President/Executive Department Commons^™

Irrational War And Constitutional Design: A Reply To Professors Nzelibe And Yoo, Paul F. Diehl, Tom Ginsburg

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Reply proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the argument of the Nzelibe and Yoo paper. Part II considers their principal-agent analysis in the context of the American political system. Part III elaborates on the "democratic peace" literature, demonstrating that it does not support the conclusions that they draw. Part IV addresses the argument that we are in a new strategic situation, such that old rules ought not apply. Part V concludes.

The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the pathologies of the SEC and explores the relation between those pathologies and the SEC's status as an independent agency. Part II then outlines an alternative regulatory structure primarily situated within the executive branch. I also argue that such a relocation of authority would enhance regulatory effectiveness while simultaneously reducing the cost of excessive regulation. The Article concludes with some thoughts about the viability of my proposal.

The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

As one grows older, birthdays gradually shift from being celebratory events to more reflective occasions. One's 40th birthday is commemorated rather differently from one's 2lst, which is, in turn, celebrated quite differently from one's first. After a certain point, the individual birthdays become less important and it is the milestone years to whch we pay particular attention. Sadly for entities like the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is only the milestone years (the ones ending in five or zero, for some reason), that draw any attention at all. No one held a conference to celebrate the SEC's 67th anniversary. Clearly …

Foreign Affairs: Presidential Initiative And Congressional Control, David P. Currie

Michigan Law Review

Jefferson Powell is one of our foremost scholars of constitutional history. He is particularly adept at bringing extrajudicial sources to bear on constitutional issues. Owing perhaps in part to his extensive service in the Department of Justice, he has a special facility for the use of executive materials; he is surely our leading academic expert on executive interpretation of the Constitution. In his latest book Professor Powell applies his enviable skills to the recurring, fundamental, and controversial question of the division of authority between the President and Congress in the realm of foreign affairs. As is always the case when …

Congress And The Legislative Web Of Trust, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

Trust in the legislative arena does not flow from altruism. It rests on two related foundations: personal interactions and rational incentives. Legislators must engage with each other over at least a two-year term and usually far longer. Their encounters reflect the dynamic of continuing players rather than one-time participants. Thus, failure to carry out commitments chills the possibility of future advantageous agreements with the aggrieved party. Moreover, the process of shared experience and personal interaction can create friendships that make the foundation for trust personal as well as professional. Further, each House of Congress has many of the characteristics of …

Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A Three-Branch Problem, William K. Kelley

Journal Articles

This article criticizes the cardinal rule of statutory construction known as the avoidance canon - that statutes must be interpreted to avoid raising serious constitutional questions - as failing to respect the proper constitutional roles of both Congress and the Executive. It argues that the avoidance canon in practice cannot be grounded in legislative supremacy, which is the common justification for it offered by the Supreme Court, because it assumes without foundation that Congress would always prefer not to come close to the constitutional line in enacting statutes. Instead, the avoidance canon creates pressure for courts to adopt statutory meanings …

Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments Process And The Wages Of Judicial Supremacy, John C. Yoo

Michigan Law Review

William H. Rehnquist is not going to be Chief Justice forever - much to the chagrin of Republicans, no doubt. In the last century, Supreme Court Justices have retired, on average, at the age of seventy-one after approximately fourteen years on the bench. By the end of the term of the President we elect this November, Chief Justice Rehnquist will have served on the Supreme Court for thirty-two years and reached the age of eighty. The law of averages suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist is likely to retire in the next presidential term. In addition to replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist, …

How Does Congress Define 'Perjury'?, Robert Blecker

Other Publications

No abstract provided.

Executive-Branch Rulemaking And Dispute Settlement In The World Trade Organization: A Proposal To Increase Public Participation, Aubry D. Smith

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that, because the Executive Branch increasingly will be promulgating domestic regulatory rules intended to comply with the rules of the world-trading system, it is necessary to increase formal oversight of the Executive Branch's role in that context. Part I argues that the United States' participation in the WTO implies a substantial increase in the impact of foreign policy on domestic policy. Part II points out a loophole in Congress's attempt to compensate for this increase by installing various devices to ensure political oversight of the Executive: the Executive Branch is subject, under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act …

Pragmatism And Parity In Appointments, Yxta Maya Murray

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

This review uses Carter's two foci as a springboard for analyzing the Article II, Section II appointment process. First, Carter's discussion of indecency in modern appointments may be a valuable theoretical insight into the process instead of a mere sociological observation. "Indecency" in appointments, or what is known as "borking" in Carter parlance, may also be a symptom of race and gender bias in the administration of the Article II, Section II power. To ameliorate the effects of this bias, I suggest the incorporation of pragmatism (a thread of philosophical and legal thought) and parity concepts into the existing appointments …

Tragic Irony Of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty In Slavery And In Freedom, The Federalism In The 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, Robert J. Kaczorowski

Faculty Scholarship

A plurality on the Supreme Court seeks to establish a state-sovereignty based theory of federalism that imposes sharp limitations on Congress's legislative powers. Using history as authority, they admonish a return to the constitutional "first principles" of the Founders. These "first principles," in their view, attribute all governmental authority to "the consent of the people of each individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." Because the people of each state are the source of all governmental power, they maintain, "where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power-that is, …

Introduction, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

As citizens, we ought to ensure that our criticisms of Congress are constructive, lest we damage ourselves. In that spirit, the American Bar Association's Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice created a special Congressional Process Committee to study selected aspects of congressional procedures and to recommend appropriate reforms. The Committee, which I chair, is composed of administrative lawyers who are experienced in legislative practice, or who have worked in Congress. We decided to address selected aspects of congressional structure and procedure for which we believe administrative lawyers possess relevant expertise.

The articles that form this Symposium grew out of …

International Trade Relations And The Separation Of Powers Under The United States Constitution, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

That The Laws Shall Bind Equally On All: Congressional And Executive Roles In Applying Laws To Congress, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Review By The Executive In Foreign Affairs And War Powers: A Consequence Of Rational Choice In The Separation Of Powers, John O. Mcginnis

Articles

No abstract provided.

Can Buckley Clear Customs?, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Using The Constitution: Separation Of Powers And Damages For Constitutional Violations, James A. Thomson

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Presidential Lawmaking Powers: Vetoes, Line Item Vetoes, Signing Statements, Executive Orders, And Delegations Of Rulemaking Authority, David Schoenbrod

Articles & Chapters

No abstract provided.

Publish And Perish: Congress's Effort To Snip Snepp (Before And Afsa), Michael J. Glennon

Michigan Journal of International Law

Over three million present and former federal employees, of the Executive as well as the Congress, are parties to so-called "pre-publication review agreements," which require that they submit any writings on topics related to their employment for Executive review prior to publication. In Section 630 of the Omnibus Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, Congress attempted to restrict the use of funds to implement or enforce certain of those agreements. On May 27, 1988, however, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in American Foreign Service Association v. Garfinkel ("AFSA "), struck that section down, …

Political Questions In International Trade: Judicial Review Of Section 301?, Erwin P. Eichmann, Gary N. Horlick

Michigan Journal of International Law

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ("Section 301") has become an increasingly potent and widely-used tool in the U.S. arsenal of trade policy measures. The past few years have seen a proliferation of Section 301 cases, affecting the trade of goods and services in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Even so, in the debate over the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("Omnibus Trade Act"), Congress expressed impatience with the President's discretion in not undertaking more Section 301 retaliations. But while much attention has focused on the politics and policy aspects of Section 301, little has been …

Agenda: Water Quality Control: Integrating Beneficial Use And Environmental Protection, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Water Quality Control: Integrating Beneficial Use and Environmental Protection (Summer Conference, June 1-3)

Conference organizers and/or faculty included University of Colorado School of Law professors David H. Getches, Lawrence J. MacDonnell and Charles F. Wilkinson.

Protecting water quality is essential to preserve the many beneficial uses of western water resources. This conference addresses the dominant federal requirements in the Clean Water Act, including the important major revisions enacted by Congress in 1987, with special attention to western problems regarding nonpoint source pollution. Developments in groundwater quality regulation are considered, as are selected issues concerning the implications of state and federal water quality regulation for the traditional exercise of water rights.

Congressional Standing To Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?, R. Lawrence Dessem

Faculty Publications

The article is divided into three major sections. Section I traces the development of a separate doctrine of “congressional standing.” It examines the doctrine's development from the Supreme Court's initial consideration of legislative standing through the current opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Section II then analyzes three possible theories of congressional injury and standing. Derivative, representative, and third-party standing theories are all rejected as a basis for congressional standing. While rejecting the suggestion that congressmen possess a personal interest in “their” votes sufficient to constitute the “distinct and palpable injury” required …

The Legislative Veto, The Constitution, And The Courts, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

Separation Of Political Powers: Boundaries Or Balance, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most significant structural elements of the United States Constitution divides the political power of the government between two discrete political institutions, the Congress and the President, in order to prevent concentration of the full power of the national government in one place. This governmental structure has posed a continuing dilemma of how to allow for the shared decisionmaking necessary to effective government while maintaining the independence of each political branch. As the United States Congress reaches its two hundredth anniversary, questions concerning the relationship between Congress and the President, for a substantial time thought by legal scholars …

Federal Lands Leasing Policy In The Second Reagan Administration, Robert F. Burford

Public Lands Mineral Leasing: Issues and Directions (Summer Conference, June 10-11)

11 pages.

The Making Of International Agreements: Congress Confronts The Executive, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive by Loch K. Johnson

Congress, The Executive Branch, And Special Interests: The American Response To The Arab Boycott Of Israel, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Congress, The Executive Branch, and Special Interests: The American Response to the Arab Boycott of Israel by Kennan L. Teslik

The Forest Service: A Call For A Return To First Principles, Charles F. Wilkinson

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Consultation Clause Of The 1973 War Powers Resolution, Laurence D. Pierce

Antioch Law Journal

In 1973, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution.' The purpose of the Resolution was "to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances .... 2 Part I of this comment examines the legislative evolution of the consultation clause to ascertain the intent of those congressional members who drafted and ratified the War Powers Resolution. Part II …

The Status Of Armed Forces Abroad, Robert C. Grabb

International Law Studies

No abstract provided.