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Full-Text Articles in President/Executive Department

Power Games, Aneil Kovvali Jan 2014

Power Games, Aneil Kovvali

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

According to the traditional account, Congress has the "necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments" by the president. As commentators have recognized, however, the traditional account does not match reality. Individuals in Washington, D.C., are more interested in fighting for their political party than for their branch of government, and the essentially reactive legislative branch lacks the capacity to respond to a rapidly changing policy environment. But the traditional account suffers from a more basic flaw. The president can decide whether or not to cooperate with Congress on a situation-by-situation basis. By contrast, Congress's tools for disciplining the …


Constitutional Conflict And Congressional Oversight, Andrew Mccanse Wright Jan 2014

Constitutional Conflict And Congressional Oversight, Andrew Mccanse Wright

Marquette Law Review

In matters of oversight, Congress and the President have fundamentally incompatible views of their institutional roles within the constitutional structure. This Article offers an explanation of divergent branch behavior and legal doctrine. Congress, much like a party to litigation, views itself as having fixed substantive rights to obtain desired information from the Executive and private parties. In contrast, the Executive views itself like a party to a business transaction, in which congressional oversight requests are the opening salvo in an iterative negotiation process to resolve competing interests between co-equal branches. In general, legislators want to litigate and executive officers want …


The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff Jan 2014

The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

Although the framers of the Australian Constitution adopted many features of the United States Constitution, they rejected the separation of legislative and executive power in favour of responsible government in a parliamentary system like that of the United Kingdom. In doing so, Australians depended on existing conventions about the nature of responsible government instead of specification of its attributes in constitutional text. The United States Constitution contains detailed provisions about separation of powers, but unwritten conventions have produced some central features of American government. This article reviews conventions developed by Congress that constrain Presidents in the domestic sphere with regard …


Contemporary Practice Of The United States Relating To International Law, April 2014, Kristina Daugirdas, Julian Davis Mortenson Jan 2014

Contemporary Practice Of The United States Relating To International Law, April 2014, Kristina Daugirdas, Julian Davis Mortenson

Articles

• Another Mexican National Executed in Texas in Defiance of Avena Decision • Manhattan Arrest of Indian Consular Official Sparks Public Dispute Between the United States and India • United States Questions Claims Based on China’s “Nine-Dash Line” in the South China Sea • United States Takes Steps to Combat Illegal Trade in Wildlife • U.S. Compromises Facilitate Agreement on World Trade Organization’s Bali Package; Question Remains Whether Bali Package Requires Congressional Approval • Destruction of Syrian Chemical Arms Delayed • Iran Nuclear Agreement Is Implemented Notwithstanding Expressions of Distrust by Iran and the U.S. Congress


Legislative Diplomacy, Ryan M. Scoville Dec 2013

Legislative Diplomacy, Ryan M. Scoville

Michigan Law Review

A traditional view in legal scholarship holds that the U.S. Constitution assigns the president exclusive power to carry on official diplomatic communications with foreign governments. But in fact, Congress and its members routinely engage in communications of their own. Congress, for example, receives heads of state and maintains official contacts with foreign parliaments. And individual members of the House and Senate frequently travel overseas on congressional delegations (“CODELs”) to confer with foreign leaders, investigate problems that arise, promote the interests of the United States and constituents, and even represent the president. Moreover, many of these activities have occurred ever since …


The Powers Of Congress And The President On Matters That Affect U.S. Foreign Affairs, Malvina Halberstam Apr 2013

The Powers Of Congress And The President On Matters That Affect U.S. Foreign Affairs, Malvina Halberstam

Articles

No abstract provided.


The Confrontation Of The Legislative And Executive Branches: An Examination Of The Constitutional Balance Of Powers And The Role Of The Attorney General, Robert E. Palmer Jan 2013

The Confrontation Of The Legislative And Executive Branches: An Examination Of The Constitutional Balance Of Powers And The Role Of The Attorney General, Robert E. Palmer

Pepperdine Law Review

The United States Constitution created an internally dependent tripartite governing scheme which relied upon a carefully drafted system of checks and balances as a means of self-regulation. Recent years have seen increased conflicts between the separate branches, the most recent of which is the occasion for this article. The article traces the rise and fall of the power exercised by the various branches and then focuses on the recent confrontation between Congress and the executive branch concerning the actions of the Environmental Protection Agency and the subsequent resignation of Anne McGill Burford. Of particular interest to this inquiry is the …


Toward Comprehensive Reform Of America's Emergency Law Regime, Patrick A. Thronson Jan 2013

Toward Comprehensive Reform Of America's Emergency Law Regime, Patrick A. Thronson

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Unbenownst to most Americans, the United States is presently under thirty presidentially declared states of emergency. They confer vast powers on the Executive Branch, including the ability to financially incapacitate any person or organization in the United States, seize control of the nation's communications infrastructure, mobilize military forces, expand the permissible size of the military without congressional authorization, and extend tours of duty without consent from service personnel. Declared states of emergency may also activate Presidential Emergency Action Documents and other continuity-of-government procedures, which confer powers on the President-such as the unilateral suspension of habeas corpus-that appear fundamentally opposed to …


Book Review Of Arnold H. Leibowitz, An Historical-Legal Analysis Of The Impeachments Of Presidents Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, And William Clinton: Why The Process Went Wrong, Jeffrey B. Morris Jan 2013

Book Review Of Arnold H. Leibowitz, An Historical-Legal Analysis Of The Impeachments Of Presidents Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, And William Clinton: Why The Process Went Wrong, Jeffrey B. Morris

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Congress Underestimated: The Case Of The World Bank, Kristina Daugirdas Jan 2013

Congress Underestimated: The Case Of The World Bank, Kristina Daugirdas

Articles

This article challenges the oft-repeated claim that international organizations undermine democracy by marginalizing national legislatures. Over the past forty years, Congress has established itself as a key player in setting U.S. policy toward the World Bank. Congress has done far more than restrain executive branch action with which it disagrees; it has affirmatively shaped the United States’ day-to-day participation in this key international organization and successfully defended its constitutional authority to do so.


Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz Jan 2013

Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The proposition that treaties can increase the power of Congress is inconsistent with the text of the Treaty Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. It is inconsistent with the fundamental structural principle that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and limited."S It implies, insidiously, that that the President and the Senate can increase their own power by treaty. And it implies, bizarrely, that the President alone--or a foreign government alone--can decrease Congress's power and render federal statutes unconstitutional. Finally, it creates a doubly perverse incentive: an incentive to enter into foreign entanglements simply to increase …


Stochastic Constraint, Neal K. Katyal Jan 2013

Stochastic Constraint, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay reviews Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11 by Jack Goldsmith (2012).

With The Terror Presidency, Professor Jack Goldsmith wrote, hands down, the very best analysis of the national security issues surrounding President George W. Bush's tenure. In Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11, Goldsmith returns to the same set of problems, but adopts a different tack. He argues that the modern wartime Executive is constrained in new ways beyond the traditional system of checks and balances, and that these new constraints combine to create an effective system that checks executive power. Though …


Agenda: The Future Of Natural Resources Policy, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center Dec 2012

Agenda: The Future Of Natural Resources Policy, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

The Future of Natural Resources Policy (December 6)

This forum will provide a post-election perspective on some of the challenges and opportunities that natural resources, public lands, and energy policymakers in Washington are likely to face in the next four years. An expert panel will discuss the dynamics in the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, and Congress, and how their evolving policies are likely to affect Colorado in the coming years.

Moderator: Dean Phil Weiser, University of Colorado Law School

Panelists:

Jay Jensen, Associate Director for Land & Water Ecosystems, White House Council on Environmental Quality

Scott Miller, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Colorado Law …


The Line-Item Veto: The Best Response When Congress Passes One Spending “Bill” A Year, L. Gordon Crovitz Nov 2012

The Line-Item Veto: The Best Response When Congress Passes One Spending “Bill” A Year, L. Gordon Crovitz

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Policy Against Federal Funding For Abortions Extends Into The Realm Of Free Speech After Rust V. Sullivan, Loye M. Barton Nov 2012

The Policy Against Federal Funding For Abortions Extends Into The Realm Of Free Speech After Rust V. Sullivan, Loye M. Barton

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.


Rediscovering A Principled Commerce Power , Douglas W. Kmiec Oct 2012

Rediscovering A Principled Commerce Power , Douglas W. Kmiec

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.


Filling The Judicial Vacancies In A Presidential Election Year, Carl Tobias May 2012

Filling The Judicial Vacancies In A Presidential Election Year, Carl Tobias

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.


Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey Feb 2012

Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey

Michigan Law Review

A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy …


Can The President And Congress Establish A Legislative Veto Mechanism For Jointly Drawing Down A Long And Controversial War?, Charles Tiefer Jan 2012

Can The President And Congress Establish A Legislative Veto Mechanism For Jointly Drawing Down A Long And Controversial War?, Charles Tiefer

All Faculty Scholarship

In the simplest case: Congress declares war, and does not intrude on the President's solo decision about when the troops come home. However, in our time, long wars, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, occur with great tension between the two elected branches of government over the pace of a drawdown. Sometimes it may be a hawkish Congress that disagrees with a President reluctant to continue the war at full troop levels. To find a joint way to draw down the American troops in the war zone, they may seek congressional mechanisms to resolve their differences with interactive processes. Then, …


Midnight Rulemaking And Congress, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2012

Midnight Rulemaking And Congress, Nina A. Mendelson

Book Chapters

This chapter focuses on Congress, our most democratic federal institution. Congress is generally responsible for defining the authorities possessed by the administrative state, and congressional oversight is key to holding agencies accountable for their actions. Midnight rulemaking also has the potential to increase congressional engagement. Two commentators have recently argued that relative inattention from Congress can facilitate midnight rulemaking, because Congress may meet less frequently during the lame duck period and there is no “repeat player” relationship between the outgoing president and the Congress. To the contrary, however, Congress retains considerable formal power to respond to and override presidential decisions, …


Assessing The Impeachment Of President Bill Clinton From A Post 9/11 Perspective, Susan Low Bloch Jan 2012

Assessing The Impeachment Of President Bill Clinton From A Post 9/11 Perspective, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The impeachment of President Clinton was more a circus than a serious effort to remove the President of the United States. The reason is simple: Few people--in the Congress or the country--wanted to remove him or believed the impeachment effort would actually result in his removal. Instead, it was a partisan political effort to embarrass Clinton and "send a message" of disapproval. Congress was attaching a "scarlet letter." But this was an indulgence that posed considerable danger that few in Congress considered. In particular, few tried to assess the potential impact this use of the process would have on the …


Congress In Court, Amanda Frost Jan 2012

Congress In Court, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Congress rarely participates in litigation about the meaning of federal law. By contrast, the executive branch joins in federal litigation on a regular basis as either a party or amicus curiae. Congress simply assumes that the president’s lawyers adequately represent its interests save in those rare instances when the two branches have a direct conflict. This Article questions that assumption.

The federal judiciary’s approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation diminishes Congress’s influence, often to the benefit of the executive branch. The rise of textualism, the canon of constitutional avoidance, the reliance on Chevron deference, and the courts’ reluctance to second-guess …


Limited War And The Constitution: Iraq And The Crisis Of Presidential Legality, Bruce Ackerman, Oona Hathaway Jan 2011

Limited War And The Constitution: Iraq And The Crisis Of Presidential Legality, Bruce Ackerman, Oona Hathaway

Michigan Law Review

We live in an age of limited war. Yet the legal structure for authorizing and overseeing war has failed to address this modern reality. Nowhere is this failure more clear than in the recent U.S. conflict in Iraq. Congress self-consciously restricted the war's aims to narrow purposes-expressly authorizing a limited war. But the Bush Administration evaded these constitutional limits and transformed a well-defined and limited war into an open-ended conflict operating beyond constitutional boundaries. President Obama has thus far failed to repudiate these acts of presidential unilateralism. If he continues on this course, he will consolidate the precedents set by …


Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, And Torrents Of E-Mail, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2011

Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, And Torrents Of E-Mail, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

This Foreword is meant as an initial foray into the question of what agencies should do with mass public comments, particularly on broad questions of policy. Part I discusses the extent to which congressional control, presidential control, and agency procedures themselves can ensure that agency decisions are democratically responsive. In view of shortcomings in both congressional and presidential control, I underscore the need to focus closely on rulemaking procedures as a source of democratic responsiveness. The possibility that agencies may be systematically discounting certain public submissions raises difficulties, and I present some examples. Part II makes a preliminary case that …


Another Word On The President's Statutory Authority Over Agency Action, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2011

Another Word On The President's Statutory Authority Over Agency Action, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

In this short symposium contribution, I attempt first to add some further evidence on the interpretive question. That evidence weighs strongly, in my view, in favor of Kagan's conclusion that the terminology does not communicate any particular congressional intent regarding presidential directive authority. Assessed in context, the "whole code" textual analysis presented by Stack does not justify the conclusion that Congress, by delegating to an executive branch official, meant to limit presidential control. Independent agencies excluded, interpreting the terms of simple and presidential delegations to speak to directive authority fails, in general, to make sense of the various statutes. Absent …


The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Jr. Dec 2010

The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

Journal Articles

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …


Once More Unto The Breach: American War Power And A Second Legislative Attempt To Ensure Congressional Input, Jonathan T. Menitove May 2010

Once More Unto The Breach: American War Power And A Second Legislative Attempt To Ensure Congressional Input, Jonathan T. Menitove

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Once again embroiled in an unpopular overseas armed conflict, the United States faces difficult questions concerning the constitutional use of military force. Records from the Constitutional Convention suggest the Framers intended to lodge America's power to go to war with the Congress. While American presidents' early use of military force displays deference to the legislature, more recent military actions illustrate the executive's dominance in making war. Notwithstanding a few early court decisions in Congress 's favor, the judiciary has been unhelpful in restoring the constitutional Framers' vision for the administration of the war power Congress, therefore, has been forced to …


Slides: The Promise And Peril Of Oil Shale: Federal Law And Policy, David Bernhardt Feb 2010

Slides: The Promise And Peril Of Oil Shale: Federal Law And Policy, David Bernhardt

The Promise and Peril of Oil Shale Development (February 5)

Presenter: David Bernhardt, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Denver, CO

13 slides


Imagining A More Humane Immigration Policy In The Age Of Obama: The Use Of Plenary Power To Halt The State Balkanization Of Immigration Regulation, Kristina M. Campbell Jan 2010

Imagining A More Humane Immigration Policy In The Age Of Obama: The Use Of Plenary Power To Halt The State Balkanization Of Immigration Regulation, Kristina M. Campbell

Journal Articles

The first decade of the twenty-first century has been grim for immigrants to the United States—both legal and undocumented—and the lawyers and advocates who work on their behalf. Following the failure of comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level, states and municipalities have seen fit to take matters into their own hands and pass a patchwork of local ordinances, statutes, and ballot initiatives ostensibly designed to do what the federal government had failed to do—regulate the flow of immigration into their cities and towns. As the economy continues to spiral downward into what may very well be the next Great …


Introduction: The Adequacy Of The Presidential Succession System In The 21st Century: Filling The Gaps And Clarifying The Ambiguities In Constitutional And Extraconstitutional Arrangements, William Michael Treanor Jan 2010

Introduction: The Adequacy Of The Presidential Succession System In The 21st Century: Filling The Gaps And Clarifying The Ambiguities In Constitutional And Extraconstitutional Arrangements, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Inevitably, the events of the day dominate the political agenda. The issues of presidential succession have been attended to in our national history only sporadically because, at most times, the question of who succeeds the President in cases of death, resignation, or incapacity does not have immediate relevance: the President is in good health, the presumption is he will serve out the term of his office for which he was elected, and political leaders ignore succession issues as if they were of only theoretical interest. And yet, again and again, succession questions have become of the most immediate consequence in …