after the events of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on international terrorism. One perennial weapon in the executive arsenal is the so-called "Vesting Clause" of Article II of the Constitution. This clause, which provides that …

To Finish The Work We Are In: Abraham Lincoln's Speeches, From Lawyer's Briefs To Moral Manifesto, Kenneth Anderson

Book Reviews

This essay from the Times Literary Supplement (23 May 2003) reviews books on Lincoln's speeches and writings, particularly the Second Inaugural Address. It examines the transition from the First Inaugural Address to the Second Inaugural Address, finally focusing on how Lincoln seeks to steer between moral relativism about the war - each side does as it sees right - and moral absolutism.

Assassination, The War On Terrorism, And The Constitution, Rodney A. Smolla

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Proposal For A New Executive Order On Assassination, Jeffrey F. Addicott

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Falling Out Of Love With America: The Clinton Impeachment And The Madisonian Constitution, Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

First, were the Nixon and Clinton affairs truly as different as my memory makes them? Were the villains of Watergate as villainous and the heroes as heroic as I remember them? Were nearly all the players on both sides of l'affaire Lewinsky as shallow and fatuous as they seemed? Or to put the question in broader historical context, was the impeachment of Bill Clinton truly distinct, not only from Watergate, but from all of the other (fortunately few) occasions on which a president was seriously threatened with removal from office? Second, if the Clinton impeachment really was as bizarre, unprecedented, …

Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A Three-Branch Problem, William K. Kelley

Journal Articles

This article criticizes the cardinal rule of statutory construction known as the avoidance canon - that statutes must be interpreted to avoid raising serious constitutional questions - as failing to respect the proper constitutional roles of both Congress and the Executive. It argues that the avoidance canon in practice cannot be grounded in legislative supremacy, which is the common justification for it offered by the Supreme Court, because it assumes without foundation that Congress would always prefer not to come close to the constitutional line in enacting statutes. Instead, the avoidance canon creates pressure for courts to adopt statutory meanings …

Everything I Need To Know About Presidents I Learned From Dr. Seuss, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Oaths are out of fashion these days. This is an era in which it is widely considered unreasonable to expect the President of the United States to obey basic principles of law and justice, much less to honor something as abstract as an oath. Perjury the violation of a legally binding oath-is publicly defended as proof of the offender's humanity rather than his criminality. And one should not even mention in polite company something as gauche as honoring an oath of marriage. Those pesky vows of marital fidelity were, after all, just words.

High Crimes And Misdemeanors: Defining The Constitutional Limits On Presidential Impeachment, Frank O. Bowman Iii, Stephen L. Sepinuck

Faculty Publications

This Article had its genesis in a statement by the authors submitted to the House Judiciary Committee during its proceedings regarding the impeachment of President Clinton. This final much expanded version appears after the conclusion of the Clinton impeachment proceedings in the Senate, and it is certainly informed by the course those proceedings took. Strictly speaking, however, this is not an article “about” the Clinton impeachment. Although this Article draws some conclusions from the treatment by the House and Senate of the fundamental allegations against President Clinton, it does not address in detail the specific facts underlying those allegations. The …

The Constitution, The White House, And The Military Hiv Ban: A New Threshold For Presidential Non-Defense Of Statutes, Chrysanthe Gussis

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The President's constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" implies that the President is entrusted with the responsibility to defend those laws against court challenges. On occasion, however, Presidents faced with legislation that they deem unconstitutional have declined to defend that legislation against legal challenges. On February 10, 1996, President Clinton declined to defend a provision included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that required discharge from the military of all HIV-positive servicemembers because he believed that the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Note explores whether …

Pragmatism And Parity In Appointments, Yxta Maya Murray

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

This review uses Carter's two foci as a springboard for analyzing the Article II, Section II appointment process. First, Carter's discussion of indecency in modern appointments may be a valuable theoretical insight into the process instead of a mere sociological observation. "Indecency" in appointments, or what is known as "borking" in Carter parlance, may also be a symptom of race and gender bias in the administration of the Article II, Section II power. To ameliorate the effects of this bias, I suggest the incorporation of pragmatism (a thread of philosophical and legal thought) and parity concepts into the existing appointments …

Tragic Irony Of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty In Slavery And In Freedom, The Federalism In The 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, Robert J. Kaczorowski

Faculty Scholarship

A plurality on the Supreme Court seeks to establish a state-sovereignty based theory of federalism that imposes sharp limitations on Congress's legislative powers. Using history as authority, they admonish a return to the constitutional "first principles" of the Founders. These "first principles," in their view, attribute all governmental authority to "the consent of the people of each individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." Because the people of each state are the source of all governmental power, they maintain, "where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power-that is, …

When Is The Senate In Recess For Purposes Of The Recess Appointment Clause?, Michael A. Carrier

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that courts should interpret the Constitution to allow the President to make recess appointments only during intersession recesses of the Senate. Part I chronicles the history of presidential recess appointments. This Part highlights the increasing frequency of, and questionable need for, intrasession recess appointments in the past twenty-five years. Part II examines the text of the Recess Appointments Clause and the intentions of the Framers regarding the scope of the clause and the appointment power in general. This Part argues that the text and the Framers' intentions indicate that the President's power to make recess appointments should …

Article Ii Revisionism, Cass R. Sunstein

Michigan Law Review

One of the most striking developments of the last decade has been the new use of Article II in public law adjudication. Article II is a prominent feature not only of cases involving the creation of federal institutions that are independent of the President, but also of new disputes involving reviewability, scope of review, and standing.

Professor Krent and Mr. Shenkman have performed a valuable service in spelling out the argument that Article II, rather than Article III, justifies constitutional limits on legislative grants of standing. Indeed, on several important matters, we are very much in agreement. In this brief …

Accountability To The Law, Walter F. Mondale

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Publish And Perish: Congress's Effort To Snip Snepp (Before And Afsa), Michael J. Glennon

Michigan Journal of International Law

Over three million present and former federal employees, of the Executive as well as the Congress, are parties to so-called "pre-publication review agreements," which require that they submit any writings on topics related to their employment for Executive review prior to publication. In Section 630 of the Omnibus Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, Congress attempted to restrict the use of funds to implement or enforce certain of those agreements. On May 27, 1988, however, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in American Foreign Service Association v. Garfinkel ("AFSA "), struck that section down, …

What The Constitution Means By Executive Power, Charles J. Cooper, Orrin Hatch, Eugene V. Rowstow, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The President’S Powers As Commander-In-Chief Versus Congress’ War Power And Appropriations Power, Charles Bennett, Arthur B. Culvahouse Jr., Geoffrey P. Miller, William Bradford Reynolds, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Some Modest Proposals On The Vice-Presidency, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

There are many good things in the Constitution, but the vice-presidency isn't one of them. In Part I of this essay, I will argue that there are three basic problems with the vice-presidency: the method of nomination, the method of election, and the office itself. That just about covers the waterfront.' If we had to do it all over again, we almost certainly would not" create the system we currently have. We cannot undo history, but we do have a very strong incentive to develop a better system of succession to the presidency. Whom we choose as vice-president is a …

Why The Reagan Administration Resists Radical Transformation Of The Constitution, Gary C. Leedes

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Constitution, The Presidency, And The Rule Of Law, L. Peter Schultz

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

A Republic, If You Can Keep It, Daniel N. Hoffman

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power by Edward Keynes and The War-Making Powers of the President: Constitutional and International Law Aspects by Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr.

The Consultation Clause Of The 1973 War Powers Resolution, Laurence D. Pierce

Antioch Law Journal

In 1973, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution.' The purpose of the Resolution was "to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances .... 2 Part I of this comment examines the legislative evolution of the consultation clause to ascertain the intent of those congressional members who drafted and ratified the War Powers Resolution. Part II …

Separation Of Powers: Congrssional Riders And The Veto Power, Richard A. Riggs

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

It has been suggested that in order to avoid this potential crisis statutory authority to veto nongermane riders be granted to the President. One author has contended that no such statute is needed, that the President presently has such power under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. On the other hand, bills have been introduced in both houses of Congress which might have specifically denied that power to the President. This article examines whether there is any constitutional ground on which the President could take the unprecedented action of separately vetoing congressional riders.

The Presidential Veto Power: A Shallow Pocket, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Problems created by the uncertain scope of the President's pocket-veto power do not often arise, but neither are they a matter of purely academic interest. Indeed, two Senators who have questioned President Nixon's use of the pocket-veto power base their challenge on the ambiguous language of the pocket-veto provision. They argue that the pocket-veto provision was intended to apply only in circumstances involving a final adjournment at the end of a term or a session of Congress and was not intended to apply to brief adjournments-such as the 1970 Christmas recess-occurring within a session of Congress. Senator Kennedy contends that …